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CONTAINMENT IN ASIA RECONSIDERED

By DAVID P. MOZINGO*

SINCE the Korean War, United States policies in Asia have gradually developed along the lines of the "containment" doctrine so successfully applied in Europe after 1947. Washington has increasingly seen the problem of Chinese power in Asia in much the same light as that posed by Soviet power in Europe and has behaved as if both threats could be contained by basically the same kinds of responses. In both Asia and Europe, containment measures have reflected a perceived need for complementary interaction between military policies and aid programs in order to prevent aggression by Communist powers and to foster the internal stability of nations in the area. Although difficulties have arisen in seeking the best balance of these components of the containment policy in Europe, most of the essential American objectives in the West have been attained.

For some time, however, it has been apparent, particularly in Southeast Asia, that the application of containment measures in the Far East has not yielded results comparable to those achieved in Europe. While it is widely recognized that this disparity in results reflects special Asian problems not encountered in Europe, there has been a general reluctance to question whether the containment philosophy really addresses the basic sources of the instability in Asia that alarms the United States. It is time to analyze the relative failure of the containment doctrine in Asia by considering both the obvious special difficulties confronting the United States there and the inherent differences between the situation in Asia and that in Europe.

Had the sense of historical perspective exerted a more prominent influence on Asian policy formulation, it is likely that containment's central objective of establishing a hard political and military line between a U.S. and a Chinese sphere of influence would have seemed infeasible from the beginning. In Western Europe, the basis for effective U.S. containment measures was soundly conceived because these measures were applied in defense of communities long-established within the framework of a nation-state system. Moreover, special ties bound the United States to Great Britain and France. By applying the containment doctrine in the West, the United States, for the third time

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in this century, reaffirmed the strategic principle that had formerly governed Britain's policy toward Europe: No single continental power was to be permitted to conquer or dominate the European nation-state system. Further, the U.S. measures to contain Russia in Europe were strengthened by the historic determination of the Western democracies to preserve their established order and values.

In Asia, the containment doctrine has been applied to an area where a nation-state system is only just beginning to emerge amid unpredictable upheavals of a kind that characterized Europe three centuries earlier. It is only since 1949 that the restoration of a strong, unified China, the withdrawal of the Western colonial powers, and the formation of new independent countries have created the beginnings of a modern nation-state system in Asia.

The question in Asia is not how a traditionally functioning system can be rehabilitated but how a very new system will evolve and mature. The kinds of American technical and economic power that helped to restore the historic vitality of the European system would seem to have, at best, only partial relevance to the Asian situation. It may be doubted whether the kinds of tools and power available to the United States can induce stability in an environment in which most countries are experiencing a profound and rapid transformation of their societies, values, and attitudes. Much of the American experience and structure of values has already shown itself to be not only inapplicable but also not even wanted. The results of the competition between the United States, Russia, and China in Asia thus far seem to indicate that attempts by external powers to shape the emerging Asian system are unlikely to succeed. None of these powers has been able, whether by appeals to ideology or common national interests or by large-scale economic and military aid, to exert enough influence to draw the more important Asian powers into close alignment. In the absence of firm ties and mutual interests of the kind that have bound the United States to Western Europe (and these did not emerge overnight), a policy of containment in Asia must rest on unstable foundations.

The Effect of National Rivalries on a Containment Strategy in Asia

The Soviet threat to Europe has been regarded primarily as a military one. Even when the Western part of that continent was most weakened, immediately after World War II, Communist parties were unable to take power in any country by popular consent. Western Europe's economic recovery was rapid. National conflicts were not so severe as to

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prevent the formation of an alliance. Until very recent times, there was broad agreement among the Western powers about the nature of the Soviet threat and how to meet it. Consequently, it was possible to lay a firm political foundation for the NATO structure.

The political conditions that were indispensable to the creation of security arrangements in Europe are absent in Asia, where very few powers see their security interests in the same way. Except for Taiwan, all of the Asian powers have an enemy or enemies whom their leaders apparently regard as more threatening than China. Japan, for example, still regards Russia as at least as great a threat to her security as China. Moreover, the common threat to South Korea and Japan that developed as a result of the Korean War has yet to result in a real rapprochement between these two countries; but without such an understanding, no "little NATO" in Northeast Asia can be built. For these and other historical, economic, and psychological reasons it is doubtful that any anti-China security arrangement can win Japan's enthusiastic participation. In fact, only the United States and South Korea have indicated interest in an alignment with Taiwan against Peking.

In Southeast Asia, the menace to Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam comes in the first instance not from China but from a very independent and highly nationalistic regime in Hanoi. North Vietnamese expansion into Southeast Asia also alarms Cambodia, but not as much as her fear of Thai and South Vietnamese aspirations to recover lost territories at Phnom Penh's expense. Prince Sihanouk believes these two historic enemies have aligned themselves with the United States, not so much to contain China or North Vietnam as to secure the arms and tacit backing of the United States for the pursuit of their irredentist claims on Cambodia—hence, his close ties with Peking and deference to Hanoi. Similar fears influence Pakistan, whose government (understandably) believes India is gearing her defenses less to protect the subcontinent from Chinese invasion than to dominate Pakistan. In Rawalpindi's view, New Delhi is using the boundary dispute with Peking to secure U.S. and Soviet aid that will more likely be used against Pakistan. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia are geographically beyond the reach of Chinese power. They have predominantly the same racial composition. In spite of these favorable conditions, in recent times the relations between the three countries have been strained by harmful rivalries they themselves have generated, not Peking.

Such strife among Asia's non-Communist powers, for which their own governments are responsible, has been far more beneficial to

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China's aspirations and interests as a great power in the Far East than have any actions she has initiated herself. It is therefore difficult to see how a containment policy directed primarily against China can be truly effective as long as the Far East seethes with conflict between jealously independent rival nationalist regimes whose policies are essentially their own. To a certain extent it would seem that previous U.S. attempts to back one or another potentially anti-Communist state and to promote the growth of its petty military power have not so much deterred or contained the dubious military threat from China as they have sharpened the very national conflicts, internal and external, that undermine local stability and hence frustrate the development of a broader basis for conciliation among the nations in this region. American objectives would perhaps have been better served by policies that emphasized the American role as a "conciliator" in Asia (for example, in the India-Pakistan, Indonesia-Malaysia, or Cambodia-Thailand-Vietnam disputes) than by so much emphasis on building anti-Communist "positions of strength" through military alliances aimed at China. Actually, the United States has the strongest kind of interest in promoting conciliation between all the states of Asia in this century of intense nationalism. This interest includes even such issues as the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. However, it is clear that the incessant conflict and rivalry among Asia's non-Communist states go further to destabilize Asian politics than do the actions taken thus far by the Peking regime.

The existence of intense rivalries among Asia's non-Communist powers, rivalries that result from their own conceptions of national interests and objectives, has produced a response in Asia to the fact of Chinese Communist power that is altogether different from Europe's reaction to the Soviet threat. At no time has there emerged anything like an Asian consensus about how to regard Chinese military or political intentions. It would be difficult to show that any Asian countries capable of independent action have accepted the United States' assessment of China. This judgment is supported by the fact that the United States has been unable to construct, even informally, an alliance structure in the Far East, directed against Peking, which includes the major Asian powers. It is well known that even some allies of the United States, given the balance of power that so heavily favors Russia and the United States, do not regard Peking as a serious military menace to themselves. At the same time, there can be scarcely a government in the Far East today that is not aware of how useful it is, in

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dealing with the United States, to invent or exaggerate fears of a Chinese bogeyman.

The United States, far removed from Asia and from direct threat by China, stands almost alone in emphasizing the urgent menace of Peking, while most of the countries in the region, who ought to be highly sensitive to any Chinese threat, have taken a more conservative view of their Chinese neighbor's intentions. Even India's bitter hostility to Peking has not produced anything like the devil-theory of China that has grown up in the United States. To sum up, the states of Asia have not agreed on the existence of a common external threat; but such an agreement seems to be an indispensable condition for the success of policies modeled on European-type containment.

Appraising China's Intentions

It is not only the inherent differences between the political structure of non-Communist Asia and Western Europe that cast doubt on the validity of applying European-type containment doctrines to the Far East. The aims and direction of Chinese Communist policy—indeed, the nature of the Communist challenge in Asia itself—must be evaluated in terms that are largely irrelevant to European experience. Menacing Soviet actions in Europe presented such a clear and present danger to all concerned that they provoked the creation of the NATO alliance. Since the Russian forward pressure came after the Western powers had already acquiesced in considerable territorial and political concessions in Eastern Europe to meet alleged Soviet security interests, there was general agreement in Western Europe that Moscow's intentions were not defensive in nature. The American effort to equate China's intervention in the Korean conflict and her use of force in the Taiwan dispute, in Tibet, and on the Indian boundary with Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe has obviously failed to convince most Asian governments that China has aggressive intentions toward them. This failure suggests why the United States has been unable to crystallize opinion in these countries behind any genuine Asian regional security arrangements to curb a supposed threat of Chinese expansion.

In explaining Chinese action, Pakistan, Burma, Cambodia, Nepal, even Indonesia and our ally Japan, have tended to give more weight to traditional, nationalistic, and defensive motives than to purely "aggressive" Communist revolutionary impulses. This is not to say that these non-Communist Asian countries have been unconcerned about China's actions, her power, or her Communist system. But it is clear that most of these countries rely on their own perception of their

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Chinese neighbor, and their perception is such that the United States is unlikely to succeed in arousing a high level of Asian fear about China unless Peking behaves in a manner far more threatening to them, collectively and individually, than she has done to date. It is recognized in a number of Asian capitals that China's belligerence is largely a function of her special rivalry with the United States over Taiwan and other issues. Hence these countries have chosen to avoid alignments that would conflict with their own interest in stabilizing relations with Peking. Their aim has been, quite obviously, to avoid inflaming relations with China, and they do not wish to be drawn into the Sino-American quarrel. Asian reactions to the issues raised in Korea, Taiwan, Tibet, India, and Vietnam have been extremely varied and at no time has any of these conflicts produced an Asian front against China similar to that which the Soviet Union brought on herself by her actions in Europe. The disparity of views among the non-Communist Asian powers, and between them and the United States, about China's intentions robs the policy of containment of the basic consensus that was essential to its success in Europe.

China's foreign policy has also helped to undermine the appeal of the containment doctrine in Asia. The basic direction of her foreign policy in Asia since 1954 has been toward seeking an adjustment of contentious issues between herself and such of her neighbors as were not allied with or seemingly under the control of the United States. Thus, for more than a decade, China has worked to normalize relations with Afghanistan, Burma, Pakistan, Cambodia, Ceylon, Nepal, and Indonesia. Peking is outspokenly hostile to all members of the American anti-China bloc. She seeks in various ways, including the threat to support revolutionary elements, to convince their leaders that making common cause with the United States carries certain risks; that it is not possible for any of them to support the United States in opposing China and have friendly relations with Peking at the same time. Even in relation to countries in this category, however, China's actions—as distinguished from her verbal condemnations—have been cautious and restrained. To those Asian governments that decline alignment with the United States, Peking offers such explicit rewards as border settlements, aid, and China's nonsupport of insurrectionary tactics by local revolutionaries. This Chinese stance reflects not only the limitations on Peking's military capabilities for large-scale aggressive actions, but, vastly more important, her recognition that naked and unprovoked aggression against her neighbors would threaten the collapse of her entire diplomacy in Asia. Since the Bandung Conference, China has

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attempted to compose her relations with any genuinely nonaligned neighbors in order to identify and isolate the United States as the aggressive power and to find common ground with Asian nationalism for the purpose of organizing opposition to the policies of the United States.

Since the mid-1950's, China's diplomatic efforts to prevent her neighbors from being drawn into the American anti-China alignment have consistently enjoyed priority over Peking's commitment to support Communist revolutions. The Chinese position on revolution, which is central to an accurate understanding of her policies in Asia, should not be misunderstood or distorted. China encourages armed "revolutionary" action on the part of Communists or other dissidents in countries where special conditions exist—that is, where the so-called "imperialist" powers have interposed themselves, as in Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Laos, South Vietnam, and most recently, Thailand (after U.S. military forces arrived in that country). Ostensibly nonaligned governments, as in India, have also to reckon with Peking's anger when they adopt "anti-China" policies. One listens in vain, however, for the strident Chinese call to "revolution" in any Asian country that is clearly independent of American tutelage and pursues a policy of accommodation with Peking.

Where supporting revolution conflicts with China's hope to wean non-Communist Asian governments away from the United States, revolution is pushed into the background. China has advised in her ideological pronouncements on revolution that local Communist parties, though they should learn from Chairman Mao, must in the final analysis find their own formulas for taking power. In those Asian countries that remain independent of the United States and friendly to China, Peking shuns calling upon the local parties to attempt "adventurist" revolutionary actions that conflict with her own diplomacy. Toward governments in this category, China's basic policy for more than a decade has been to concentrate wherever possible on currying favor with nationalist leaders (some of whom, from the Communist viewpoint, can scarcely be described as "progressive") and to encourage the local party to develop the art of skilled united-front tactics. Local Communists are expected to exploit the various "contradictions" in their own country so as to place themselves in a position to take power when the old incompetent order collapses. Peking encourages local parties to take power by the parliamentary or peaceful path if they can, but she points out that there is no instance in which the bourgeois classes have permitted a Communist party to win power "democrati-

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cally." Hence, the Chinese argue, it is indispensable that a real Marxist-Leninist party organize for and be prepared to use armed revolutionary struggle. Otherwise the chances are very slim that a Communist party could come to power, much less be strong enough to carry out a dictatorship of the proletariat.

Peking's actual behavior and her ideological theses on revolution reveal that she is prepared to refrain from direct interference in the competition (whether peaceful or violent) between Communist parties and the "bourgeois" classes in Asian countries, so long as the United States also does not directly intervene in these countries' politics.[1] This is the essence of the Chinese version of peaceful coexistence in Asia, formulated more than ten years ago at the Bandung Conference.[2] China has not violated her own ground rules in relation to any independent Asian country, regardless of its social system, except where the United States has come to play a direct role in support of "bourgeois" regimes' competition with local Communist parties. The dispute with Moscow on the meaning of peaceful coexistence has arisen over the issue of what the policy of the Communist powers should be in situations where the United States rushes in to prop up a non-Communist regime that is in danger of losing the competition with its local Communist opponent. China argues that the Communist bloc should try to deter, or by various means oppose, attempts by the United States to use her own power unilaterally to determine the outcome of the competition between the bourgeois elites and the Communist forces. The Chinese leaders' view of their own national interests requires this position, for they regard the United States as bent on organizing all Asia into a belt of client-states opposing Peking. These fears are less disturbing to the Soviet leaders, who have long betrayed noticeable ambivalence about the desirability of fully opposing the United States in Asia if to do so would benefit the interests of the Chinese state.

As her power increases, of course, it is possible that China may abandon her present compromise with independent Asian nationalist regimes and, under the protection of her own nuclear deterrent, energetically attempt to impose Communist regimes on her neighbors. That possibility cannot be dismissed lightly, but it is a course of action

[1] The definitive statement of the Chinese position on "peaceful coexistence" with other non-Communist states was set forth in the Sixth Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU, "Peaceful Coexistence—Two Diametrically Opposed Policies," published December 12, 1963. The full text is in *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement* (Peking 1965), 259-301.

[2] For complete texts of Chou En-lai's three speeches at the Bandung Conference on relations with Asian countries, see *China and the Asian-African Conference* (*Documents*) (Peking 1955).

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fraught with grave risks for Peking. While it is conceivable that China might attempt to invade small neighboring countries or to foment and support revolution in them, it is far less likely that she will feel confident enough to undertake such measures against large Asian powers such as India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Japan. Some of these nations will be able to move in the nuclear direction at some future time; should Peking, without provocation, take an aggressive attitude toward these countries, she would run the risk of hastening the development of an anti-China nuclear club. Nothing would seem so well calculated to drive non-Communist Asia closer to the United States (or Russia) as an attempt by Peking to coerce her neighbors into unconditional surrender to Chinese demands.

Seen dispassionately, China's policies in Asia are more characteristic of a traditional great power than of a revolutionary renegade. The commitment to revolution plays a special part in Chinese policies, but in aspiring to great-power status, Peking emphasizes such traditional and conventional instruments as diplomacy, economic power, and the presence or threat of force. The demands of the Chinese regime for certain irredentas, spheres of influence, and concessions to its security interests are opposed by the United States and the Soviet Union, each of them much more powerful than China. Peking cannot hope to force concessions from either of these powers by provoking a direct test of strength. But it is quite evident that Communist China does not intend to accept passively a position and influence in the world, particularly in Asia, that she regards as being dictated either by the Soviet Union or by the United States. It is doubtful that any Chinese leadership born in this century would react differently. But the Chinese leaders are not the only ones in Asia and in other areas with aspirations that go beyond the position Russia or America would assign to them. China's call to "revolution" is directed primarily to existing and potential elites in Asia and elsewhere whom she regards as likely to share with her an interest in altering any status quo imposed by U.S. or Soviet policies.

The model she has offered to these potential Communist and nationalist allies, in the hope that their revolutionary efforts will shake U.S. and Soviet domination, is one derived from Chinese Communist revolutionary experience. The Chinese leaders believe that under favorable conditions, well-trained and indoctrinated Communist parties can integrate this model with their own concrete situations and can ultimately take power. The Chinese do not say that revolution can or should be launched everywhere; they actively support unrest only in certain carefully defined revolutionary situations: where "imperialism"

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(i.e., the United States) is present, and where the prescribed local conditions of success exist. Peking is the master, not the servant, of its revolutionary ideology.

The entire Chinese line on revolution has been fashioned to support the great-power policies Peking pursues in her contest with the United States and the Soviet Union. Where China's leaders have believed their interests in this fundamental struggle could be best served by supporting foreign Communist revolutionary movements, they have done so. But wherever they have believed they could advance in the contest with Moscow and Washington by supporting an odd assortment of friendly nationalist, militarist, or monarchial regimes, they have not hesitated to leave local Communist parties to their own fate. Had Peking's actions conformed to the devil-theory of China that has grown up in the United States, the appeal of the containment policy in Asia would no doubt be much greater than it is today.

Obstacles to Chinese Preeminence in Asia

It is not surprising that a state with China's present power and long history should aspire to regional preeminence. But the task of transforming such ambitions in Asia into reality promises to be very difficult. Various forces in Asia, independent of American power, seem likely to curb Peking's influence.

The position of the Chinese state in Asia is not comparable to that of the United States in the Western hemisphere or to Russia's position in Eastern Europe. In addition to the United States, Peking confronts, in Russia, Japan, India-Pakistan, and Indonesia, large powers which, irrespective of their political order, have reason to oppose mainland China's hegemony in Asia. Russia's and Japan's interests are very different from China's, and the power complex developing in both these countries would act as a major curb on Chinese expansion in the most decisive theater, Northeast Asia, even in the unlikely event of a total withdrawal of American power. The departure of the United States from Asia would no doubt gratify Peking, but it would not clear the path for Chinese hegemony. Rather, it would set the stage for a different kind of power struggle in the area.

Since the nineteenth century, both Japan and Russia have tried to be expansionist powers at China's expense. No Chinese government is likely to rid itself of the old fear that these two powers might again take the path of aggression against China or combine against her interests in Asia. If a disengagement were ever to occur between the United States and China, it seems very probable that China's attention

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would turn to the older problem of opposing Russian and Japanese penetration of the Asian mainland. In the twentieth century this old three-power rivalry might take a different form than it did in the past, but the steady rise of Russian and Japanese power would continue to be a basic obstacle to Chinese hegemony. The longer and much deeper history of China's fear of Russia and Japan may one day exert a powerful influence on future Chinese leaders' attitudes toward the United States, if a major conflict between the two powers does not come to pass.

The natural direction for Chinese expansion, it is usually thought, is into Southeast Asia, where China has historically exerted influence. China's nearness and the absence of strong indigenous military powers have led to the assumption that she is destined to dominate Southeast Asia unless resolutely deterred by the United States. This fits in neatly with theories about power vacuums. But the major Southeast Asian countries themselves have strongly resisted the idea of being drawn into China's orbit (or anyone else's). All of the countries in this area, including Vietnam, share an antipathy toward Chinese pretensions to superiority and dominance, whether on the part of local Chinese populations or of the Peking government. Nearly all the countries of Southeast Asia possess impressive geographic barriers against a major Chinese invasion. Moreover, they all are well aware that Soviet and American power interests are also opposed to Chinese predominance, although not all agree with the United States about how to deal with China. Contrary to the experience of past centuries, when her spreading culture was a powerful vehicle for claims to regional predominance, China's influence as a whole has been declining in Southeast Asia. Recently excluded from the area by the Western imperial powers, China now faces the intense nationalism that has captured the successor states since World War II.

The existence of fraternal Communist parties, the most successful of which have been every bit as nationalistic as the Chinese party, has not constituted an unmixed blessing as far as Peking's search for preeminence in the area is concerned. These parties have been useful and necessary allies, as in Vietnam and Laos, in opposing the American effort to turn the 1954 Geneva agreement on Indochina into an anti-Communist and anti-China front. On the other hand, some of these highly nationalistic and ambitious Communist parties, like the Indonesian one, often complicate China's diplomatic dealings with nationalist governments. The stronger Asian Communist movements have all shown an independent temper, and this has increased their freedom to take actions contrary to China's interests.

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The Chinese leaders believe that the removal of Western influence from Asia, coupled with prolonged internal instability, will eventually aid local Communist movements in coming to power. But China's leaders, no less than Russia's, are already discovering in their relations with North Vietnam and North Korea that ideological affinity and territorial proximity between Communist states do not result in the subordination of the smaller partners. Already it is evident that North Korea and North Vietnam will develop their own distinctive national personalities and forms: neither is now or is likely to become simply a small replica of "the thought of Mao Tse-tung." In the past, both regimes have shown a willingness to depart from the Chinese line on key issues. Should other Communist regimes emerge in Southeast Asia—in Vietnam, say, or possibly in Indonesia—Peking cannot assume on the basis of past experience that they will follow her lead. Actually, China must remain worried that such regimes may seek more freedom of action by currying favor with the Soviet Union—or, for that matter, with the West. Consequently, it is by no means clear at this point that China's leaders would prefer the development of stable, independent, diverse, and highly nationalistic Communist regimes in Southeast Asia in preference to the prolonged continuation of weak non-Communist regimes led by men willing to defer to China's interests in return for Peking's respect of the essential sovereignty of their countries.

None of the elites of the principal Asian nations—Japan, India, Pakistan, Indonesia—on whose political and military stance a great deal of China's ultimate position and influence in Asia depends, have shown themselves to be anybody's pawns—Russia's, China's, or America's. The United States and Russia have failed on the whole in their attempts to manipulate Asian nationalism so as to support their own state strategies in the cold war. By now it ought to be apparent that there is not going to be either an American or a Soviet solution to Asia's postcolonial problems. By its nature that goal was never really attainable, but it seemed to be a serious aspiration at one time because both Russia and America have been attracted, to a different degree and in very different ways, to the notion that they have special world ideological missions. Peking may believe China can succeed where two vastly richer and stronger superpowers failed, but the post–World War II history of Asian nationalism indicates very clearly that none of the great powers will be likely to succeed in this endeavor.

It should not be forgotten that between 1948 and 1951, during the heyday of Sino-Soviet cooperation, the Communist parties of Asia tried very hard to use armed insurrection as a means of discrediting and

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destroying such leaders as Nehru, Sukarno, U Nu, and others. In every instance where the non-Communist leadership could lay genuine claim to representing the force of nationalism, the Communist rebellions were crushed. So complete was the failure of these parties' assaults on nationalism that the Communist movement was forced to come to terms and to shift to policies of peaceful coexistence—a new line first championed by the Communist parties of China, India, and Indonesia, and only later by the Soviet Union. It should also be added that except for the special case of Malaya, the most politically significant defeats inflicted on Communist movements have come at the hands of non-aligned nationalist governments, and, as the recent suppression of the Indonesian Communist party again demonstrates, these defeats were brought about without the assistance of the United States.

The fear, expressed in the argument that neutralism or nonalignment is simply a temporary way station on the road to communism, that Peking and other Communists can push over popular nationalist regimes like "dominoes" once a Communist revolution succeeds somewhere else, is overwhelmingly contradicted by the proven vitality of Asian nationalism in the last twenty years. The Chinese Communists were the first to recognize, more than a decade ago, that genuine non-Communist nationalism was nobody's pushover and that efforts by local Communist parties to prove the contrary would bear bitter fruit. In Asia, it is only where an existing leadership has not earned, and therefore cannot claim, the mandate of nationalism that Communist parties have been able to make a serious challenge for power—a challenge based on their own attempt to seize power from those who either lost that mandate or never had it.

The Real American Problem in Asia

Much discussion about the threat of Chinese Communist expansion exaggerates what Peking is capable of doing both now and later and underplays the role of indigenous forces at work in neighboring countries affected by Chinese policies but clearly free from Chinese domination. This is a critical distinction to make, for the fact is that China is assigned far more responsibility than she deserves for the disturbances that lie at the roots of American anxiety about Asia. It is simply not true that Peking or any other Communist power can successfully "turn on" a Communist revolution wherever it chooses. Neither Peking's actions nor her ideological pronouncements have created the essential conditions that have energized the growth of the Communist movement in Asian countries. Local Communist parties have scored impres-

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sive gains, invariably, in those countries where native non-Communist elites have, by their own actions, failed to gain or retain their people's recognition as popular, effective nationalists. Local non-Communist elites themselves, not Peking, created the basic sources of internal discord in Laos, Vietnam, and Indonesia, where the most successful Communist movements to date have developed. Communist strength in these countries would be far less today had the non-Communist political elements subordinated their private rivalries to the larger task of national consolidation. Where the competition among the non-Communist elites has not reached the point of destroying the national fabric—for example, in Japan, Thailand, Pakistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, India, Malaysia, and the Philippines—the Communists have been unable to make a serious bid for power.

The plain fact is that Asian communism's greatest asset is not, and never has been, Communist China's potential military threat or her support of revolution. It has been, and continues to be, primarily the existence of incompetence and corruption and the lack of a genuine, socially progressive, nation-building ethic within the non-Communist elite in every country where communism has made serious advances. Conversely, the most effective deterrent to Communist gains has proved to be the existence of a non-Communist elite dedicated to solving its country's problems and therefore capable of holding the loyalty of its own people. American military power and aid, in themselves, have not proved adequate to find, to build, or to replace a dedicated, hard-working, non-Communist elite.

In the absence of indigenously inspired civil strife, gross incompetence among the non-Communists, or a foreign colonial enemy, no Communist movement in any Asian country has come even close to taking power, through either revolutionary or conventional political strategies. The political, economic, and social upheaval indispensable for a successful "people's war" cannot be manufactured abroad, and it does not burst on the scene overnight. Fundamentally, the prospects for successful Communist movements in Asia depend far less on contriving armed insurrection than on the character and ability of the non-Communist elites. Asia's non-Communists, the Chinese believe, will do the basic job of disintegrating their own societies and reputations to the point at which Communist parties can effectively exploit the situation. If the Chinese are right, and the evidence suggests that in some countries they are, the Communist threat to Asia would not disappear if Communist China's presence vanished from the scene tomorrow.

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There most certainly are both immediate and long-range prospects that the kind of future the United States would like to see develop in Asia will not come about. And the nature of the threat to idealized U.S. hopes is primarily the potential rise of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes in response to a broad pattern of grievances long felt and long uncorrected. But this danger comes not from the Left alone, in the shape of communism, but also from the Right, in the form of authoritarian, oligarchic regimes representing the military, the privileged social classes, and the commercial element. There are numerous examples—Laos, Indonesia, Vietnam, Kerala—to show that when the Communist parties are likely to take power, whether through elections or revolution, the rightist classes are likely to agree on a coercive political solution of their own invention, rather than to accept one formulated in Moscow and Peking.

For a long time, United States assumptions about political developments in Asia have contained the unwarranted expectation that somehow national communities based on some form of democratic consensus ought to, or are likely to, flourish in the area, provided an assumed Communist threat to their institutions is checked and economic development is encouraged. It is quite natural that the United States, in view of her values and traditions, should act to promote economically viable and politically responsible regimes wherever there is a *clear* indication of local purpose and desire. But successful policies for the long run—not based merely on the year-to-year fluctuation in Communist fortunes—must take account of the limitations on what the United States, great though her power is, can realistically expect to achieve in a vast and varied part of the world that has very different traditions from her own. History thus far would appear to show that overt Communist military aggression can be defeated and that artificially contrived "people's wars" do not succeed in countries whose leaders command the consent and loyalty of their own people. There is, however, serious reason to doubt that any foreign power, including the United States, can redeem the image of harsh and unpopular governments or can persuade or force unwilling governments to take those measures of reform that alone can win the support of their own populations or build a nationalist following where one does not exist.

Unfortunately, the painful truth is that Asia's strongest political tradition is the very authoritarianism that stands in the way of such reforms. The variations in this authoritarian tradition have been either despotic or benevolent but have remained authoritarian. The sharing of state power under the rule of law is an alien conception in many

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parts of Asia. Moreover, the desirability of political Westernization is not at once obvious to most Asians, as it is to Americans. Except where Western institutions have been imposed forcibly by Western powers, there has been little lasting, indigenously sustained commitment to socially progressive or politically democratic ideas in any Asian country. There is no "free Asia" counterpart to the Western democratic traditions on which to build except in our own imagination. The United States can have hope for and can act to sustain Japan's, India's, or any other country's adoption of consensus-type political communities, but there should be no illusions. The foundations of transplanted Western political and social ideas in Asia are weak. Institutions based on them have already been overturned in Burma, Korea, Pakistan, Laos, and Indonesia; they have hardly existed in other countries of the Far East. One may even fairly doubt that Western political forms would survive in India or Japan in the event of a serious crisis.

In Asia, however, the absence of quasi-democratic, pluralistic institutions has not proved to be an insuperable obstacle to maintaining stable political communities based on the tacit or expressed consent of the governed. Indeed, some Asian societies are likely to find what they regard as the appropriate balance between the conflicting demands of progress, justice, and order best achieved within a traditional-authoritarian political system that is in harmony with their historical development. What has proved to be the indispensable condition for maintaining a stable non-Communist political order is that the government and its leaders win and retain the confidence of their people as genuine exponents of nationalism. Where this common bond of nationalism links leaders and citizens, no Communist movement in Asia has been able to sever it at the polls or on the battlefield.

All this is true even in an era when U.S. military power has been overwhelming and when vast sums have been made available for aid to any regimes that would hoist the anti-Communist banner. The United States has been at no disadvantage compared to the Communists in her resources for waging the contest in Asia. Quite the opposite is true. The real difficulties that beset the United States arise primarily from the nature of the task she has set out to achieve. That task has become, evidently, nothing less than to act as a vehicle shaping basic forces of change in a vast part of the world that not only is entering the nation-building stage of development, but is also undergoing at the same time the profound experience of total cultural transformation. But the United States has virtually no ties linking it to the traditions that are bound to govern the evolution of most Asian countries. In the context

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of the profound upheaval now occurring in Asia independently of great-power action, it would be well to ponder whether even the United States can reasonably expect to exert a decisive molding influence on the form or spirit of new national communities that must ultimately reflect their own diversity, peculiarities, needs, traditions, and aspirations. It is leaning on a weak reed, in truth, to base long-range policies on assumptions that the United States, or any combination of Western technological expertise and aid, will somehow be able to channel and mold the vast revolution in human attitudes and behavior that is painfully under way not only in Asia but in three-quarters of the world. But if the United States is determined to substitute American power for the absence of indigenous, non-Communist nationalism and to attempt a basic transformation of the elites and the societies of the far-off countries of Asia, let *that* true purpose be defined for what it really is, not displaced onto the myth of a Chinese Communist bogeyman.

It is primarily the evolution of nationalism, not the foreign policies or ideology of the Peking government, which frustrates the United States in Asia. The power fundamentally to change the basic indigenous forces shaping the development and character of nationalism in Asian countries lies in neither Peking nor Washington. No internal or external Communist power has yet been able to force the submission of an independent Asian country, however poor and whatever its political system, whose non-Communist leaders can justifiably claim the mandate of nationalism. It is incredible to suppose that the United States can, by the exercise of her own power, claim that mandate for any non-Communist elite that has not earned it from its own people. And until the United States comprehends the full meaning of nationalism in Asia, Communist and non-Communist alike, the gap between America's expectations and the real world around her will remain frustratingly large.

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ON THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia

By JOHAN GALTUNG*

I. Introduction

IT may seem preposterous to write about the effects of the economic sanctions currently in effect against Rhodesia since the process is not yet completed: we do not know how it will all end, and primary source material of a crucial nature is not yet available.[1] But the purpose of this article is more in the direction of a general theory, using the case of Rhodesia as a source of examples and illustrations. The material on Rhodesia included here consists of some secondary sources, such as books and articles, and some primary sources, such as documents and other printed material; but the basic sources are mainly personal observation and a number of informal interviews with Rhodesian citizens (mostly businessmen) and with citizens of other African countries (mostly politicians), all dating from January 1966, about two months after UDI.[2] The purpose of such an exploratory study is obvious: to get some impressions about the psychological and social mechanisms of economic boycott when they are operating, instead of having to rely on retrospection. Besides, such an exploration can serve as a pilot study for a more thorough investigation both of the general theory of economic sanctions and other sanctions in the international system, based on historical cases mainly in this century, and of the Rhodesian

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[1] Using the term "Rhodesia" rather than "Southern Rhodesia" or "Zimbabwe" has no political implications; this usage is simply shorter and more frequently found.

[2] UDI is used as the common abbreviation for the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Smith government on November 11, 1965.

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case in particular.[3] It is as such that this article must be interpreted, not as anything more pretentious. Thus, although it is our impression that the interview excerpts presented are typical of attitudes of the majority of whites in Rhodesia and that the phenomena reported are significant, we have no formal way of proving this contention—for instance, by representative sampling.

Another warning may also be in order: the reader who looks for anything like a complete account of the antecedents and present circumstances of the entire complex of problems referred to today as "Rhodesia" will have to look elsewhere; in the present article only the bare minimum of background data and hypotheses is included, mainly in footnotes.[4]

This being said, the virtues of studying Rhodesia in order to understand better the local impact of international economic sanctions should be stressed. Rhodesia is in no sense a simple case, but offers all the complexities of the modern world: racial strife, struggle for independence, complex relationships between national (UK), regional (OAU, Commonwealth), and universal (UN) sources of power, and the ingredients of North-South and East-West conflict. Thus, even though no one would generalize from the case of Rhodesia to other cases, an understanding of the Rhodesian case will serve as a basis for understanding other cases better.

II. The General Theory of Economic Sanctions

We shall define sanctions as actions initiated by one or more international actors (the "senders") against one or more others (the "receivers") with either or both of two purposes: to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important. This definition at

[3] A study of this kind is presently under way at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, under the direction of Fredrik Hoffmann.

[4] There are, of course, many works available giving various accounts of the background of UDI. Scandinavian readers will find Holger Benettsson, *Problemet Rhodesia* (Stockholm 1966) elucidative. Very valuable information, as well as attempts at analysis, can be found in two papers by Peter Wallensteen, *Den rhodesiska självständighetsfrågan efter december 1962*, mimeographed (Uppsala 1965) and *Aspekter på Rhodesiakrisen efter självständighetsförklaringen*, mimeographed (Uppsala 1966). Non-Scandinavian readers will find Philip Mason, *The Birth of a Dilemma* (London 1958), Patrick Keatley, *The Politics of Partnership* (London 1963), and Nathan Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia* (London 1965), valuable. However, apart from Wallensteen, *Aspekter*, these publications do not deal with the sanctions. A recent and relevant work on sanctions is Ronald Segal, ed., *Sanctions Against South Africa* (London 1964), presenting the papers and the recommendations of the International Conference on Economic Sanctions Against South Africa, London, April 14-17, 1964. For Scandinavian readers, Kaj Björk, *Sydafrika och vi* (Jönköping 1965), gives some of the arguments in connection with sanctions against South Africa.

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once raises an interesting question. It is not obvious that the same action or sanction can serve both purposes; in fact, modern penology does not seem to warrant much belief in punishment as a *general* method for making people comply.[5] Punishment may have other effects, as when criminals are kept off the streets and isolated in prisons where their deviant actions are hidden from the general view and thus are less consequential to the outside world, but this is not the same as making them comply.

Thus, when sanctions are discussed it makes good sense to ask which purpose is dominant. Imagine, in the Rhodesian case, that another policy had been enacted: that of rewarding the Smith government for any positive step toward majority rule, instead of punishing it for any step interpreted as negative relative to the goal of majority rule. Expressed concretely, this would have meant a policy of increased trade, or increasingly favorable trade conditions, and more contact and more diplomatic cooperation as less discriminatory practices were introduced in Rhodesia, with a well-thought-out and well-communicated pattern of action: so much reward for so much compliance. Even a positive escalation process might be envisaged. Imagine that arguments in favor of such a policy as a method of bringing about compliance were in fact quite convincing. Nevertheless there would probably be counter-arguments to the effect that "This is selling out to the enemy," "This is rewarding sinfulness," "This means that any rascal can come around and do something nasty and then extort a reward for undoing the harm he has done—which is tantamount to blackmail," "There will be inflationary effects and we shall soon run out of rewards," and "Who will pay for all this, anyhow?"

Without belittling the significance of any one of these arguments, it makes good sense to ask a politician engaged in sanction policies, "If you cannot have both, which outcome would you prefer, punishment without compliance or compliance without punishment?" If he insists that punishment is a sufficient condition for compliance, then he is simply naive; if he insists that punishment is a necessary condition for compliance, then he is probably in addition highly punishment-oriented in the sense that punishment has become an automatic and probably also cherished goal in itself. This punishment-oriented attitude is probably fairly widespread, particularly as applied to the international system, and serves to maintain negative sanctions.[6] If com-

[5] For a general discussion of the problem of compliance, see Galtung, "On the Meaning of Nonviolence," *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 3 (1965), 228-57.

[6] The best treatment of this theme is probably found in Bjørn Christiansen, *Attitudes to Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality* (Oslo 1959).

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pliance is not obtained, there is at least the gratification that derives from knowing (or believing) that the sinner gets his due, that the criminal has been punished. In this sense negative sanctions are safer than positive sanctions. And when hatred is strong, positive sanctions would probably be out of the question anyway.

In this article we shall disregard the punishment aspect and be interested in sanctions only as a way of making other international actors comply, and we shall concentrate on negative sanctions. As a reference for a more complete discussion, however, the following dimensions for classifying sanctions may be useful:

1. Are the sanctions *negative* (punishment for deviance) or *positive* (reward for compliance)?
2. Are the sanctions aimed at responsible *individuals* in a receiving nation, or are they *collective* (hitting the nation as a whole, including individuals and groups that are not particularly responsible)?
3. Are the sanctions *internal* (due to changes arising inside the receiving nation) or are they *external* (having to do with the interaction pattern with other nations)?
4. Are the sanctions *unilateral* (only one sending nation) or *multilateral* (several sending nations, with regional sanctions being a special case) or *universal* (with all or almost all other nations participating)?
5. Are the sanctions *general* or *selective* (involving all possible measures or only some special measures)?
6. Are the sanctions *total* or *partial* (involving all or only some measures of a special kind)?
7. Types of sanctions (types of values of which the receiving nation is deprived):[7]

[7] Many of these sanctions are mentioned in the relevant Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations:

"The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions and may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations."

These provisions, of course, also apply to the United Nations itself. According to information given by Mr. David Owen to the meeting of the Technical Assistance Committee on November 24, 1965, the United Nations withdrew its experts from Rhodesia almost immediately after adoption of the Security Council resolution condemning developments there.

To give some impression of how the measures suggested in Article 41 of the Charter have in fact been used by the member nations, we have used the UN Press Services Reference Paper No. 4 (March 23, 1966) to study how the sanctions employed by four

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major groupings among the sixty nations that had reported to the Security Council were distributed.

TABLE I. SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA, BY TYPE OF SANCTION AND COUNTRY GROUPING*

	No recognition	*Dipl. rel. restricted*	*Dipl. rel. not estab.*	*Telecomm.*	*Passport*	*Part. econ.*	*Compl. econ.*	(N)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Socialist	84	0	17	25	0	0	33	(12)
Commonwealth	23	13	15	8	23	38	46	(13)
African, not Commonwealth	0	11	11	0	44	11	33	(9)
All other	46	12	23	0	15	50	27	(26)
(N)	(25)	(9)	(8)	(4)	(11)	(19)	(20)	(60)

* The figures do not add up horizontally to 100% since one nation may employ several types of sanctions.

The table should be read with utmost caution since it is based on a press release, not on primary sources, and since one does not know to what extent the UN asked for information. However, the differences are nevertheless quite remarkable. The focus is on sanctions of the verbal, expressive type (such as nonrecognition) and on economic sanctions, with the socialist countries specializing in the former and Commonwealth and African countries in the latter. Telecommunication and travel sanctions have been remarkably underutilized, as have diplomatic sanctions. In December 1965, twenty nations had consulates general or high commissions in Salisbury. Only six of these—Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the United States—were affected as of March 25, 1966. The table seems to indicate that the more remote a nation is from Rhodesia, the more it uses nonrecognition; the closer the nation is, the more it uses economic sanctions. On the other hand, the less the trade with Rhodesia, the more complete the boycott; here the nations that are big traders have the most difficulties.

Also, there are very important exceptions to the relatively comprehensive sanctions called for by the UN in the resolution of November 20, 1966, in which the Security Council (with France abstaining) called upon "all states not to recognize this illegal authority and not to entertain any diplomatic or other relations with this illegal authority." Thus the information given by the Commonwealth Relations Office on January 31, 1966, is interesting in showing the loopholes in the sanctions system. Briefly stated, they are as follows, using the calculations made by Wallensteen (*Aspekter*, 29-32):

1. Zambia (export sanctions 30% effective)
2. South Africa (export sanctions 0% effective)
3. West Germany (export sanctions 70% effective)
4. Malawi (export sanctions 0% effective)
5. U.S. (export sanctions 45% effective)
6. Congo (L) (export sanctions 0% effective)
7. Portuguese territories (export sanctions 0% effective)
8. France (export sanctions 60% effective)

The loopholes have a clear structure. First of all, there are Rhodesia's ideological allies, South Africa and Portugal, who have a vested interest. They can hardly afford to have Rhodesia lose, since this might encourage similar processes directed against themselves. Second, there are Rhodesia's African neighbors, Zambia, Malawi, and the Congo, who are evidently more concerned with the impact of sanctions on their own vulnerable economies than with the use of sanctions as weapons against an ideological enemy. Third, there are the three biggest Western powers (the United Kingdom excepted): the United States, West Germany, and France, all with their vested interests. The diversity of motives for not making sanctions complete is impressive. Such diversity is a factor on which a skilful government in a receiving nation can base policies designed to demoralize the sending nation.

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a) diplomatic sanctions
  (1) nonrecognition
  (2) rupture of diplomatic relations
  (3) no direct contact with political leaders
  (4) no cooperation by international organizations
b) communication sanctions
  (1) rupture of telecommunications
  (2) rupture of mail contact
  (3) rupture of transportation (ship, rail, road, air)
  (4) rupture of news communication (radio, newspapers, press agencies)
  (5) rupture of personal contacts (tourism, family visits)
c) economic sanctions
  (1) internal destruction (economic sabotage, strikes)
  (2) rupture of trade relations (economic boycott)
    (*a*) hitting imports to receiving nation (import boycott)
    (*b*) hitting exports from receiving nation (export boycott)

    Economic boycott can comprise *goods, capital, services.* If passage of goods, capital, and/or services to or from the receiving country is reported, the boycott is *supervised*; if in addition passage is impeded, the boycott may be referred to as a *blockade.*

For simplicity we may disregard the cases of internal sanctions and sanctions directed at individuals: with the present structure of the international system, territorial integrity makes such actions—unilateral, multilateral, or universal—impossible unless they are combined with a military presence. In a future world, the supranational structure might include permanent enforcement machinery stationed in all nations—like local police stations in the nations of today—but this is for the future.[8] Thus, our discussion here is limited to *negative, collective,* and *external* sanctions, and like most other analysts we shall concentrate on the theory of *economic* sanctions.

The theory is simple. The input-output matrix of the economy of the receiving nation is inspected. The impact of partial or total boycott of selected imports or exports is calculated. As a matter of rational politics, maximum effect with minimum boycott is looked for; in the

[8] For an excellent study, see Louis B. Sohn, "Responses to Violation: A General Survey," in Richard A. Falk and Richard J. Barnet, eds., *Security in Disarmament* (Princeton 1965), 178-203.

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case of a receiving nation for which there are accessible data on the economic system, this is a problem that might be left to computers. The ideal case would be that of a system in which total boycott of one product alone would be sufficient, and oil is often held to be this product.[9]

If the goal is to damage the economic system of the receiving nation without similarly damaging the sending nation, this can obviously be attained if a number of conditions that we can refer to as "the ideal case for an economic boycott" are fulfilled. The ideal conditions would be more or less as follows:

1. that imports have a very high loading on important sectors of the economy of the receiving nation;
2. that there is no internal substitute for the imports;
3. that a high loading of the important imports comes from the sending nation(s);
4. that there is no external substitute for these imports, so that the receiving nation cannot threaten to change trade-partners;
5. that the imports make up a very small part of the exports of the sending nation(s), and/or that the products can be exported to other nations;
6. that the exports from the receiving nation are sent mainly to the sending nation(s), and that there are no easy substitutes for them, so that the receiving nation cannot obtain income easily;
7. that these exports from the receiving nation can easily be obtained elsewhere by the sending nation(s) so that the sending nation(s) are not hurt economically and can threaten to change trade-partners, *or* that the exports cannot be obtained elsewhere by the sending nation(s) so that the sending nation(s) can demonstrate that they would rather suffer deprivation than touch products from the receiving nation; and
8. that trade relations are easily supervised and even controlled (as when the receiving nation is an island or is surrounded either by impenetrable terrain, such as swamps or deserts, or by nations that participate in the boycott).

[9] The basic facts about the structure of the Rhodesian economy seen from this point of view can be found in the survey reported in a Supplement to the *Standard Bank Review* (November 19, 1965), according to which a boycott of the major product for export, tobacco, should affect Rhodesia more than the United Kingdom if the latter were to stop importing it from Rhodesia.

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It is easily seen that the case in which these conditions are met is that of a small economic satellite of a major economic power. In such a case, perhaps seventy-five percent, or perhaps even ninety percent, of both exports and imports of the small country may be with the big country, yet this trade volume may still be less than one percent of the big country's total trade. This trade structure occurs not infrequently in the present world, and it gives a major potential for control by the big nations of those small nations in their "sphere of interest," particularly since the power of any weapon lies more in its potential than in its actual use.

One could use this kind of situation as a point of departure for a complete theory of economic sanctions. The crucial concept here is *vulnerability*, which has an external and an internal component. The key to the understanding of vulnerability seems to be *concentration*: the more a country's economy depends on one product, and the more its exports consist of one product, and the more its exports and imports are concentrated on one trade-partner, the more vulnerable is the country. To launch economic sanctions without a careful examination of all these factors would be like launching a military campaign without military analysis.

Without going into a great many details, it is interesting to determine which countries rank highest in external vulnerability. As a first approximation, information about the percentage of the GNP comprising foreign trade (exports plus imports) is useful. Among the first ten ranks in the list given in the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*[10] are four islands (Barbados, Mauritius, Cyprus, and Malta), and among the first ten ranks in a similar list in the UN's *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1964* are three islands (Mauritius, Trinidad, Iceland) and Hong Kong, which for all practical purposes is an island. The two ranking lists are not identical, which reflects problems in connection with national accounts statistics more than changes between the periods of time the two lists cover. However, it is interesting to note that six of the first seven countries on the UN list are or have been under British rule. Also, the superpowers, the United States and the USSR, rank eightieth and eighty-first on the *World Handbook* list (with foreign-trade percentages of seven and five), which marks them as particularly invulnerable. The People's Republic of China ranks seventy-ninth, France ranks sixty-seventh, and the United Kingdom, fifty-first. Clearly, the big powers are very different from the smaller powers in external vulnerability. On the other

[10] Bruce M. Russett and others (New Haven 1964). The data are from Table 46.

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hand, the rank order correlation between the foreign-trade variable and GNP per capita is less than .10, so vulnerability should be seen more as a property of the small power than as a property of the poor nation. Thus, the general picture is that economic sanctions as a source of power tend to preserve existing power structures.

This becomes even more evident when we examine the extent to which exports are limited to a few commodities and their markets to a few countries. The rank order correlation of .606 between Michael Michaely's indices of these two types of concentration suggests that these two aspects of external vulnerability tend to covary.[11] Most vulnerable on both counts (if we also take into consideration the percentage of the GNP comprising foreign trade) are Hong Kong, Trinidad, and Mauritius; least vulnerable are big countries such as the U.S., Brazil, Mexico, India, Argentina, and Colombia. Bigger countries of course have in general more diversity in raw materials and bigger domestic markets; hence they have more potential for diversified domestic industries, which can be converted to export industries. On the other hand, the rank order correlation between the *coefficient of commodity concentration* and the percentage of the GNP made up of trade is only .108, and the corresponding correlation for the *coefficient of geographic concentration* is only .098. Hence, even if there is concentration of exports in terms of commodities and trade-partners it does not follow that exports are very important for the GNP.

Let us then imagine that the three factors of concentration we have discussed (concentration in the economy, concentration in commodities, concentration in trade-partners) are of equal weight in determining external vulnerability. Of course, if sanctions were universal (and not unilateral) geographic concentration would not count; if sanctions were general (and not highly selective) commodity concentration would not count; and if sanctions were both universal and general (and total) then only the trade percentage of the GNP would count. But *a priori* it may be as difficult to make sanctions universal and general as it is to make them "bite." Hence, we have added the ranks for each country reported in Michaely's data on commodity concentration and geographic concentration[12] to its rank for the trade percentage of the GNP. The distribution is interesting, but it should be noticed that the socialist countries are not included in Michaely's lists, which comprise only forty countries. A high score on this index means low vulnerability and a low score means high vulnerability.

[11] *Concentration in International Trade* (Amsterdam 1962), esp. chap. 2.
[12] *Ibid.*, 22.

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The least vulnerable countries are the United States (109 of 120 possible points), France (108), Italy and Japan (104), the Federal Republic of Germany (100), and the United Kingdom (99)—as one would expect. Most vulnerable is Mauritius with 9 points (3 is the minimum); then follow Trinidad and Panama (20) and Rhodesia, which ranks high on both kinds of concentration (ninth and tenth) and on the trade percentage of its GNP (27 points, giving a rank of four on this composite vulnerability list; it ranks eighth on the list in the *World Handbook*). All countries with point scores lower than 50 are or have recently been colonies, which means that they are vulnerable relative to their former mother countries.

For our purpose it is significant that Rhodesia (here including Zambia and Malawi) ranks fourth on the score of external vulnerability, since what we say would apply *a fortiori* to less vulnerable countries. (This rank is based on combined data for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for 1959, showing trade to be sixty-six percent of GNP, about half of that percentage comprising exports. Exports of Rhodesia alone, excluding Zambia and Malawi, constitute about forty-three percent of its GNP, according to the Supplement to the *Standard Bank Review*, indicating that Rhodesia's position on that variable is not lower than that of the former Federation, so that Rhodesia alone would not rank lower on the index of external vulnerability.) Most of the countries scored fall between Rhodesia and the United Kingdom, indicating that if they are vulnerable according to one of the variables, then they compensate for it on either or both of the remaining variables.

The determination of a nation's external vulnerability reflects only some of the ideal conditions for economic boycott described earlier. There are still the problems of how important the imports actually are, how easily internal or external substitutes can be found, and so on. Imagine then that all external conditions listed above (conditions 3-8) are obtained by extending the boycott from a unilateral through a regional to a universal action. Then the receiving nation is left with only three counterstrategies:

1. to train itself in sacrifice by doing without certain commodities, and preferably even liking it;
2. to restructure the national economy so as to absorb the shock of the boycott, by producing locally the imported commodities denied it or by making some substitutes for them, by finding alternative employment for people made jobless, and so forth; and

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3. to organize changes of trade *with* third parties, or *via* third parties,[13] or, if the boycott is truly universal, to engage in smuggling.

To what extent these counterstrategies are sufficient as defense will be discussed below; here it will be noted only that this repertory of defense measures is already quite limited. On the other hand, the world has yet to see a universal boycott.

The theory of the effects of economic warfare is now fairly similar to the theory of the effects of military warfare. Both kinds of warfare are means toward the same end: political disintegration of the enemy so that he gives up the pursuit of his goals. The method used is value-deprivation, which may or may not increase with time according to how the action proceeds and what countermeasures are enacted. Countermeasures may take the form of offensive measures (value-deprivation from the attacker) or defensive measures (reducing the value-deprivation inflicted upon oneself) of active or passive varieties.

We shall now distinguish between a naive and a revised theory of the effects of economic warfare. The *naive* theory of the relation between economic warfare (and also military warfare) and political disintegration sees some kind of roughly proportionate relation: the more value-deprivation, the more political disintegration.[14] The idea is that there is a limit to how much value-deprivation the system can stand and that once this limit is reached (resulting in a split in leadership or between leadership and people), then political disintegration will proceed very rapidly and will lead to surrender or willingness to negotiate. The theory can be illustrated as in Diagram 1.

However, this theory disregards the simple principle of *adaptation*: that which seems unacceptable at the beginning of the conflict becomes acceptable as one gets used to life under hardship. Thus, the "upper limit" of what can be tolerated recedes as the value-deprivation progresses, and political disintegration becomes less easily obtainable. However, there remains an upper limit of value-deprivation, short of total destruction, which presents difficulties for the attacker. Even if we exclude moral problems, the attacker must recognize that he may have

[13] An excellent account of how South Africa was able to get around the Indian boycott launched against it in July 1946 by means of trade via third parties is given in K. N. Raj, "Sanctions and the Indian Experience," in Segal, *Sanctions Against South Africa*, 197-203.

[14] This must, by and large, have been a major theory behind many efforts in recent history to bomb an adversary into submission. For an interpretative analysis of the effects of bombing in World War II on the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan, see Galtung, "On the Effects of Bombing Civilians" (forthcoming). The line of argument is very much as for the effects of economic sanctions in the present article.

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to restore the attacked nation and have to coexist with its new leadership, not to mention its future and possibly revanchist generations.



DIAGRAM 1. THE NAIVE THEORY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Thus, an important defense strategy is to indicate that one will hold out at least until the attacker's upper limit is reached.

But we refer to this theory as "naive" also because it does not take into account the possibility that value-deprivation may initially lead to political *integration* and only later—perhaps much later, or even never—to political disintegration. The basic point here is that value-deprivation creates the social conditions under which much more sacrifice is possible so that the limit for political disintegration will be reached much later. The theory can be illustrated as in Diagram 2.

The problem is now under which conditions the revised theory is the more valid and under which conditions the naive theory is less naive. A short list of such conditions includes these:

1. The attack from the outside is seen as an attack on the group as a whole, not on only a fraction of it;
2. There is very weak identification with the attacker, preferably even negative identification; and
3. There is belief in the value of one's own goals in the sense that no alternative is seen as better.

The interesting thing is that in economic warfare, often even more than in military warfare, the first condition is almost immediately and

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automatically satisfied. The collective nature of economic sanctions makes them hit the innocent along with the guilty. They are in prac-



Diagram 2. The Revised Theory of Economic Warfare

tice, if not in theory, an application of the principle of collective guilt. However, if the other two conditions are not satisfied, then this *may* turn to the benefit of the attacker. Internal dissension in the receiving nation may result when the people feel harassed. The people may then bring pressure upon the leaders to change their policy—in other words, political disintegration.

Thus, the recipes for economic sanctions of various types are fairly obvious. Like a military operation, the logistics of sanctions can be worked out in great detail, and this can even have its bureaucratic appeal since there is an element of administrative challenge, as well a neatness, about the operation when modern, well-organized societies with good national bookkeeping are involved. At the same time it is obvious where the weaknesses of the theory of economic warfare lie.

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There are two weak points: (1) the idea that political disintegration is more or less proportionate to economic disintegration, and (2) the idea that economic disintegration cannot be counteracted. Of course, no politician of any standing would be so naive as to subscribe to the idea that economic sanctions—once they are effective, economically speaking—will automatically cause either partial or complete surrender. But the politician who is sophisticated at the verbal level may still be naive at the level of actions: he may simply be at a loss as to what to do when faced with the complexities of the effects of economic sanctions—or of other sanctions, for that matter. We shall try to describe systematically some hypotheses about such effects that are negative from the point of view of the sending nation(s), but before we do that, let us look more closely at the kind of theory the sending nation(s) (in this case, the United Kingdom) may have as to how the sanctions will eventually work.

Prime Minister Wilson's methodology and theory of economic sanctions have been set forth in some detail in speeches given in Parliament on December 10, 1965, and January 25, 1966.[15] First of all, there has been a policy of graduated escalation along two dimensions: starting with the United Kingdom, measures have proceeded from selective and partial sanctions toward practically general and total economic sanctions; they have proceeded from relatively unilateral action by the United Kingdom toward the universal action envisaged and hoped for. Some of this gradualism has been deliberate (to permit the threat of worse measures to be invoked at any time, as well as to prevent too much damage to Rhodesia, which will have to function in the future) and some of it has been a virtue of necessity. On the day of UDI, a number of financial measures excluding Rhodesia from the sterling area and from the preference status enjoyed by Commonwealth members were introduced, together with a ban on Rhodesian tobacco imports to the United Kingdom and on weapons exports from the United

[15] See the *Official Report* for these two days. For another and very similar example of a theory as to how sanctions might work, let us quote from the article "Can Smith be brought down?" *Peace News* (November 19, 1965), 1, 4. Six factors are mentioned: white supporters will desert Smith (1) "as the economic life of the country becomes more unmanageable"; (2) because of the staunch attitude of the governor and the symbolism of some people's indication of their support for him; (3) because of the blank spaces in the newspapers, indicating censorship; (4) because of "unrest among members of the civil service, police and army"; (5) because of "unrest among the African population"; and (6) because of "South Africa's refusal to deal in Rhodesian currency." This list shows a clear overestimation of the organizational power of the African population and an equally clear overestimation of the force and legitimacy of British symbols far from home. Moreover, there is always the question of how many people really worry about censorship, particularly when it is directed against opinions and writers they dislike themselves.

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Kingdom to Rhodesia. Then, in the three months that followed UDI, most moves toward complete boycott were made.

Incidentally, communications restrictions were remarkably underutilized, particularly considering how tempting it must have been to use them since white Rhodesians are heavily dependent on such communications for maintaining their identity as an outpost of British (if not Labour) civilization. The United Kingdom has, however, tried to control access to Rhodesia, probably partly to symbolize its sovereignty over the "runaway colony," partly to control the information flow.[16]

The Wilson theory as to exactly how political disintegration will take place within the very short time spans he announced in the first weeks and months after UDI contains such elements as increasing unrest among the whites due to unemployment and material deprivations resulting from reduced exports and imports. According to this theory, either development may be used by the existing opposition elements in Rhodesia or may lead to the formation of new centers of opposition; in either case the opposition may make an appeal to the governor, and a solution will be found through him. Thus, the governor may symbolize a return to "law and order," and the troops stationed in Zambia may be recalled at the governor's request. Exactly what may happen to Smith and his numerous followers in this context is not clear, but then Wilson is speaking as a politician, not as a social scientist.

Clearly, if political disintegration should take place it would happen through the dual effect of sanctions, which weakens the people in power and strengthens those in opposition. For this to happen, as Wallensteen points out, it is not sufficient that the sanctions are perceived as an evil; alternative courses of action must also be perceived as lesser evils.[17] Thus, it is Wilson's task not only to escalate into a sanction pattern as harsh as possible, but also to present alternatives as acceptable as possible. To achieve the latter aim, a vision of the near future that does not contain majority rule must be presented to the white Rhodesians—and the famous six points were designed to do this. What was held out to them was legal rule, not majority rule.[18]

[16] This control of access to Rhodesia dates from November 1965 when "Great Britain established a general requirement for visas for travel to Rhodesia, and stated, on this occasion, that the sole legal authorities outside Great Britain having the right to issue such visas are the British embassies and consulates." Later on, sanctions were added to this rule: "The British authorities . . . reserve the right to refuse entry into Great Britain to persons who have sought visas for entry into Rhodesia from the representatives of Ian Smith's regime" (quoted from Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Circular No. 27, March 11, 1966).

[17] *Aspekter*, 25-26.

[18] Wilson's thinking about how Rhodesia should be made to comply can be interestingly contrasted with the thinking of one Conservative M.P., Mr. G. Lloyd, who "sug-

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Equally clear is Smith's counterstrategy: to reverse the order of utilities. For that purpose, sanctions must appear as manageable, even slightly ridiculous, and the alternatives must be defined not merely as a return to the pre-UDI situation but as alternatives that will of necessity have even more negative implications for the white Rhodesians. There are many ways of achieving this purpose. One of them is to maneuver Wilson into a position in which, because of the African Commonwealth members, he is unable to offer an alternative that does not contain majority rule. Another method is censorship, so that information about attractive alternatives (as well as information about serious effects of the sanctions) does not reach the Rhodesian reader. To the extent that that reader is in general agreement with Smith, this method will work, because there will be no demand for these two types of news; they will both cause severe cognitive dissonance. But the major counterstrategy will always be to channel the effects of the sanctions themselves in the best possible directions—and this is the topic to which we now turn.

III. The Defense Against Economic Sanctions

Two principles for discussing counterstrategies against economic sanctions have here been presented. One of them follows from the logic of the attacker. There are three holes in this system, however, even when the sanctions are universal (adaptation to sacrifice, restructuring the economy to absorb the shock, and smuggling). The other principle follows from the logic behind what we have called the revised theory (that the collectivity is threatened, that there is no identification with the attacker, and that there is firm belief in one's own values).

The details about how the first three counterstrategies work out in the Rhodesian case are in a sense obvious aspects of the total situation. More important is the question the social scientist observing the situation will immediately ask: Are these strategies *self-reinforcing*, so that some immediate benefit or reward can be derived from engaging in them, and so that one does not have to rely on belief in ultimate victory

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gested that Britain should look back and consider what might have been done and how much money could have been spent in the past to bring Rhodesia to a position today where it was felt independence could be granted. Britain could then get the Commonwealth together and raise, say, £200 million to bring Rhodesia to such a position by possibly 1980. Of this, possibly £50 million could be spent on education, £50 million on boosting the economy, £50 million on communications and £50 million on other projects" (the Salisbury correspondent in *The Star* [Johannesburg], January 12, 1966, 21). Although this suggestion reflects the paternalist position of "education for maturity," it also reflects the approach of the positive reward, provided there is a way of tying the transfer of £200 million to the steps toward majority rule.

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or loyalty to the regime alone? The following accounts seem to indicate that this is the case for all three.

> Q. How do you manage with so little petrol?
> A. Oh, that is easy enough. You know, if a family has two cars and receives some petrol for both, to put one car in the garage is not very much of a sacrifice. Besides, some of us who live in the countryside and have offices in Salisbury join our rations and form a car pool and go in together. It is strange to see how much better friends one becomes with one's neighbors in such situations—we really did not know them before. And if even this should not work, this may be the great impetus that forces the city to develop adequate collective transportation, and if even that does not work, doctors are almost unanimous that walking is good for you.[19]

Thus, an important mechanism increasing group solidarity is revealed: the car pool seems to have some of the same functions as the bomb shelter during an air raid.[20] *Adaptive measures* have become goals in themselves.

> Q. But what about all kinds of luxury goods, or household appliances?
> A. You must remember that very many families here are quite well off. They have a refrigerator, maybe even two. They work. If refrigerators cannot be bought, well, some will be without and others will not have the latest models. But most will have refrigerators, and they will last—our technicians are not so bad that they cannot improvise some spare parts. And as to luxury goods—we have been without them during two world wars when we helped Britain, the same Britain that attacks us today, and we can do without them again. Besides, one family has some and another family will borrow from it. That was also the pattern during the war.

Again, there is the possibility of improvisation and of mutual aid, with the well-known social implications of both. Hence, there is immediate reward in the process, and this reward may be particularly attractive as more people are deprived of this kind of experience in their daily

[19] Thus, there were stories in the press about the Masais, who are able to keep fit and healthy because they walk to work (hunting) over long distances every day.

[20] A good account of the effects of air raids on Britain is found in R. M. Titmuss, "Argument of Strain," in Eric and Mary Josephson, eds., *Man Alone* (New York 1962), 505-15.

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life. (Thus, in a more traditional and poorer society there would be only marginal reward to derive from this sort of experience, since it is not scarce.)

However, *sacrifice* also has its immediate, built-in reward. *Conspicuous sacrifice*, when indulged in by the leaders of a society, may have its obvious propaganda effect: the sanctions themselves may give the leaders pretexts to demonstrate their ability to share the plight of the people. Under normal conditions such occasions are denied them and such demonstrations would in fact make them appear ridiculous; under moderate hardship they can act out a carefully balanced amount of heroism and sacrifice. And this signal is communicated not only to their own believers and disbelievers, but also to the sending nation(s), conveying to them the message "We would rather suffer at your hands than give in."[21] Thus, the situation opens possibilities for the use of symbols out of which strong ideological sentiments can be made, and this is another self-reinforcing ingredient.[22] It should be noted in passing that this advantage does not apply equally to the case of military action, since there heroism may be too risky: the leaders may be captured or simply perish if they carry it too far.

Let us then turn to the possible consequences of *restructuring the economy*. People in key economic positions are also usually people with political influence. An economic boycott may reshuffle the relative importance of economic sectors so that new economic elites emerge. The question is, Will the new elites be more or less willing to comply with the norms of the sending nations? Since economic boycott in general implies a rapid decrease of import-export business and a change toward home-based production, the question is whether the cosmopolitan layer of the tertiary sector (engaged in trade), which stands to lose some of its significance, is more or less amenable to compliance than are the emerging leaders of home-based industry or agriculture (or other primary activities).

In the Rhodesian case, the farmers are seen as the group most solidly behind Smith.[23] In addition to the simple structural reasons that are

[21] After UDI, shops in Salisbury displayed posters with drawings of Rhodesians in uniform, with rather determined faces, tightening their belts. The general idea was that of serving the country again, of "the men being called up," something of the prewar atmosphere described by Doris Lessing in her novel *A Proper Marriage*.

[22] Thus, the idea of the prime minister bicycling to his office might appeal to many. (Incidentally, the photograph of Smith on a bicycle that figured in many newspapers implied no permanent change in his means of transportation.) But just as important might be the idea of symbolizing "everything normal"; the receiving nation can make political gains on this as well as on conspicuous sacrifice.

[23] According to observers, the opposition in the white Rhodesian population amounts to around 20,000 and consists mainly of the press, the bankers, the industrial-

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conducive to making farmers nationalists in most nations,[24] and in favor of cheap labor, there is also the element of isolation from world trends and consequently a solid measure of conservatism, a kind of asynchrony relative to the second half of the twentieth century. For the cosmopolitan businessmen nothing of this applies, or it applies much less. Businessmen are more likely to have connections abroad—or money. They depend for their personal needs less on development in Rhodesia, whereas the farmers have no or few alternatives. But for this same reason the farmers might also feel that the policies of the Smith government are rather hazardous, and one day the farmers could turn against him. In our view, however, this is unlikely precisely because of the way in which economy and sociology here seem to go hand in hand: changes in the economy put power more and more into the hands of the farmers; they increasingly become the symbol of national survival. Moreover, when an import-export firm has to close down there is little alternative use to which it can be put, whereas it makes a great deal of sense for the government to subsidize the conversion of tobacco land to grain fields or pasture.[25]

Thus, there is a built-in and ever more powerful mechanism of reinforcement here, and the same effect seems to apply to efforts to make substitute products. If such efforts fail, then Britain is to blame; if they succeed, then it is a proof of local ingenuity and justifies the claim to independence. To make automobile fuel out of sugarcane—or even out of coal, which is also a surplus product—would be the ideal.[26] To assume that the nation receiving sanctions will never be able to do such things because it never did them before is a little bit like trusting that children will never grow up when left alone. At any rate, the self-reinforcing power of such inventiveness will probably lead to a chain

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ists, the lawyers, the teachers, and people in their primary circles. We know of no solid data to support this contention.

[24] One very simple reason is that the ownership of farms is usually hereditary, which ties farmers to the territory for generations ahead. A professional's job is not hereditary; he can afford to be nonnationalist or even antinationalist since his position will not similarly affect his offspring.

[25] Of course, the list of people belonging to the opposition according to observers (footnote 23) is impressive, and these people could be most dangerous to the regime. However, they have lost much of their prestige simply from being less functional than the farmers, who will always have the important task of keeping the population alive during a period of crisis. Thus, our argument is in terms of transfer of legitimacy due to a dislocation of the center of gravity in being functional to the community at large. The result may be more legitimacy to sectors favoring more apartheid.

[26] Thus, in South Africa, the technology of extracting oil from coal is already quite advanced. According to the *Times Review of Industry* (December 1963), about ten percent of the country's needs are taken care of that way (the state-owned plant SASOL produces about forty million gallons of gasoline annually).

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reaction both in inventiveness and in feelings of autonomy. Thus, it is almost certain that regardless of the political outcome, Rhodesian industry will come out of the crisis with a greater share of the home markets—and this possibility probably serves as an extra incentive.

In the pattern of employment, however, it is difficult to discover anything self-reinforcing. The governmental policy of letting imported labor from neighboring countries to be the first to absorb the shock so as to deflect the effects of sanctions and even turn them toward friends of the enemy (except for the case of Africans from Mozambique and South Africa) is probably clearer, but it is not internally stimulating. The next in line to absorb the shock would be, or could be, native Africans. A cleverer policy would be to distribute the impact more evenly and to display some cases of conspicuous sacrifice by the white community.

But very strong reinforcement, as far as we can judge, comes from the third strategy, that of *smuggling*:

> Q. But haven't you all become so well adjusted to rather regular business patterns that it is difficult to do more irregular types of business?
>
> A. As to the moral aspect, No—if we have to do something irregular, Britain is to blame, not we. And as to habits, I'll tell you how it is. Look at Salisbury; see how beautiful and perfect everything is. Look at the surroundings; see what a good life we have. My wife and I used to go to garden parties and give garden parties perhaps three times a week; there were shows and exhibitions; the weekend trip to Beira for a good swim, an occasional hunt—we had and still have everything except, I have to admit, life had a tendency to be somewhat boring. And then these blessed sanctions came into our existence and we had to get out of our smug practices and use all our talents again. I have never had so much fun since I came here—years ago! You have to figure out how products can be brought in by middlemen, how you can threaten that firms we used to import from will lose their markets here forever if they do not help us, how goods can eventually be smuggled into the country if that is necessary, how to get petrol more cheaply than from the Portuguese merchants who set up filling stations across the border from Umtali and charge exorbitant prices for the gallon. You really get a chance to show what you are worth.

At this point it must be added that the challenge of smuggling is not

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enough; one also has to be at least moderately successful in order to be rewarded in the process. Thus, if the sending nations are able to ensure that regardless of how much talent is invested in smuggling very few goods will in fact materialize, the rewards from this defense mechanism will dwindle away. But in Rhodesia, with its extensive borders adjoining friendly territories, even moderate talent should be able to bring about major success.[27]

Thus, in general the thesis that economic sanctions, at least to start with, will have a tendency to create social and political integration rather than disintegration seems to be a relatively strong one.[28] But this thesis is not unconditional. Thus, it will probably not hold in traditional societies based more on primary relationships, but then such societies are less likely to depend on trade for their continued existence.

[27] According to the report on the fuel situation in Rhodesia circulated to member states by the UN Secretary-General, the oil expert Walter J. Levy states that "oil shortages are already the cause, and will increasingly be so, of the major and most overt upset in the Rhodesian economy and society." The statement is interesting since it is not phrased in absolute terms; all it says is that the oil embargo causes more economic difficulties than the other embargoes. And Levy also adds, ". . . If the question were one of survival the availability of oil, in itself, would certainly not be the decisive consideration during the next few months." This sounds reasonable, since only twenty-seven percent of the energy needs are covered by means of oil, whereas sixty-three percent are met by coal from the Wankie coal belt and ten percent of the needs are covered by hydroelectric power from the Kariba Dam. Since the Wankie coal belt is in Rhodesia and "to blow up the Kariba Dam would mean to flood Beira" (according to a Rhodesian informant), this means that about three-quarters of the energy needs are under control. And where oil is concerned, the railroads have been switching from diesel engines back to steam engines and the forty-three percent of the oil that went into ordinary gasoline for cars covers a substantial fraction of luxury consumption. It is worse with the ten percent that was used for airplanes, but this is hardly too difficult to replace (figures from "The Bite on Business," *The Sunday Times*, November 14, 1965). But when Mr. Levy, the oil expert, goes on to say that by the middle of 1966 the Rhodesian economy would be significantly affected and "that, on such a basis, there would be pressure on the regime, and the oil embargo could be of even greater political and psychological import than the immediate economic impact," then one wonders on what kind of data such conclusions are based (quotations from *UN Weekly News Summary*, Press Release WS/231, March 4, 1966, 3-4). According to the *Rand Daily Mail* (Johannesburg), February 16, 1966, about 150,000 liters of gasoline go into Rhodesia by car from South Africa and Mozambique every day, which is close to the normal consumption of about 300,000 liters. According to the *New York Times* (international edition, April 16-17, 1966, 1), the amount had risen to 50,000 *gallons* from South Africa alone by mid-April, but then the minimum daily consumption was estimated at 150,000 gallons a day.

[28] Such theories, understandably, have also been very popular in Rhodesia. Thus, in a letter to the editor of the *Rhodesia Herald*, November 25, 1965, one writer asserts (rightly or not) that the food situation was better in Germany in 1918 than in 1917, that the Versailles Treaty led to the German experiments with rockets with their well-known consequences, that the reparations Germany had to pay to Serbia (such as trams for Belgrade) gave Germany a bridgehead on the economic market in that country because of the necessity for repairs, and so on—in short, stories of how sanctions may backfire and lead to unanticipated consequences. Stories of the same kind also cropped up in our interviews.

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The theory also presupposes that there is strong support among the sectors that become dominant in a crisis economy, and it presupposes that smuggling is not entirely impossible. Under these conditions the short-term impact of economic sanctions will be negligible.

However, it can be argued that even if the *economic* effect of sanctions is negligible, or at least manageable, there will always remain a *moral* element. Other nations have by their action declared themselves against the receiving nation and have tied their action to moral depreciation, even condemnation. What are the effects of such moral disapproval?

These effects may lead to surrender—for instance, under the conditions mentioned above of strong latent identification with sending nation(s) and severe doubts as to the propriety of one's own actions. However, both of these conditions can be manipulated by means of modern propaganda, for the government in the receiving nation will legitimize its control of the machinery of news communication with reference to the crisis and will probably gain acceptance for its claim. The obvious techniques are to keep public expressions of approval of the motives of the sending nations below a certain threshold, perhaps even down to zero percent, and approval of one's own motives above a certain threshold, perhaps even up to a hundred percent. Only a very unrefined government will aim for the extreme thresholds here—the more sophisticated will stay away from the extremes to satisfy the more sophisticated members of the population. What matters is not so much what people think as whether they think there are many who share their treacherous thoughts—in other words, what matters to the government is the creation and maintenance of "pluralistic ignorance."[29] And complete censorship will only lead to suspicion.

Much more complicated is the case, as in Rhodesia, where there is at the same time very strong identification with the sending nation and strong disapproval of its sanctions. In other words, there is cognitive dissonance, as illustrated in Diagram 3.[30] The simplest way of solving these dissonances would be either to accept the sanctions and become, in fact, an adherent of Wilson's policies or to reject Britain and become an anti-British Rhodesian. No doubt both these factions exist, but they

[29] "Pluralistic ignorance" is what obtains when there is confusion about where the majority stands. In Rhodesia, even under the mildly authoritarian conditions reigning there now, it would be difficult for an opposition that happened to be in the majority to know that this was the case, since there is no adequate way of expressing such attitudes, and hence no incentive for action due to the feeling of being supported and strongly so.

[30] For the first presentation of this theory, see L. Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston 1957), particularly chap. 1.

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

DIAGRAM 3. A SIMPLE, UNBALANCED CONFIGURATION

are not majority factions. In fact, there are strong formal and informal pressures against either position; against the former for obvious reasons and against the latter because so much of the local ideology is based on the idea of loyalty to British symbols. Hence, the technique for resolving the dissonance is to split the cognitive elements, and since attitudes toward sanctions are homogeneously negative, "Britain" will have to be split. Some interview excerpts give insights into the mechanisms:

Q. But Queen Elizabeth, whom you say you greatly admire, and pay allegiance to, declared herself in favor of the sanctions. . . .

A. Do you really believe that? Oh no, that was because she was *forced* to do so, and by whom do you think, by that same Wilson. He told her to do so. But you know what, some of us who watched television very closely saw a twinkle in her eye; that was a secret signal to us that she is really in favor of us, she is with us.

The structure of this cognitive configuration, shown in Diagram 4, is obtained by introducing "Wilson" and splitting "Queen Elizabeth"



DIAGRAM 4. A REVISED, BALANCED CONFIGURATION

into the apparent and the real one. There is not only one cycle but sixteen (one with five, five with four, and ten with three elements), all of them balanced. The structure has several advantages. It preserves the basic attitudes, and at the same time it has a measure of sophistication that can serve as a good basis for speeches, editorials, and such. The ability to distinguish between the apparent and the real is usually

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highly thought of, and much involved conversation is possible on the basis of Diagram 4, with Wilson pictured as a crook and Queen Elizabeth as schizophrenic.

Another example, based on the Rhodesians' intense dislike of Harold Wilson, is presented in Diagram 5.



DIAGRAM 5. A SIMPLE, UNBALANCED CONFIGURATION

Q. You love Britain and want to remain within the Commonwealth, and you dislike Wilson. But you cannot deny that Wilson is a part of Britain, and even a rather important one, the country's Prime Minister. . . .

A. Oh yes, he is. By a rather slim majority, though.[31] But that does not prove that Wilson is a true Briton. It only proves how clever he is, and how effective international communism is.

Q. How so?

A. Well, it is well known here that Wilson is really a Communist; you see it quite clearly in his earliest writings. In later years he has disguised it, or tried to do so. But we believe there is some kind of link between him and Peking. For how could you otherwise explain all these things that happen? That we, the best-run colony in Africa and the most truly anti-Communist of them all should be the last ones to gain independence, that everything should be turned against us when we want what was due to us rightfully after our partners in the Federation, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, or Zambia and Malawi as they like to call themselves now, gained independence?

Again, there is the same technique. "Wilson" is split into two, the position as prime minister and the person Wilson—and just as the apparent Queen Elizabeth should be dissociated from the real one, so should the person Wilson be dissociated from the prime minister's office, which he holds unrightfully, not because of any electoral fraud, but because he has not revealed his true intentions. Moreover, "international communism" is brought into the picture, as in Diagram 6. Again there is an extension from one unbalanced cycle to sixteen

[31] This was in January 1966.

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

DIAGRAM 6. A REVISED, BALANCED CONFIGURATION

balanced ones, and again, an increase not only in balance, but also in sophistication of the structure of argumentation. The evils are now brought back to "international communism," which offers an extensive basis of explanation since there is a great deal of tradition, even literature, that the theories can be hooked on to.

Q. But how does international communism operate here?

A. Well, you know the hold they have on Tanzania, with that Peking Communist Nyerere. You also know that Peking wants copper. So what would be better than to create the conditions under which better land transport would have to be built from Tanzania right into the copper belt, under the pretext of helping Zambia with oil and petrol, and then the Chinese can sit on it? Also, conditions are created whereby the moderate Kaunda regime may have to yield to extreme leftists, and Zambia is also theirs. Kenya can fall any moment—so isn't it rather strange that Britain should attack the only real friends they have down here in the fight against international communism? And how do you account for that, except by admitting that communism has crept into Britain itself—or rather, at its very head, in that Mr. Wilson? And that he was able to persuade the others, playing on their fear of losing the votes of the Afro-Asian nations in the United Nations?

Expressions like these are so frequent that they seem to be a rather accepted ideology. There is no sign of the Rhodesians' underestimating the enemy: to them he is both strong and extremely intelligent in his machinations. However, he does make a mistake: he underestimates the dormant power of Britain, and fails to foresee that one day the British people will awake and see the spell that has been cast over them. And in the meantime it is up to Rhodesia to keep vigil, to be on guard

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and tell the truth to the world. This duty also gives an international role to the Rhodesians, a deeper meaning to their existence and to their fight. The parallel with Cuba in the Western hemisphere is immediate.

Thus, the world is dichotomized into one good and one bad part, as it usually is in times of crisis. But, one may ask, what has happened to the basic issues, majority rule and UDI? And this is precisely the point: the basic issues have in a sense disappeared; a reinterpretation has taken place, giving the sanctions a new meaning. Not that Rhodesians are not able at any moment to argue about these issues, but the third issue of communism is always there as an even more dominant theme. Whether it is called a smoke screen or not, its role in the cognitive system is considerable.

The insertion of "majority rule" and "British rule" in the cognitive system presented above is simple: both kinds of rule are possible agents of communism. "British rule" is seen as such only as long as it means Wilson or Labour rule (for which reason the Rhodesians paid enormous attention to all British by-elections that might have upset Wilson's precarious majority in early 1966 and to all signs of a split in the Conservative party, which they analyzed as they did Queen Elizabeth) and alignment with Afro-Asian nations in the UN. And "majority rule" is seen as the agent of communism only as long as it means government dominated by "all these Communist-trained Africans, coming out of Dar es Salaam, aligning themselves with Nkrumah, Touré, and others" and "so-called Pan-Africanism." Thus, the final goal is arrived at: the portrayal of independent Rhodesia as one of the few remaining bastions of the free world, misunderstood and betrayed by people who would do well to put their own house in order before they criticize white Rhodesians.[32]

> Here are we in little Rhodesia trying to form a bastion of democracy against the shaky black states to the north of us only to find the formidable might of the good old U.S.A. pitted against us. Why?
>
> Have we ever asked you for anything in the way of foreign-aid handouts or squandered your gifts on graft, personal gain, or flashy cars, like so many of the black despots in Africa and Asia? One day you are going to need a trustworthy and staunch ally in this part of Africa and, apart from the Republic of South Africa, which is likely to be your next target for destruction, on which

[32] See letter to the editor, *New York Times*, January 28, 1966.

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other country in the whole of this continent can you honestly rely with confidence?

Where is your much-vaunted sense of fair play? Where were your sanctions and embargoes when Hungary was crushed or when India seized Goa? Perhaps the nations involved were a little too powerful for your might, and it is only the smaller, comparatively defenseless countries like ours that you are prepared to tackle.

Well, good luck to you—you go right on trying to placate and pander to the petty little tyrants on this continent and see what you get by way of thanks for it in the end.

As for criticism and your holier-than-thou attitude in the United Nations and elsewhere regarding our relationship with the Africans, may I suggest that you put your own house in order and start treating your own Negroes and Red Indians (especially the latter —they have more right to the country than the European "settlers") fairly before throwing stones in our direction.

You had better snap out of your fawning terror of the Afro-Asian bloc and give us a chance before you lose yet another of the few friends left to you in this sorry world.

However, consistent ideologies are not enough. They may appeal to the intellectual and be useful in discussions, but in an atmosphere where political discussion is discouraged and contact with foreigners is seriously reduced, they are of limited value except as a ritual, not unlike religious liturgies. People cannot repeat these arguments in their daily conversations; in such contexts other symbols and forms of expression appealing more directly to the emotions are needed. And they have not been wanting in Salisbury after UDI.

First of all, there are the *jokes* ridiculing the sanctions. An advertisement in the *Rhodesia Herald* announced the New Year's Eve party at a certain restaurant with an admonition to "order tables now," some alluring comments on the culinary pleasures to be expected, and the assurance that "there will be no sanctions against drinks." The point about this jocular remark is not that it is particularly good—much better jokes were heard in everyday conversation—but that it appeared in an advertisement for everyone to see. Thus, the people become familiarized with the sanctions, and the sanctions become more manageable, just as "doodlebugs" were more manageable than V-weapons. At the same time, jokes heard by the present observer were never directed against Britain as such, but rather against Wilson; never against Com-

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monwealth symbols, but rather against policies and some member nations of the Commonwealth.

Second, there is the element of superstition, even *mysticism*, dear to anyone exposed to a crisis. Thus, the word "Rhodesian" was held to carry a secret message, revealed when a line is drawn between the *s* and the *i*—Rhodes/ian—or Cecil *Rhodes* and *Ian* Smith:

> So, you see, it is already in the word! Rhodes founded the colony;
> Ian is giving us independence!

It was also reported that the Friends of Rhodesia Association went out of their way to get their offices in Durban set up in Salisbury House, Smith Street, but were unable to get them on the eleventh floor to symbolize the date of UDI (11/11/65).[33] This kind of magic is probably linked to right-wing extremism in somewhat the same way as dogmatism and quasi-scientism are tied in with left-wing extremism.

Third, there is an element of *style* in the Smith regime that may appear spurious to its style-conscious antagonists in the mother country, but not necessarily to the Rhodesians themselves. A great proportion of the customary rigamarole of British democracy is carried over, and the solemn phraseology remains intact.[34] However, Smith himself is as an orator considerably closer to the style of the Rhodesian farmer than is, for instance, Wilson. Symbols associated with Smith, such as the RAF, "wounded in the war," "a farmer himself," a certain lean handsomeness, and the idea that he is not so much a professional politician as

[33] This Association was originally formed with the three goals of promoting tourism to Rhodesia, of encouraging the purchase of Rhodesian goods, and of acting as a pressure group by writing letters to the press, and so on.

[34] The Proclamation of Independence, signed on "this eleventh day of November in the Year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five" may sound quaint: "Now Therefore, We the Government of Rhodesia, in humble submission to Almighty God who controls the destinies of nations, conscious that the people of Rhodesia have always shown unswerving loyalty and devotion to Her Majesty the Queen and earnestly praying that we and the people of Rhodesia will not be hindered in our determination to continue exercising our undoubted right to demonstrate the same loyalty and devotion, and seeking to promote the common good so that the dignity and freedom of all men may be assured, DO, BY THIS PROCLAMATION, adopt, enact and give to the people of Rhodesia the Constitution annexed hereto. GOD SAVE THE QUEEN."

There is style to that proclamation, and its expressive adequacy was fully appreciated by our informants. The same applies to the little document entitled *Rhodesia's Finest Hour*, showing the Smith government impeccably lined up for the signature ceremony, with the Queen's image watching them. We quote from Smith's speech: "Let there be no doubt that we in this country stand second to none in our loyalty to the Queen and whatever else other countries may have done or may yet do, it is our intention that the Union Jack will continue to fly in Rhodesia and the National Anthem continue to be sung. . . . We Rhodesians have rejected the doctrine of appeasement and surrender. The decision which we have taken today is a refusal by Rhodesians to sell their birth-right, and even if we were to surrender, does anyone believe that Rhodesia would be the last target of the Communists and the Afro-Asian bloc?"

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a solid Rhodesian who has taken on himself the responsibility for a job to be done, must contribute to identification. Above all this distinctly Rhodesian style underlines the justification of UDI and the idea that Rhodesians are different from and yet of the same blood as the British.

In a sanction process a receiving nation is greatly aided by a general tendency to *underestimate* it. It is customary in human affairs to underestimate one's opponent, under a relatively wide variety of conditions. There is a particularly simple reason why this is *a fortiori* true for the case of economic sanctions. A nation about to be punished is a nation that has done something wrong; it is morally inferior in one way or another. To attribute to it intelligence, tactical ability, moral strength, tenaciousness, or other properties valued highly by the punishing nation(s) can easily lead to serious cognitive dissonance. The more such virtues sending nations(s) admit the receiving nation has, the less justified do the former's own actions appear and the less probable their chances of victory, for the properties mentioned are precisely among the ones needed to counteract the effect of sanctions.

Thus, one can predict easy acceptance of ideas to the effect that the population of the receiving nation is inferior where intelligence and morality are concerned. Varieties of this theme—for instance, that this inferiority applies "only to the leaders and not to the people" or "only to the people and not to the leaders" (who control the people in an authoritarian or totalitarian manner)—will also in all probability appear, just as theories about gray eminences.[35] Obviously, such theories may often have a nucleus of truth or may even be quite adequate descriptions of objective reality—but this is not the reason why they are held to be true. When pressed for data, people in the sending nation(s) will usually quickly reveal a nonempirical attitude, a lack of data, and a lack of ability to revise their judgment when new data that point toward revisions of the prejudices appear.

In the Rhodesian case the most common themes are expressed in these excerpts:

> The white population in Rhodesia is, in fact, so uneducated that they say about ninety-seven percent of them are illiterate. The reason why they are there is that they cannot compete with West Indian labor (Nigerian politician).

> The white population is about the size of the population of Chelsea.

[35] Expression of such theories was very frequently found in Salisbury as well as London. Possibly the theories are quite valid—but then they are also valid in all other countries. Ghost-writers and -thinkers are found everywhere.

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> Now, imagine you asked the city council in that city to take care of the affairs of a nation. They would simply not be able to do so; more talent and training are required (British politician).
>
> Most of the settlers are there to seek comfort alone; that is all they care for; they have no higher ideals than their own well-being. Deprive them of some of their material comfort, deny them some of their imported stuff, and they will ask for fair weather very quickly (countless informants, rank-and-file and politicians).
>
> One reason why the Wilson team could not negotiate with Smith's people was that they were so silly that they did not even understand the proposals put forward to them (British informants).
>
> Smith is not able even to write his own speeches, not to mention formulate governmental policies—but there are men behind him who are the real rulers and who do all the brain work. Smith is only a front figure (Opposition member, Rhodesia).
>
> They have poorer brains down there, and they are shut out from the general trends. They used to say that "Kenya was for officers, Rhodesia was for other ranks." And these poor whites have of course much more to lose (white newspaperman, Kenya).

What all such statements do not take into account is above all the same factor: that human beings and social systems change when exposed to crisis. The city council of X-town, when given the responsibility of heading a nation, may develop abilities not expected by either itself or others; and a society, when worked upon by the forces of cohesion, may draw on reservoirs of strength and ability not only to resist stress but also to act creatively—qualities that lie latent in quieter periods. This is in a sense a truism—anyone who lived through the occupation of, say, a European nation during World War II will know by his own experience that there is a great deal of truth to this.

More important is the advantage of being underestimated. First of all, it makes the sending nation(s) overestimate the probable effect of the sanctions they initiate, and that gives the receiving nation a better chance to counteract the effects. Moreover, if the receiving nation is clever enough, it will conceal some of its unrecognized strength and conform to its image as inferior and may be able to extend the fight on this basis. Besides, to appear stupid in a conference may be a very clever tactic since it impedes communication and makes it easier afterward to claim that there were misunderstandings. In more formal terms: one

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can retain the pretense of willingness to negotiate and yet make negotiation impossible. At any rate, to have hidden resources is always an asset.[36]

We know of no better way to summarize all this discussion of the defense against sanctions than by quoting the following lines from Ian Smith's "Three Months of Independence" broadcast to his nation:

> The thought of operations carried out by British troops based in a Commonwealth country—which is now a republic and no longer acknowledges the Queen or flies the Union Jack—against a fellow-member of the Commonwealth which has no wish to become a republic, unless the Commonwealth abandons the ideals upon which it was built, still shows loyalty to the Queen and is proud to fly the Union Jack, is to me incomprehensible. . . . Is it not appropriate to ask Mr. Wilson a direct question: Is he a fellow traveler?
>
> If not, why does he allow British ships to pour British provisions into the Viet Cong, thus assisting them to wage their deadly war against Americans, Australians and New Zealanders?
>
> If not, why is he aiding and abetting the Communist forces in their march down the American continent?
>
> If not, why does he continue to supply and assist the Communist revolutionaries in Cuba?
>
> If not, why does he continue to aid and finance, with British taxpayers' money, the openly Communistic countries of Ghana and Tanzania, in spite of their withdrawal from the Commonwealth, accompanied as it was by the hurling of vile insults at Britain?
>
> If not, why—when Rhodesia is holding the front line against the Communist forces in Africa—is Mr. Wilson boasting and bragging about his efforts which are calculated to bring us to our knees?
>
> If he is not a Communist, perhaps he could tell us precisely what he is doing to combat the spread of communism in the world today, on the one hand, and on the other hand, what he is doing to promote democracy and democratic institutions in the world, and particularly in Africa?[37]

[36] This is particularly true if one can even afford to use these resources to help others when one is in distress oneself. A typical example of the Smith government's strategy in this respect was demonstrated in connection with the cyclone in Mozambique at the beginning of January 1966: Smith sent a widely publicized cable to the Governor-General of Mozambique offering all kinds of assistance—at a period when Rhodesia itself was in a difficult situation (Rhodesia Ministry of Information, Press Statement 29/66, January 10, 1966).

[37] Quoted in the *Rhodesia Herald*, February 11, 1966.

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IV. Conclusions

In this article the conclusion about the probable effectiveness of economic sanctions is, generally, negative. To arrive at this conclusion the target society has been analyzed as an organism with a certain self-maintaining potential. When hit and hurt it reacts—like most organisms—in such a way as to try to undo the damage and to restore the *status quo ante*. In so doing, the target society may even be partly strengthened because of the hidden forces that are activated. The goals of the system may not only be maintained but even be reinforced; the sending nation(s) not only may fail to achieve their goals, but may even contribute to exactly the opposite of what they hoped for.

Sanctions against collectivities will always affect the just together with the unjust, since collective sanctions correspond to a philosophy of collective guilt. From the outside, where nations as such (Germany, Rhodesia) appear as the wrong-doers, sanctions are just another way of acting out the billiard-ball image of nations—that is, nations as undifferentiated wholes. From the inside, collective sanctions seem unreasonable to both the just and the unjust, with the consequences we have tried to describe.

To many, these effects will serve as an example of the lack of isomorphism between interpersonal and international relations: what works at the individual level does not necessarily work at the level of interaction between nations. However true this may often be, it is not a good example. Prisoners will often feel precisely that "only a part of me did wrong, and only a short time—and here all of me is imprisoned, and for a long time." Even if great care is taken, verbally, to draw a line between the *peccatum* and the *peccator* and not generalize from the sinful act to definitions of the whole person as a sinner, imprisonment is nevertheless a way of putting all parts of the person, sinful or not, in prison. Thus, there is in practice also a billiard-ball conception of man as an undifferentiated whole. Biology protects this billiard ball from differentiated imprisonment, much as norms of national integrity protect the nation billiard ball. In both cases imagination must be exercised to find more differentiated forms of punishment.[38]

[38] Let us pursue this parallel a little further. A basic point in sanction theory is *immediacy*; whether the sanctions take the form of reward or of punishment, they should ideally follow the actions to be rewarded or punished so closely that a clear connection is established. If there is a considerable delay, the learning effect may be considerably reduced. However, a characteristic of the international system is its long reaction-time, because of the generally weak level of integration and because of delays caused at the intranational level.

The case of Norwegian trade with Rhodesia may be suggestive in this respect. In this

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But nothing of what has been said should be taken to imply that there are no conditions under which economic sanctions will work. For reasons due to the structure of the internal economy of the target nation as well as to its trade structure, the damage wrought or anticipated may appear so much more frightening than the renunciation of its goals that capitulation or compromise may be the result. Also, although there may be short-term adaptation, the long-term effect may nevertheless be capitulation or compromise out of boredom, fatigue, and desire to return to more normal conditions and ways of life.

Then there is another, and much more important, class of conditions under which sanctions may work and often do work. In fact, sanctions are used continuously, in everyday social interaction, at the individual and at the national levels of interaction. But characteristic of this use of sanctions is a communality of interest in which rupture of generally smooth relations is perceived as a worse threat than some short-run lack of gratification. Hence, sanctions not only "bite," they also "work" in the sense that compliance is obtained. This is the case within primary relations, as within a family or a peer group, and is also the case within secondary relations based on contractual or normative situations. But when this sense of communality of interest is lost, i.e., when there is

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case, "all imports to and exports from Southern Rhodesia, except consignments contracted before November 27, 1965, have been banned." What then happened to Norwegian trade with Rhodesia can be seen from Table II.

TABLE II. MONTHLY VALUE OF NORWEGIAN-RHODESIAN TRADE, 1966 COMPARED WITH 1965, IN THOUSANDS OF NORWEGIAN KRONER

	MONTHLY CHANGE IN TRADE, 1966 MINUS 1965 VALUES	CUMULATIVE CHANGE IN TRADE, 1966 MINUS 1965	
		Value	*Percent*
January	1975	1975	258.1
February	216	2191	159.3
March	—2347	—156	—3.7
April	644	488	11.0
May	224	712	14.5
June	1471	2183	36.7
July	—3093	—910	—10.1
August	—1911	—2821	—25.7
Total	—2821	—2821	—25.7

The figures are for exports and imports combined. Thus, there was a quick *increase* in trade after UDI (mainly in imports from Rhodesia). Then there are some fluctuations in the cumulative pattern until the decrease became stabilized during the summer of 1966. In total trade statistics for 1966, a considerable decrease relative to 1965 will appear. But the pattern is similar to rewarding a child for its mischievous behavior at breakfast, punishing it in the afternoon and the evening, and then announcing that the total day was worse for the child than the preceding day. (Trade statistics are from *Månedsstatisikk over utenrikshandelen*, Statistisk Sentralbyrå, Oslo.)

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conflict and patterns of influence become predominantly coercive, then sanctions seem to function in a completely different manner. This does not mean that they cannot both bite and work in this case, too, but there are indeed many conditions that must be fulfilled, as has been indicated in this article.

The condition for sanctions to be effective that is most often referred to in more or less scholarly analyses is the problem of *universality*. The argument is that economic sanctions have failed because they were not universal; some countries did not participate, or some other way of circumventing the sanctions was found (smuggling, use of third parties, and so on). Only detailed analysis of individual cases can do justice to this argument. But even though the argument no doubt has some validity, there are also important reasons to believe that this validity is limited.

First of all, even under a totally effective blockade a country may continue to run on its internal resources, and these resources (economic, social, moral, political) may be strengthened rather than weakened by the sanctions. The question is whether these resources are sufficient to maintain a society and a political community—and this question cannot be answered in general and *a priori*.

Second, although the economic effect of sanctions by definition increases with the increasing participation of the senders, it is not obvious that the moral effect increases. On the contrary, to feel that the rest of the world is "ganging up" on one may serve as a very effective and hardening stimulus, supporting paranoid and psychopathic tendencies as well as more salutary forces.[39] However, we know very little about this.

But even if the direct and intended consequences of sanctions are unlikely to obtain, there may be other effects. When analyzing political actions in terms of their consequences, and particularly in terms of whether the actions serve the purposes intended for them, less rational purposes are often forgotten. If economic sanctions do not make a receiving nation comply, they may nevertheless serve functions that are useful in the eyes of the sending nation(s). There is, for example, the punishment aspect referred to earlier. There is the value of at least doing something, of having the illusion of being instrumental, of being busy in time of crisis. When military action is impossible for one reason or another, and when doing nothing is seen as tantamount to complicity, then *something has to be done to express morality*, something

[39] This is a major perspective in the well-known content analyses of German actions and reactions before the outbreak of World War I made by R. C. North and his colleagues.

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that at least serves as a clear signal to everyone that what the receiving nation has done is disapproved of. If the sanctions do not serve instrumental purposes they can at least have *expressive* functions. Thus, as a highly dramatic (and costly) way of reinforcing international morality, economic sanctions may be useful, although it would be interesting to compare their effects with those of much cheaper means, such as declarations, resolutions, or demonstrations.

This judgment leads to the suspicion that economic sanctions may serve the purpose of expressing moral disapproval best when they are of a symbolic nature and value-deprivation is kept low. Moreover, we believe that this purpose is served still better if the senders deprive themselves of as much or even more value as the receivers are deprived of. Thus, a boycott of South African oranges may by itself be a meaningful demonstration of an attitude, an act of communication so to speak. But which case is more effective: when there is no other way for the boycotters to obtain oranges, whereas South Africa easily finds other markets, or when South Africa finds no substitute market, whereas the boycotters indulge in oranges from Israel, Cyprus, or Spain?—in other words, when only the senders are hurt, or when only the receivers are hurt? The dilemma may serve well as an illustration of the difference between nonviolent and violent reasoning, but where the resolution of the dilemma is concerned we simply do not know the answer.[40]

Let us now turn the argument around and imagine that experiences with economic sanctions in this century had been more positive. Let us imagine that economic sanctions as a coercive measure have become a permanent and frequent aspect of international interaction. What changes does this imply in the structure of the system? And, to what extent are these changes cherished results and to what extent less-applauded consequences?

First of all, if economic sanctions have come to stay, it would be unwise of realistic and clever governments not to think about countermeasures. Some governments will even today define themselves as belonging to minority groups in the international system against whom such sanctions might be wielded; others are foresighted enough to appreciate that the world structure may change and that they may one day become the victims of such policies, however improbable that might seem today.[41]

[40] See footnote 5.

[41] Thus, Norwegians would be most surprised and indignant if they heard that the Lapps had been influential enough to marshal nations into a boycott of Norway because of discriminatory practices. They would be less surprised, perhaps, but equally

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The first and most obvious countermeasure would be to do what many nations do today as a part of their program of total defense: broaden their basis of production for exports so that their economy cannot be destroyed by actions pertaining to one or a few products only. One-crop countries are vulnerable because of the greater ease with which an economic boycott can be supervised.[42] This, then, leads to *diversification of the national economy*.

Second, nations will try to increase the number of recipients of their exports and suppliers of their imports in order to be less dependent on a single nation that might engage in unilateral boycott actions against them. This will also make boycott actions less easy to carry out since there will be fewer relationships like the one between Britain and Rhodesia. One may refer to this as the *defeudalization of international trade*.

Both of these strategies will be applauded by many today since they are compatible with general moves toward political and economic independence. This approval also applies partly, but only partly, to the third countermeasure: the tendency toward *economic self-sufficiency*, which has been a classical component of defense against military warfare and is an equally obvious component of defense against economic warfare. This tendency is also consistent with the almost universal need for economic structures that can save a nation from expenses in foreign currencies. But the consequence of self-sufficiency is decreased world interdependence; and to the extent that a high level of interdependence, economic and otherwise, between the nations of the world is seen as a way of strengthening the capacity of the international system to resist war, this is a rather negative consequence.

Thus, the countermeasures consequent to a declared policy in favor of the application of economic sanctions are consistent with economic policies pursued by many nations today, but are based on other reasons. This consistency will facilitate their implementation, and, since there will then be less to fear, their implementation will probably also further the acceptance of economic sanctions. But these consequences do not appear to be consistent with a view of the interdependent international structure as more resistant against violent conflict than a structure very low in interdependence. Thus, one may run the risk of buying a (dubi-

indignant if certain attitudes expressed at the UNCTAD conferences about Norwegian shipping policies crystallized into boycott actions.

[42] Shipping is of course also a "crop," putting a nation like Norway in the same position as many developing, raw-material-exporting countries where vulnerability is concerned.

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ous) nonmilitary coercive measure at the expense of an even more dangerous international structure than that we already have.

In conclusion, although this is outside the general scope of this article, let us indicate some classes of answers to the obvious and highly legitimate question, *What, then, can be done?* If we exclude military actions on moral grounds and economic sanctions on pragmatic grounds, what is left? This question can be discussed by reference to the survey given in Section II, with special attention to the dimensions of positive versus negative, individual versus collective, and external versus internal sanctions. This article has dealt with sanctions that are negative, collective, and external—and of a further special type, economic. Answers to the question may, however, possibly be found among the other combinations.

But first of all, there are all the other *negative, collective, and external sanctions*. We have indicated above some reasons why communications sanctions may be effective, but in general we feel that very much of what we have said in this article about economic sanctions would apply *a fortiori* to these other types of sanctions. More particularly, it does not seem that the "nonrecognition games" often indulged in by governments are very instrumental, although they may serve a number of expressive functions. The same probably applies to diplomatic ruptures. But many detailed studies are needed to know more about this.

Second, there is the possibility of *positive, collective, and external sanctions*—in other words, of indicating the conditions under which sending nations will offer *rewards* rather than conditions under which they will try to administer punishment. In the Rhodesia case this would mean outlining a policy of (even escalating) rewards for every step toward majority rule and social integration. It may be argued that this was tried and failed; we shall not enter that debate. The important fact from our point of view is only that we know very little about how such positive sanctions would actually operate. Thus, would none, some, most, or all of the mechanisms we have described for negative sanctions be operative, only in reverse? Would sending nations be willing to renounce the punishment element of negative sanctions? Would there be more or less opportunity to express morality when right rather than wrong actions were singled out for attention through the system of sanctions? Could positive sanctions and negative sanctions be combined?

Third, there is the possibility of *negative, external, but individual sanctions*. These are impossible under present conditions of interna-

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tional law, which reserves the right of jurisdiction over individuals to nationals and/or individuals on national territory. Nevertheless, let us imagine for a moment that international society was structured in such a way that sanctions could be *aimed at responsible individuals*, like federal police actions in some cases in the United States. In that case, almost none of the processes we have indicated would be operative. It is the collective nature of economic sanctions that sets in motion processes that counteract the impact and have the additional quality of being almost automatic. Thus, the skilled politician in the receiving nation who knows or senses these processes has at his disposal a force that he can amplify if he has the necessary talent. He can ride a wave, so to speak, and his major temptation will probably be to overdo the amplification, to emphasize too much the spirit of sacrifice, to use too vivid colors in the way he presents the picture of the situation to his followers, and so on. But, if key individuals in the nation had already been arrested through quick action (perhaps parachutists?), there would be fewer to rally around—and if, in addition, there was a certain level of identification with the world police, this might solve the whole problem.

Fourth, there is the possibility of *external and individual, but positive, sanctions*. This would mean that the sending nations would single out for attention particularly valuable individuals in the receiving nation and would reward them. This is already being done to a considerable extent, through prizes, awards, invitations to lecture, and so forth, but it could be done more systematically and on a grander scale. It would encourage individuals, reduce pluralistic ignorance, serve as a reinforcement of morality, and emphasize the brotherhood of mankind—but it could also open the way to all kinds of retaliation against the rewarded individuals by the authorities to be influenced. It would effectively change loyalty patterns of some people more in the direction of the sending nation(s), but what the short-term and long-term effects of that would be is difficult to tell.

Finally, there is the possibility of *internal sanctions*. In the case of Rhodesia, this would mean the whole repertory of Gandhian techniques, from general strikes to parallel rule—if we exclude direct violence against people or against objects (sabotage). The virtues of internal action are many: it would provide training in political action and organization (but would also presuppose it); it would increase self-reliance instead of strengthening the pattern of reliance on outsiders; it could be much more effective than external sanctions since most of a nation's economy is internal—but it would also set in motion

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many of the same counteracting processes. White Rhodesia would still feel persecuted and would be able to play on the David and Goliath theme—and there will always be many on the side of a David.

In short, it is difficult to tell, but the *a priori* value of these alternative techniques is at least as positive as that of economic sanctions, the world's experiences in this century considered. Thus, the field is open for both research and new policy measures—and it seems safe to predict that the rest of this century will witness much experimentation in this field. It is only to be hoped that such experimentation will be not completely unguided by good theory and good data—as well as by a constructive and positive orientation in international affairs.

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FRENCH STRATEGY EMERGENT

General André Beaufre: A Critique

By EDWARD A. KOLODZIEJ

GENERAL André Beaufre defines strategy as "*the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.*"[1] Nowhere is this dialectic more pronounced than in Beaufre's own works where Beaufre as strategist is pitted against Beaufre as a leading Gaullist strategist and director of the Institut Français d'Études Stratégiques.[2] Beaufre, as strategist, broadens the image of French military thinking projected, for example, by General Pierre Gallois's more widely known, always stimulating, but more flamboyant and less precise, writings.[3] Beaufre, as Gaullist, delineates the profound dimensions and compelling attractions of newly emergent French nationalism which still are only dimly perceived in what is for the French the Anglo-Saxon world.[4] The first Beaufre teaches by way of his original contributions to strategy and deterrence theory; the second informs by way of his candidness and sincere conviction as a

[1] *An Introduction to Strategy*, trans. Major-General R. H. Barry (New York 1965), 22 (Beaufre's italics).

[2] General Beaufre's major works on which this study is based include the following: *Introduction to Strategy* and the French text *Introduction à la Stratégie* (Paris 1963); *Dissuasion et Stratégie* (Paris 1964) and its English translation *Deterrence and Strategy*, trans. Major-General R. H. Barry (New York 1965); *L'O.T.A.N. et l'Europe* (Paris 1966); "L'O.T.A.N. et l'Europe," *Stratégie*, No. 8 (April-May-June 1966), 5-12; "Le Problème du Partage des Responsabilités Nucléaires," *ibid.*, No. 5 (July-August-September 1965), 7-20; "De la Méthode," *ibid.*, No. 6 (October-November-December 1965), 7-15; "Vue d'Ensemble de la Stratégie," *Politique Étrangère*, XXVII, No. 5 (1962), 417-46; "Les Armaments et la Paix," *ibid.*, XXVII, No. 4 (1962), 321-30. General Beaufre's very recently published *Stratégie de l'Action* was not yet available when this article was written.

[3] See especially General Pierre Gallois, *Stratégie de l'Âge Nucléaire* (Paris 1960). A much revised English edition was published under the title *Balance of Terror* (Boston 1961). See also "La Logique de l'Ère Nucléaire et Ses Incidences sur l'O.T.A.N." *L'Avenir de l'Alliance Atlantique* (Paris 1961), 111-78. A representative spectrum of General Gallois's views has appeared in the pages of the influential *Politique Étrangère*: "Les Conséquences Stratégiques et Politiques des Armes Nouvelles," XXIII, No. 2 (1958), 168-80; "La Paix par la Dissuasion Controlée," XXVI, No. 6 (1960), 553-56; "Pierrelatte A Ses Raisons," XXVII, No. 5 (1962), 453-61; "Faux Paradoxes et Vérités Paradoxales," XXVIII, Nos. 4-5 (1963), 317-29. Also relevant are "L'O.T.A.N.: La Défense de l'Europe Occidentale Hier et Aujourd'hui," *Res Publica*, VI, No. 1 (1964), 42-51.

[4] Obvious exceptions are Stanley H. Hoffmann, "De Gaulle, Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance," *International Organization*, XVIII (Winter 1964), 1-28; Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., *France, Troubled Ally* (New York 1960) and "A Personal Evaluation of the Western Alliance," in Furniss, ed., *The Western Alliance* (Columbus 1966), 159-78, esp. 165ff; and Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership* (Garden City 1965), esp. chap. 2, 31-65.

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Gaullist interpreter. Each sharply opposes the other, yet each spurs the other on to formulate or invent a solution to resolve the conflict between them. Indeed, it is precisely this tension that must be seen to appreciate fully Beaufre's approach and contribution to strategy and to understand better the Gaullist persuasion and the troubling dilemmas to which it gives rise.

The first order of business is to sketch a profile of both Beaufres; the second, to analyze the differences between them.

I. Beaufre as Strategist

What may appear initially paradoxical to students familiar with the Niagara of strategic studies issuing from public and private sources in the United States is Beaufre's view that the science and art of strategy are out of fashion, "museum pieces along with Frederick the Great's snuff-box and Napoleon's hat."[5] To Beaufre, what today pass as strategic thought are really technically or tactically oriented studies that are forms of subsystems analysis. Following a more classical tradition, Beaufre conceives strategy as essentially synthetic. It serves overall policy which, in turn, is viewed as a function of a philosophy of life. "It is a *method of thought*, the object of which is to codify events, set them in order of priority and then choose the most effective course of action."[6] The course of action that is adopted aims at applying force to achieve a *decision* over an adversary. It may employ any means, physical or nonphysical, to resolve a conflict of wills. Unlike Clausewitz, who viewed physical force as the ultimate arbiter and victory in battle as the immediate aim of strategy, Beaufre identifies the outcome of clashing wills not exclusively as the residual of physical violence, but as the decision that is "*achieved when a certain psychological effect* has been produced in the enemy: when he becomes convinced that it is useless to start or alternatively to continue the struggle."[7]

Beaufre's view frees strategy from Clausewitz' preoccupation with the application of violence in battle. To Beaufre, it is essentially a psychic process within which physical coercion has an important role, but not necessarily a monopoly. The military has no intrinsic claim to dominate strategic thought. Nor is strategy, as Wohlstetter has also indicated, the preserve of the scientist and technician who create and construct modern weaponry.[8] The controlled application of violence

[5] *Introduction to Strategy*, 11.
[6] *Ibid.*, 13 (Beaufre's italics).
[7] *Ibid.*, 23 (Beaufre's italics).
[8] Albert Wohlstetter, "Scientists, Seers, and Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, XLI (April 1963), 466-78.

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is only one method by which to influence the will of an adversary, and not always the most appropriate in many circumstances. Economic, diplomatic, and propaganda tools, each possessing its own peculiar capacity to influence an adversary's will, may be more effective, efficient, and feasible. The task of total strategy is to ensure that these specialized mechanisms and the substrategies appropriate to them are at the strategist's disposal and under his control. The strategist's task is to assure that when a number of means are simultaneously employed they are internally consistent, complementary, and reinforcing.

This overall perspective of strategy, Beaufre argues, was lost in the carnage of World War I in which men were victims of their own technical genius and outmoded strategic designs. World War II, culminating in the explosion of an atomic bomb, urged technological advances to new heights and stressed material elements in warfare. The complexity, speed, and scope of war accelerated the process of conceptual disintegration of strategic thought begun over a generation before. Strategic thinking fell increasingly behind the rapid pace of military technology, political upheaval, economic production, and scientific discovery. Military destructiveness in particular grew to unprecedented and unanticipated proportions. The prospect of total warfare prompts Beaufre's call for a return to total strategy as a way of comprehending, organizing, and employing all forms of force, now broadly conceived, to resolve conflict on terms favorable to one's interests and objectives. Success in the dialectic struggle assumes the determination of the adversary's will through an understanding and control of the various means actually or potentially available to the antagonists to influence each other. Strategy legislates the utility of different forms of force under differing circumstances to achieve defined objectives. It yields operational doctrine that indicates how, when, where, and in what measure different kinds of force may be usefully applied and the combinations and options that are open to the strategist.

In choosing among possible strategies, the operational guide of total strategy is the effectiveness of each substrategy and the means accompanying it to secure a defined set of purposes. Strategy is the coordinating function, not the function to be coordinated. It is free to employ any method not incompatible with the outcome sought from the dialectic process. By definition it must be open to changes in the material and psychic environment and not anchored to any one doctrine or defensive plan as was French defensive thinking during the interwar period. New tactics and substrategies must always be devised to avoid what Herman Kahn has called operational, procurement, and research

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and development gaps.[9] Total strategy must be highly pragmatic and independent of the means that are invoked to achieve defined policy goals. It is the bridge between means and ends. In the absence of this detached synthetic viewpoint—the view from the bridge, so to speak—particular forms of force, whether material or nonmaterial, and the substrategies fashioned for their use tend to follow their own inner logic to the point of being inconsistent with or even detrimental to the political goals presumably animating them. Examples, such as the course of American military strategy during World War II, come readily to mind. Hypnotic fascination with science and technology or with the unreflective application of military solutions to fundamental political problems threatens to run the same error of confusing military ends with political goals. The unregulated use of military force is cause for special dread. The introduction of physical violence into a contest between two wills, uninfluenced by other factors, inexorably leads upward, as Clausewitz argued, in an ascending spiral of interaction to the elimination of one or the other or both of the adversaries.[10] This model of pure war, a conceptual tool for Clausewitz, is now a distinct possibility.

Beaufre's analysis reformulates Clausewitz' models of pure and real war. He identifies three conceptually distinct, but interrelated and interacting, levels of conflict: nuclear, conventional, and cold-war. The first turns on a dialectic of deterrence; the second, on a dialectic of victory; and the third, on a dialectic of freedom of action. They are distinguishable by the degree of risk that is run at each level in taking action against an opponent. At each level, moreover, there are a large and indeterminate number of subtle gradations. What occurs at one dialectic level also affects what occurs at the others although each has its own rules of operation and peculiar doctrine. Thus, for example, the Soviet-American nuclear balance, while presently stable, encourages at the cold-war level political initiatives, such as personal insults traded between heads of state and extensive espionage and subversive activities, which in other times would have led to armed conflict. French history illustrates Beaufre's argument. Witness those wars involving France provoked by the Ems Dispatch and the slap by an Arab chieftain. The ominous prospect of nuclear conflict induces a greater degree of toleration between antagonists. Aircraft may be shot down mysteriously; presidents, insulted at summit meetings; and one's

[9] *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton 1960), 324ff.
[10] *On War*, trans. O. J. Matthijs Jolles (Washington 1943), 3-18.

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allies, intimidated by the threat of imminent nuclear disaster—yet no war erupts.

The cold war is now a permanent feature of the international environment whereas heretofore it was episodic and atypical.[11] It is a substitute for nuclear war that is recognized as irrational yet, paradoxically enough, as an indispensable instrument of state policy. While a direct strategy, concerned principally with the application of force to a geographical area, is appropriate to nuclear warfare, an indirect strategy suits a cold-war situation. Through internal and external maneuvering, indirect strategy searches to attain its objectives short of military conflict. The external maneuver, employing political, economic, cultural, and limited military means, prepares the enemy psychologically for the inner movement that is specifically aimed at some determinate goal such as the overthrow of a foreign government that is at stake in the struggle. Appeals to international law, humanitarian aspirations, or world public opinion are made to dissipate an enemy's energies, deflect his attention, and finally destroy his freedom of action, particularly in the area that is marked for subversion. Threats of economic retaliation and armed intervention complement these positive assaults. Once the adversary's morale is sapped, his confidence shaken, and his international support eroded, the internal thrust gains increasingly in importance. It is executed through the controlled application of violence, prolonged political and social upheaval, economic stress, or a combination of these and other elements.

Beaufre's seminal discussion of indirect strategy casts revealing light on revolutionary warfare. Through successfully executed cold-war maneuvers, an adversary who is weak at the nuclear and conventional levels may nevertheless attain a dominant cold-war position in a specific area. While not discussed by Beaufre, Cyprus offers a case at hand that illustrates his notion of indirect strategy. Greek Cypriots carefully avoided a direct military confrontation with British forces. Reliance was placed instead on efforts to gain diplomatic support through the United Nations and contacts with Communist nations. Britain was tarred with a colonial brush to elicit international sympathy for the Cypriot uprising. The Greek government, favorably disposed to the Cypriot cause, urged Britain, its NATO ally, to grant concessions, and influence was exerted on the United States to persuade the British to yield. Meanwhile military action on the island was largely confined to terror incidents. Concentration on external maneuver, coupled with

[11] Read especially Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy*, 107-30.

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relentless internal pressure, through violence, riot, and disorder, on the area sought, proved ultimately successful for Cypriot independence, if not for the goal of union with Greece.

Conventional conflict is the conceptual link between cold and nuclear warfare. It is characterized by the introduction of organized nonnuclear military forces and is identified by a more favorable balance between risk and stakes than exists at the nuclear level. A conventional balance is inherently more volatile and unstable than a nuclear equilibrium since, unlike strategic nuclear war, conventional conflict presumes a much higher probability of victory, in the sense that the anticipated political gains of warfare are estimated as greater than the costs that are deemed tolerable. Nuclear conflict sets the limits for conventional warfare since no adversary can be certain at what point nuclear weapons may be introduced into a conventional battle. At any moment the war can be transformed and the calculations of victory overturned. Beaufre seizes upon this uncertainty as a device to stabilize conventional conflict. For purposes of deterrence, he emphasizes the conceptual notion of a finely graduated escalation ladder whose rungs ascend almost imperceptibly from nonnuclear to nuclear conflict. Within this view, adversaries, while fighting with conventional means, are simultaneously seen as locked in a psychic nuclear struggle in which each seeks to prevent the other from ascending the escalation ladder while still keeping the option open himself. On the other hand, for purposes of military defense, the two forms of warfare are to be treated as dichotomous, not as continuous. Beaufre would stress the difference between them in order to hinder the expansion of the conflict to levels whose political implications are still only dimly perceived and whose military effects remain tenuously calculable. These distinctions are crucial for Beaufre. In his scheme, strategy aims at delineating the rules of behavior appropriate to each level of conflict—nuclear, conventional, and cold-war—the utility of the means and maneuvers that may be conceivably employed in different contingencies at each conflict plateau, and the results that can be expected from the introduction of diverse forms of physical and nonphysical force.[12]

Beaufre departs from Clausewitz in still another important respect. While agreeing with Clausewitz that an adversary relationship is basic to strategic analysis, Beaufre places this clash of wills in the larger system of interlocked processes of change that have an important and, in many instances, a decisive impact on the primary adversary rela-

[12] *Deterrence and Strategy*, particularly 23-33.

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tion.[13] These more inclusive processes include scientific and technological advancement, world industrialization and trade, the rise of the underdeveloped nations and their accompanying demands for political, social, and economic progress, the continued upward growth of population, and the persistence of ideological divergencies—factors with which we are all familiar. Strategic control must therefore extend beyond the immediate circumference of the adversary relationship to embrace those forces and factors that threaten the goals of one or both antagonists. The dialectic is not only between the antagonists but between each antagonist and the larger material and psychic background processes that set the parameters of his action and condition or, at various points, shape his will at successive levels of strife. Strategy can no longer be usefully confined to a study of the primary adversary relationship but must examine all of these interlocking and mutually reinforcing processes. The influence exerted by these other processes of change may either deepen or diminish the intensity of the primary adversary relationship as the antagonists cope with the larger material and psychic environment of which they are parts.

Beaufre's views are suggestive and of practical import. They force the strategist beyond the cramped terms of the primary adversary relationship, conceived in some quarters as communism versus capitalism or the United States against the Soviet Union. The spread of nuclear weapons is of obvious mutual concern to the established nuclear powers, however much they may disagree in other areas. Note, too, the test-ban agreement and the Geneva discussions on a nonproliferation treaty. Coping with an expanding world population and the multiple problems to which it gives rise offers another area of common interest, although direct and formal exchanges on this question are not being actively pursued because the conflicts of interest and viewpoint on other grounds are still too great.

Beaufre's principal contribution lies in his broad and flexible view of strategy. It is cast in terms of a complex set of dialectical processes between adversaries and between adversaries and their material and psychic environment. The study of strategy is thus both identified as a branch of the social sciences in its quest for a science of action—or, in Raymond Aron's word, a praxeology[14]—and simultaneously defined as a humanistic art, potentially applicable, notwithstanding Beaufre's

[13] The relation of nuclear deterrence to larger changes in the international environment is suggested throughout Beaufre's writings. See especially *Deterrence and Strategy*, 137ff.

[14] Raymond Aron, *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations* (Paris 1962), 563ff.

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preoccupation with statecraft, to all conflict situations. The dialectic of clashing wills is bounded by a bewildering array of material and psychic factors that can be described and analyzed, and for which predictive models of their influence on the dialectic process and the individual clashing wills can be developed. The dialectic process is basically indeterminate since it largely takes its form from the wills that are locked in conflict. The strategic dialectic process consequently is a historical process wherein the disputing wills strive to maintain their freedom of action. Beaufre's view of the strategic dialectic, inspired, it would seem, by the economic dialecticism of Marx and the ideological dialecticism of Hegel, encompasses both. The strategic process is evolutionary, not static; its basic note is conflict, not harmony. The dichotomy between peace and war is rejected since human history is viewed essentially as the residual product of an almost infinite series of points of conflict in time and space at which human intelligence and volition were at play. The major source of change is the human will that seeks control over its material and psychic environment, endeavors to use that control to dominate other opposing wills, and, in turn, finds itself transformed, ironically enough and thus unexpectedly, by the dialectic process of which it is an intrinsic part.

The strategic dialectic as immanent in human history is, to that extent, a creative process. The rules of behavior applied by antagonists in the dialectic process to produce decisions are inherently mutable and require a form of artistic inspiration—along with scientific and technical knowledge—to be employed successfully, much as a painter must understand the limits of his materials and techniques before he adds color to canvas to create a painting.[15] Art cannot be fully eliminated from strategy since the study of strategy, as a part of a larger historical process dependent on human intelligence and volition, does not meet the tests applicable to the physical sciences. Data of the past are often absent, fragmentary, or inapplicable as new conditions of international existence arise or are created from the adversary relations at play and the processes of change of which they are a part. The strategist, while relying on the past, is compelled, paradoxically enough, to create his data through his imagination in order that he may keep abreast of the changes occurring around him that foretell the future.

It is unfortunate that some of Beaufre's critics are unable to appreci-

[15] Beaufre enjoys comparing strategy in operation to music. Direct strategy "in which force is the essential factor" is the major key; indirect strategy "in which force recedes into the background and its place is taken by psychology and planning" is the minor key (*Introduction to Strategy*, 134).

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ate the key element of his argument, which is his call for a return to the task of defining more comprehensively the scope of contemporary strategy as a study and as an operational science and art. Beaufre is criticized instead for allegedly denying the utility of collecting historical and contemporary data in solving strategic problems and for employing a methodology that is unduly abstract and deductive.[16] Neither indictment is telling.

Beaufre can be reproached for his failure to appeal to concrete and readily available data to support his points. The discussion below of Beaufre's defense of the *force de frappe*, for example, lends weight to this criticism. It is quite another thing to charge, however, that he rejects such analysis. Beaufre answers this criticism well enough and in his own language.[17] Analysis of his work, as this critique suggests, provides little foundation for such an indictment. Even his critics concede that he draws extensively on American strategic thought that prides itself on factual content and rigorous analysis.[18]

The attack on Beaufre's methodology is more serious. It reflects a bias in favor of an inductive and pragmatic approach to strategic analysis that is so ingrained that there is little, if any, likelihood that it can ever be fully harmonized with Beaufre's viewpoint. Beaufre attempts to advance strategy beyond the identification of techniques of control and influence or the isolation and resolution of specific issues such as the measurement of nuclear bomb blasts, future projections of military technology, or estimates of the economic effects of boycotts and trade restrictions. He envisions the task of the strategist as one in which these considerations and the techniques and modes of thought associated with them are related to and reconciled with the larger ends pursued by nations. It is tempting to ignore this broader and more important problem. Strategic analysis is difficult enough. The ultimate validation of ends sought by nations and the adaptation of strategy to them appear to be almost hopeless enterprises. The life of a professional strategist can be amply filled by attending exclusively to the multiple and complex considerations of state action, maneuver, feint, and thrust. For the individual, strategy as a study and as an activity can easily become an end in itself. The same satisfaction cannot be predicated for the political community. It cannot leave strategy to the strategists. It needs a way of life beyond its strategy to give inner meaning to its

[16] See Bernard Brodie's review of Beaufre's *Introduction to Strategy* and *Dissuasion et Stratégie* in *Survival*, VII (August 1965), 208-10. Also examine the exchange between Beaufre and Brodie, *ibid.* (December 1965), 342-44.

[17] *Ibid.*, 242-43.

[18] *Ibid.* (August 1965), 209.

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action, establish internal cohesion and high morale among its citizenry, and justify the material and human sacrifices that must inevitably be made to execute whatever particular strategy is adopted. Beaufre recognizes and states, albeit confusedly and circumferentially, the relation of strategy to philosophy. Some of his critics prefer to ignore the problem and assume its resolution by excluding it from their deliberations. Beaufre is regrettably susceptible to the reverse, and equally serious, defect. Having acknowledged the strategic-philosophical problem, he is too readily satisfied with his vague and provisional outline of its dimensions. He fails to identify this more encompassing problem in terms sufficiently concrete and contemporaneously significant to be fully convincing. In confusing his critics, Beaufre encourages them to miss or distort his argument. As a consequence, all tend to talk past one another.

Since understanding and controlling nuclear warfare offer the most sweeping challenge to contemporary strategic thinking, it is no accident that Beaufre focuses much of his attention on these problems. It is in his exegesis of nuclear warfare that the dialectical struggle between Beaufre as strategist and Beaufre as Gaullist strategist is joined. He finds himself trapped between the comprehensive demands of his argument for a rejuvenated science and art of strategy—detached, objective, and synthetic—and the strictures imposed by the Gaullist quest for national independence and *grandeur*—goals demanding from the strategist involvement, commitment, and narrow focus. Beaufre's views on strategy that have just been summarized set the stage for a critique of his conception of nuclear deterrence. They provide the criteria by which to assess the validity of his recommendations for European deterrence and defense.

II. Beaufre as Gaullist Strategist

Beaufre distinguishes between a defensive and an offensive deterrent posture. At a minimum, nuclear weapons afford a nation a defensive deterrent posture wherein it can "prevent an enemy initiating against one an action of which one is afraid," such as an attack against one's territory.[19] A defensive deterrent position generally assumes strategic nuclear inferiority and is credible only when a core value or vital interest is at stake. On the other hand, an offensive deterrent posture can prevent enemy resistance to "some action which one proposes to take oneself." Unlike Gallois, who fails to see or accept the importance

[19] *Deterrence and Strategy*, 25.

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of the distinction, Beaufre concedes that offensive deterrent capacity among nuclear powers is the exclusive domain of the United States and the Soviet Union.[20] The Suez crisis, in which Beaufre was in charge of French military operations, a fact not without significance, exemplifies offensive nuclear deterrence. Soviet nuclear threats, coupled with adamant American opposition to the attack against Egypt, neutralized the British nuclear capacity. The British had counted on United States acquiescence in the action, if not active encouragement. Once American political support was clearly withdrawn, so also was destroyed all hope of British access to the offensive deterrent value of the American atomic arsenal. Soviet nuclear threats then tipped the scales against the Anglo-French initiative. In a sense Suez was the first nuclear war.[21] More than any other incident since World War II, it indicated the outer limits of a small nuclear power's political leverage over a major one.

Aware of these limits, Beaufre assigns only defensive deterrent capacity to small nuclear powers. A nation with nuclear power can pose a defensive deterrent threat to a nuclear superpower since it can inflict on the potential aggressor damage that exceeds in value whatever stakes the aggressor hopes to gain from his attack or threatening move against the vital interests of the smaller power. A deterrence of proportionality or relative equilibrium is established. The stronger enemy cannot be annihilated but, as De Gaulle has noted, an arm can be torn off, which, while not fatal, can be very painful and costly.[22] For analytic purposes, Beaufre assumes that the equalizing power of the atom as a strategic instrument is reached if the weaker power can destroy at least fifteen percent of its stronger opponent's total human and material resources.[23]

These arguments have, of course, been pressed before, although without benefit of Beaufre's useful distinction between defensive and offensive deterrent capacity.[24] What makes Beaufre's contribution unique is his claim that an independent nuclear power, if aligned with a stronger nuclear ally against a third powerful nuclear enemy, can actually strengthen, not weaken, the alliance. Gallois argues the oppo-

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] At least one French air general on active duty during the Suez crisis believed that the British backed down in large part as a result of the nuclear threat (interview, November 16, 1965, Paris).

[22] *Deterrence and Strategy*, chap. 2, 34-77.

[23] *Ibid.*, 34-40.

[24] Gallois, *Stratégie de l'Âge Nucléaire*, 229. Herman Kahn does, of course, distinguish among three kinds of deterrence (pp. 126ff.). None of these distinctions quite fits or implies Beaufre's categories that envisage the reliance on nuclear weapons both as a deterrent against untoward enemy aggression and as a basis on which to take the initiative against an opponent.

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site case: that nuclear power erodes military alliances since no nation can be imagined as coming to the aid of another at the risk of its own destruction.[25] Each nation defends itself as best it can by its own nuclear striking power. The strong mutually deter each other as do the weak. Confrontations between strong and weak nuclear powers are balanced by the doctrine of proportionality. The ironic consequence is that peace is guaranteed through nuclear proliferation.[26]

Beaufre's distinction between defensive and offensive nuclear capacity avoids the dubious assumption underlying Gallois's position that a kind of equality of political power exists among nuclear powers, however they may differ in actual nuclear striking capacity. Nor does Beaufre merge nuclear deterrence and nuclear defense as does Gallois, who largely fails to distinguish the varying political and strategic effects of different levels of nuclear destructive capacity. Gallois would assure international peace and the protection of national interests by charging every conflict among nations with the possibility of nuclear war and escalating to that level as quickly as possible. Beaufre would agree with Gallois that deterrence of untoward enemy actions is a function of a nation's ability to convince its adversary that it will strike first with nuclear weapons if its core values are attacked. Beaufre sees, too, that credibility is not an automatic concomitant of the mere possession of nuclear weapons under most conceivable political contingencies involving the interest of a nation, as Gallois so easily assumes. Beaufre faces the problem that Gallois conveniently sidesteps: that a small nuclear power cannot assure its interests entirely through its own nuclear capacity. Suez cannot be ignored. Alliance affords access to greater strategic and political power than a small nuclear nation can muster alone. While retaining its defensive deterrent capability, a weaker nuclear nation potentially acquires through alliance with a stronger nuclear power an offensive deterrent capacity, not to mention greater defensive deterrent capability under some circumstances. Beaufre goes beyond Gallois's national frame of reference and reformulates the first-strike problem in alliance terms rather than restricting the problem to bilateral national conflicts between nuclear powers.

[25] *Stratégie de l'Âge Nucléaire,* 232ff., and "Faux Paradoxes et Vérités Paradoxales," 325.

[26] For a useful critique of Gallois's position, see Raymond Aron, *Le Grand Débat* (Paris 1963), 115-56. It is interesting to note that Aron wrote a complimentary preface to Gallois's *Stratégie de l'Âge Nucléaire.* Aron distinguishes his critique of Gallois from his preface of a half-decade ago on the grounds of Gallois's recent turn to aggressive nationalism (p. 135). On this matter Gallois appears more consistent if not in style at least in holding fundamentally the same views today that he held when he wrote his work.

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Recent American strategy, with its emphasis on second-strike capacity, centralized command and control arrangements, and redundant communications systems has tended to obscure the first-strike problem.[27] Emphasis has been placed on pause, controlled response to a direct attack, and shots against military targets to limit damage. The enemy is encouraged to act similarly.[28] The hope is that, if war breaks out, devastation will be held to a minimum and that the war will be brought to a swift close on terms favorable to the United States and the West. To the extent that the United States gives the appearance that it may not strike first against, say, a Soviet attack in Europe and reinforces this impression by adopting a graduated response strategy, a dangerous instability develops at the nonnuclear level. The risks of aggression are lowered in using conventional arms while at the nuclear plateau both major powers are reciprocally deterred from attacking each other's core interests. The stronger nuclear ally is unable "to exert any credible deterrent effort in defence of interests which the other party knows to be marginal in his opponent's eyes."[29] A third nuclear power, allied to one of the two stronger nuclear powers, can restabilize the nuclear balance in areas vital to it.

Beaufre considers the first-strike threat in support of values that the third power deems crucial to be more credible than pronouncements of aid by its stronger ally whose interests in the values at stake are clearly tangential. Through its nuclear independence, capacity, and determination, the weaker power injects uncertainty into the enemy's calculations and increases his risk. As a result, conflict is actually stabilized and diminished in areas vital to the third power. The inner cohesion of the alliance is simultaneously enhanced inasmuch as the range of interests vital to each nuclear ally is fully covered. A marginal political stake is made vital to a stronger ally who is convinced, as the common foe presumably is, that the weaker nuclear ally, to protect its interests, will trigger a nuclear holocaust affecting all antagonists indiscriminately. The stronger ally cannot remain indifferent to the fate of its weaker ally when the latter is threatened, nor can it be unconcerned about the response, perhaps involving nuclear weapons, which its partner might make.

To minimize uncertainty among allies about when one of them

[27] See, for example, Alain C. Enthoven, Speech before the Loyola University Forum for National Affairs, Loyola University, Los Angeles, California, February 10, 1963, Department of Defense News Release: 157-63.

[28] Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Speech before the Economics Club of New York, November 18, 1963, Department of Defense News Release: 148-63.

[29] *Deterrence and Strategy*, 81.

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might strike first under certain defined circumstances, alliance members are led to coordinate their activities not only at the nuclear level but at all levels of possible conflict. Only increased coordination can produce an independent center of decision capable of creating enough uncertainty in the mind of an enemy to deter him from aggression against interests that are marginal to the major ally but critical to the minor alliance partner. Integration, conceived as centralized nuclear control in the hands of the major partner, decreases uncertainty and, concomitantly, reduces the risk to a potential aggressor bent on attacking the weaker alliance member. Alliance, conceived as a grouping of national independent centers of decision, can increase offensive and defensive deterrent capacity of the alliance against a common enemy to a degree that would not be possible if the alliance partners acted in isolation from each other. Nuclear deterrent power, as distinguished from nuclear fighting capacity, is created. Overall deterrence is created as the area of credible nuclear protection is enlarged. There is no need to dispute United States claims that it possesses enough nuclear capacity to defend Europe. Doubt turns on the credibility of the American guarantee. Independent nuclear forces existing alongside those of the United States, Beaufre alleges, fill the credibility gap.[30]

As coordination of national nuclear powers progresses, the alliance is prepared for wider ranging and more discriminating sets of deterrence maneuvers at conventional and cold-war levels of activity. Deterrence becomes a complex of activity unto itself. It gradually takes on the character of nuclear war carried out by means other than nuclear weapons. Providing a backdrop of nuclear stability, the alliance becomes the framework within which crises can be managed to forestall escalation to nuclear levels, to limit destruction if military conflict erupts, and to terminate the clash as soon as possible on terms satisfactory to all of the alliance members. The contingency planning and the projected operations surrounding the Berlin crisis of the early 1960's is the archetype of the high degree of cooperation that is possible among allies to secure stability in Europe and around the world.

III. Critique

Ambiguity still surrounds Beaufre's meaning of coordination. Like the term "integration," it eludes precise definition. Beaufre fails to explain how a marginal political value can be made vital through the threat of nuclear warfare initiated by an ally. The political value at stake will

[30] *Ibid.*, chap. 3, 78-103. The core of Beaufre's argument is contained in this chapter. Nevertheless, the entire book should be read to understand the context of Beaufre's position.

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remain marginal and, under the threat of a nuclear war, may become even less important for the stronger ally. Rather than seeking greater identification of its interests with those of its weaker partner, the stronger power, if equally committed to its own values and political system, will tend to disengage itself from its smaller ally whose nuclear threats are likely to be considered reckless and irresponsible. Indeed, in the eyes of the stronger ally, the intransigence of its weaker partner may at times appear more dangerous than the pretensions and threats of the common enemy. Beaufre's analysis of the likely response of a major nuclear power to the behavior of a smaller nuclear power to which it is allied tends, at this point, to pass from the possible to the improbable. Beaufre's ingenious formulation moves gradually, almost imperceptibly, from analysis to hope.

It is important to recall in this connection that well before France left the organization of NATO military forces, the United States made a number of pronouncements and took actions, especially after the sale of twelve KC-135 refueling tankers for the Mirage IV proved ineffective as a lever on French nuclear policy, to dissociate itself from France and to isolate France in the alliance. Other NATO allies were encouraged with varying success to criticize independent French moves. Secretary of Defense McNamara launched his 1962 Athens campaign to convince NATO members that the United States had adequate nuclear power to defend Europe without any European contributions. In his 1962 Ann Arbor speech he specifically rejected independent nuclear efforts as ineffective, useless, and dangerous, and the MLF was concocted, at least in partial response to the *force de dissuasion*.[31] The test-ban treaty was partially aimed at isolating France and diluting the political, if not the strategic, value of Nth-country nuclear forces. The hot line to Moscow can serve the function of distinguishing in Russian eyes United States actions from those of its more provocative allies, notwithstanding the French countermove with its own hot line to the Soviet Union. Whatever the merit of these moves individually, they do have a certain logic when related to the proliferation of national nuclear forces. The distinction between ally and enemy that Beaufre manfully attempts to preserve by putting a positive value on an independently operating nuclear system loses force when a nation finds itself menaced more by the actions of its allies than by its enemies.

Nevertheless, unlike Gallois, Beaufre finds considerable utility in the

[31] Remarks of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, at the Commencement Exercises, University of Michigan, June 16, 1962, Department of Defense News Release: 980-62.

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Atlantic Alliance and American nuclear protection, though he similarly resents and rejects the political implications of the American guarantee and, concomitantly, European and French dependence. A counterforce posture, while unable to destroy the Soviets' increasingly invulnerable nuclear force, does still retain some credibility given the strategic and political importance of Europe to the United States. American troops in Europe are hostage to this intent. American military power also furnishes some degree of offensive deterrence power to protect Western European interests elsewhere. As suggested above, Beaufre even finds virtue in the maintenance of adequate flexible response forces in Europe to deter the outbreak of hostilities in whatever form and to limit and terminate destruction. He would, however, introduce the *threat* of tactical nuclear weapons earlier in a conflict to stabilize the level of conventional conflict that still is animated by the possibility of victory and is prone to a dangerous escalation. Aside from their firepower, tactical nuclear weapons possess two unique characteristics not possessed by nonnuclear arms: since they have not been tried in battle, uncertainty surrounds their use, a circumstance that complicates an enemy's calculations; and, second, fear is created that their use would more quickly precipitate a strategic nuclear conflict. Uncertainty and fear conspire, therefore, to extend to the conventional level the stability now characteristic of the balance of terror.[32]

Beaufre's use of tactical nuclears is very subtle—indeed, one is prompted to say, too subtle for the enemy to grasp. He would increase tactical nuclear deterrence but, in the event of conflict, would strongly resist the rapid introduction of tactical nuclears in defense, since this would skip a number of escalation steps even before the antagonists began their ascent of the escalation ladder. How one spans the obvious gap in credibility between a deterrent maneuver threatening tactical nuclear weapons and an implicit defensive posture composed of conventional forces and reserves large enough to avoid using nuclears for fear of escalation is difficult to see. Beaufre accepts in effect the criticism of the defensive use of tactical nuclear weapons as a substitute for conventional arms, especially in Europe where the defending forces of the West are not necessarily in a superior position.[33] On the other

[32] *Deterrence and Strategy*, 55, 62-63.

[33] See Morton H. Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (New York 1963), 58-75, for a review of the arguments for and against the use of tactical nuclear weapons. American policy has again shifted from that represented in Halperin's analysis and now looks to greater command and control of nuclear-equipped ground units and the withdrawal of the Davy Crockett, a lightweight atomic-launch weapon, from front-line units in Europe.

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hand, he hopes to preserve the utility of tactical nuclears at the psychic or deterrent level. Following a similar line of reasoning, he basically approves of the Kennedy defense changes in the direction of flexible response, but criticizes the announced abandonment of massive retaliation as weakening the strategic deterrent.[34]

But Beaufre cannot have it both ways—eat his nuclear cake and have it, too. If war, even atomic war, is to be limited in scope, intensity, and object, some form of communication process must be established with the potential enemy, based on one's military capabilities and pronouncements about their use. The enemy must be given some incentive to keep the conflict confined and some rational basis to believe that he will not be penalized for his self-restraint.[35] One cannot match Soviet irrationality with threats of apocalyptic devastation while organizing and announcing graduated defensive moves. Beaufre fears that a flexible response strategy, by making war more humane and, by definition, inclined toward constraint and rationality in using nuclear weapons, may prompt a quick Soviet military thrust into Western Europe, such as a takeover of West Berlin. A *fait accompli* would result. The Western bargaining position would be seriously impaired. Hope of resolving hostilities swiftly against the Soviets on terms favorable to the West would be destroyed.

Beaufre's solution would expand all forms of military power, conventional and nuclear, but would leave the impression that nuclear weapons would likely be used in the first instance of military confrontation. Beaufre would invoke "coordination" among the allies to resolve these contradictions. But what could possibly be the nature of this coordinating process? The usual meaning of coordination gradually loses significance. It hides what must in reality be a negotiating and bargaining process among the allies. In this sense, coordination clearly corresponds to Beaufre's analytic definition of the strategic dialectic. Difference of wills is at issue; and force, psychic and material,

[34] *Deterrence and Strategy*, 43-44.

[35] Secretary McNamara opened to public view this communication process in his testimony before Congress: "It would certainly be in their interest as well as ours to try to limit the terrible consequences of a nuclear exchange. By building into our forces a flexible capability, we at least eliminate the prospect that we could strike back in only one way, namely, against the entire Soviet target system including their cities. Such a prospect would give the Soviet Union no incentive to withhold attack against our cities in a first strike. We want to give them a better alternative. Whether they would accept it in the crisis of a global nuclear war, no one can say. Considering what is at stake, we believe it is worth the additional effort on our part to have this option" (*Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1964-68 Defense Program and 1965 Defense Budget, January, 1963* [Washington 1963], 30).

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particularly the threat of interallied nuclear blackmail, is ever present.[36] The ally-enemy relationship, while of course still applicable in part, is nevertheless further obfuscated.

The coordinating process, while it may have the salutary effect of permitting a greater degree of information exchange than presently exists in NATO, is hardly likely to yield a satisfactory definition of what constitutes vital and marginal interests or privileged sanctuaries and theaters of war. Beaufre implicitly conceives the resolution of difference in terms of the weaker nuclear party. "The intrusion of a third party into a situation of bipolar nuclear equilibrium," he states, ". . . has strategic consequences out of all proportion to the nuclear strength of the third party."[37] The stronger party, if truly an ally, must come to the aid of the weaker. It cannot tolerate the loss of even an obdurate and disobedient ally to the enemy. It has little alternative other than to throw its nuclear weight behind the weaker partner while working for compromise to forestall the impending holocaust.[38] The strategy of the stronger tends to dissolve into the strategy of the weaker. Much of the freedom of action that strength approaching a counterforce capacity brings is lost, despite its cost, since one's allies dilute its potential effectiveness and erode its very raison d'être. On his own account Beaufre asserts, "The only way in which an independent force can avoid being 'dangerous' is to be truly allied."[39] Alliance based on independent nuclear entities tends toward a kind of strategic reductionism that menaces alliance cohesion or makes alliance response ineffective in case of crisis.

So long as this "truly allied" position has not been achieved, the weaker power by definition will strive to keep its independence, which rests on its nuclear power and its capacity to unleash nuclear war on its own national authority. Such a decision, Beaufre argues, must be peculiarly national since it brings into question the sovereignty and existence of the state.[40] Independence rests on uncertainty for both the enemy and the ally. Both run risks in aligning or conflicting with the weaker third party.

To Beaufre's credit, he is acutely aware that the threat posed by the weaker ally to its stronger partner has a debilitating effect on alliance cohesion. As if to soften the impact of his analysis, he turns to dis-

[36] See the first paragraph of Section I of this article.
[37] *Deterrence and Strategy*, 84.
[38] Stanley Hoffmann makes a similar argument in "De Gaulle, Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance," 9. For a brief critique see Aron, *Le Grand Débat*, 155-56.
[39] *Deterrence and Strategy*, 92.
[40] *L'O.T.A.N. et l'Europe*, 127-28.

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arming candor to preserve what remains of his argument that independent nuclear powers increase their overall deterrent capacity through alliance and, implicitly, that the United States has much to gain in aligning itself with an independent, nuclearized France. "Blackmail is a nasty word," he says. "If certain means prove to be extremely powerful, there is no need to be ashamed of them nor to consider them dishonest. Other people would be quite prepared to use them if they had them."[41] Such frankness, while as commendable as it is remarkable, compromises much of the alleged positive virtue of a number of independently operating national nuclear forces within an alliance.

The major reasons for the French deterrent are more clearly exposed in Beaufre's discussion of the utility of NATO for France. The French gain some residual nuclear deterrent capacity from the American arsenal so long as the alliance (as distinguished from the organization) is maintained. The French nuclear force, we gradually learn, is a response to the United States-Soviet nuclear balance. It is a form of insurance against an uncertain future in which that equilibrium may be upset and is a means to influence present United States policies.[42] It also blocks a Russian-American "condominium" that might jeopardize distinctly European interests.[43] Under these circumstances what Beaufre fears most would have come to pass: enemies would become allies and allies would become enemies or weak and neutralized pawns of the superpowers. To keep United States nuclear power within the French camp while preserving French nuclear independence, Beaufre offers the dubious rule of action that independent nuclear forces "contribute to general stability *always provided that the threat of these forces is not used in an irresponsible manner and without regard for the very strict rules governing the nuclear game.*"[44] How does a statesman know when he is acting irresponsibly? Beaufre provides little operational guidance beyond his injunction although his intellectual enterprise is devoted to this end.

Beaufre cuts short his delineation of "the very strict rules governing the nuclear game" despite his insistence that the exercise be undertaken to avoid mishap. A nuclear force to be fully credible must be invulnerable and capable of penetrating alerted enemy defenses. Whether the *force de frappe* is equipped to carry out these missions, an indispensable requirement of Beaufre's analysis of the utility of an inde-

[41] *Deterrence and Strategy*, 85.
[42] *L'O.T.A.N. et l'Europe*, 120ff.
[43] *Ibid.*, 173-75.
[44] *Deterrence and Strategy*, 162 (Beaufre's italics).

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pendent nuclear force, is presently highly questionable. The highly vulnerable Mirage IV, dependent for warning on the NATO alert system, is not scheduled for phase-out until the late 1960's. Even with thermonuclear weapons, French missile development gives no indication, even on the basis of official estimate, that it can produce a viable invulnerable missile strike force before the middle 1970's.[45] At the same time both the United States and the Soviet Union are locked in a qualitative arms race in which the United States alone spends more for military research and development than the French spend on their entire military establishment. In fiscal year 1965, the United States spent $7.2 billion on defense research and development. France's total defense budget during a comparable period was approximately $4.8 billion.[46] The gap between the major and minor nuclear powers gives every indication of increasing, not decreasing.

Beaufre himself unwittingly furnishes critics of the *force de frappe* with ammunition in his critique of the Pentagon's controlled nuclear war concepts. He charges that a small nuclear strike, one of the crucial options of a controlled nuclear war, may be effectively blunted or nullified by an ABM system whereas a massive attack would not be.[47] The same logic should apply with equal merit to the French deterrent. Given the existing state of technological development, an antimissile missile system promises to be more effective against any attack that a small nuclear power could launch than against one that a superpower could initiate.

Beaufre is strangely silent about the strike capacity and survivability of the French force. The same careful attention to detail that he devotes to an explication of nuclear deterrence is absent from his treatment of the French nuclear force. Beaufre's silence is all the more curious since he is evidently thoroughly acquainted with the complex and comprehensive studies of deterrence requirements in which Albert Wohlstetter and Herman Kahn have pioneered. In fact, Beaufre's arguments rest on the assumption that the balance of terror is even more delicate than Wohlstetter suggests. Not only are independent nuclear powers needed to stabilize bilateral deterrence, but closer political cooperation is demanded to enact the intricate indirect maneuvers of the *nuclear* deter-

[45] *The Economist* (November 21, 1964), 814.

[46] U.S. House of Representatives, *United States Defense Policies in 1965*, H. Doc. 344, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (April 6, 1966), 79, 118. A more conservative figure of $4.2 billion for French defense is given in the publication of the Service de Presse et d'Information, Ambassade de France, *France and Its Armed Forces* (New York, December 1964), 50.

[47] *Deterrence and Defense*, 43.

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rence drama to forestall the use of nuclears in war. Beaufre bases the value of a reformed Atlantic Alliance squarely on its utility as a framework for developing contingency plans to cope with anticipated crises.[48] On the basis of Beaufre's analysis, there is little likelihood that the French would strike first with their nuclear force, whatever its composition, except under the most improbable circumstances of a direct attack against French territory itself. If Suez was the first nuclear war as some have intimated, then the French force is as limited in utility as the British nuclear power was in 1956—even more so given the expansion of Russian nuclear strike capacity. The French nuclear system would necessarily be restricted to a very narrow band of maneuver even if it were presently able to meet the minimal deterrence standards sketched by Beaufre for the residual nuclear striking capacity that would remain available after an enemy's first strike. Beaufre claims a defensive deterrent capacity for the French force, yet serious doubt remains whether it can meet his fifteen percent destruction test against the Soviet Union. He does not enhance the credibility of the French nuclear force in the eyes of Europeans by his admission that it cannot presently defend Europe and that the use of nuclear weapons is a radically national decision.

Beaufre is most disappointing in his treatment of European defense and political unity, the focus of his *L'O.T.A.N. et l'Europe*. His proposals lack the intellectual penetration and political courage of his earlier strategic analysis. He argues persuasively that NATO was meant as a framework to commit the United States to European defense, a helpful corrective in light of currently influential official American thinking that assumes the opposite point of view.[49] It follows logically from Beaufre's argument that any reform of NATO should be aimed at creating an independently organized and operating European security system leading eventually to European union. He rejects economic and distinctly political approaches to European unity—the economic because of existing divergent economic interests and the absence of a political authority to resolve economic differences; the political because of the divergent policies being pursued by European nations, particularly Germany, divided and hesitant to choose between a future in Europe or one linked closely with the United States within NATO. Beaufre proposes the strategic-military route as the quickest way to advance the construction of Europe. Initially, NATO would be reformed to give the Europeans a greater say in alliance strategy. Top

[48] "L'O.T.A.N. et l'Europe," 5-12.
[49] See, for example, Timothy Stanley, *NATO in Transition* (New York 1965).

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NATO commands would be manned by Europeans. Close liaison with United States forces, which would operate as a national entity, would be maintained to assure that the American nuclear arsenal would remain enlisted in the service of European security.

As the Europeans learned gradually once again to work together as they had before in implementing the 1948 Brussels Pact, relations with Eastern Europe, it is anticipated, would evolve to the point at which these nations could be brought into a larger security system from the Atlantic to the Vistula. Here Beaufre explicitly excludes the Soviet Union. To resolve the unsettled problems of Europe, Germany would be united, but at the cost of renouncing its claims to territory in Poland and Czechoslovakia. It would also be asked to commit itself to a European security system encompassing East and West European nations. It is expected that the nations of Western Europe would remain under the protection of the United States nuclear umbrella until a European security system, resting on a British-French nuclear force, could be developed. Only through European unity could European interests be effectively asserted against a superpower since neither Great Britain nor any continental power alone would have enough counterbalancing force. The United States and the Soviet Union would guarantee these arrangements but would be expected to withdraw progressively from Europe. The superpowers would have incentive to accept this solution. Détente in Europe would free each to concentrate on its larger security problems, particularly in Asia where China threatens the interests of both.[50] Secure at home, Europe would also find its political insulation from the contentions of the Far East reinforced.

Beaufre performs the useful service of reminding passionate advocates of Atlantic Community that Europe cannot be historically conceived in the cramped cold-war terms of East and West. The unresolved problems in Europe stem immediately from World War II. A lasting solution of the European problem must obviously deal with a divided Germany and Europe and the tenuous status of Berlin. Beaufre understandably fears that the notion of Atlantic Community and closer bilateral ties between the United States and individual European countries under the facade of union would solidify, as George Kennan cautioned a decade ago, the division of Europe with all its attendant dangers while assuring American hegemony of its western rump.[51]

However suspect the notion of Atlantic Community may be, it affords no presumption in favor of Beaufre's essentially Gaullist solution to

[50] *L'O.T.A.N. et l'Europe*, 148-57.
[51] Kennan, *Russia, The Atom, and the West* (New York 1957).

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European problems. Beaufre's Europe would still remain a loose collection of nation-states. Although he concedes that no European nation can compete with the superpowers on any level of activity, he offers a vision of political divergence and difference that effectively conserve and deepen the present weakness of Europe. What a French *force de frappe* cannot do—deter against a Russian attack in Europe—a coordinated British-French force according to Beaufre's meaning is not likely to achieve either. The two forces might conceivably be at cross-purposes with each other and dilute further what little deterrent value each possesses alone.[52] Beaufre's description of British-French strategic differences during and after World War II leaves little room for hope of easy and swift resolution of outstanding strategic differences. Nor does it appear realistic to believe that a loosely formed grouping of European nations, each jealous of its national rights and sovereign prerogatives, is likely to agree more quickly on strategic policy than are two allies that fought side by side in two wars and formally allied themselves in 1948 under the pressure of an expanding Soviet threat.

The present disarray of NATO casts more doubt on the utility of Beaufre's approach to Europe and his final design for it. Present-day Europe, uneasily divided into two semicohesive camps, would become a fluid, Balkanized Europe, prey to itself and to outside powers. In effect, Beaufre advises more, not less, national compartmentalization to end the division of Europe. The increased segmentation of Europe is offered as a means for fortifying and stabilizing the Continent. The divisions of Europe that before gave birth to war now become through some kind of unexplained legerdemain the midwife of a new unity. Beaufre revives the nineteenth-century balance-of-power system that broke down with such disastrous results in 1914 and reapplies it to Europe without apparent modification. Astonishingly enough, it is offered further as a model for world stability. "The best guarantee of security is the prospect faced by an aggressor of seeing the number of his potential enemies increase the greater his success becomes," Beaufre observes. "He must therefore have a number of partners, in other words the world must be truly multipolar. . . . This is the doctrine which governed European policy for centuries; it would now be worth applying it at world level."[53]

A strategic route to European unity, if valid, assumes some conception of a common enemy or threat. If the Eastern European nations are to join and if the Soviet Union is to allow them to pass increasingly

[52] *L'O.T.A.N. et l'Europe*, 23-47.
[53] *Deterrence and Strategy*, 159.

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out of its immediate control, the conclusion follows that the Soviet Union is not the common enemy. Beaufre speaks anxiously of the threat to peace in Central Europe if the division of Europe remains. Threat from whom or what? Only Germany remains. The common strategic problem allegedly drawing East and West Europe together is the status of Germany and its permanent harnessing within a coalition of European states. The effective subordination of Germany is clear. Germany would have no nuclear weapons but would be primarily dependent on the British-French nuclear force with some still undefined right of access to the American nuclear arsenal in case of renewed Soviet pressures against its interests.[54]

German unity is gained, but at the price of Germany's capacity and right to assume the same status and opportunities of national independence or the same political and military power that France has allegedly reserved for itself in the *force de frappe*. Beaufre would effectively box Germany by four nuclear powers, with an implicit French veto over any German attempts to gain for itself the trappings of power retained by France. The *force de frappe* takes on more the character of a political club held over the head of Germany than a strategic strike force aimed at increasing NATO's deterrent posture. Germany is faced with an impossible choice: on the one hand, a nominally unified existence, but one subject to France and dependent on a security system of questionable reliability in what must remain a feeble Europe, or, on the other, continued division and dependence on the United States. There is, of course, a third possibility. Germany may again turn East or to its own resources and a purely national solution in an attempt to resolve its problems, even as it may give the appearance of posturing to the West.

Beaufre imprisons France and its neighbors within the procrustean confines of their own national boundaries and canalizes their energies and ingenuity within the narrow perspectives of their own national goals. Where is the breadth of view appealed to by Beaufre in his sketch of a new science and art of strategy? Where are the elaborate and carefully planned stratagems, military and nonmilitary, to implement coherent political purpose? Analysis leads inexorably to the conclusion that European differences can be settled and common interests asserted only through union. Yet European unity is founded on the shifting sands of divergent, potentially rival national systems whose maintenance is encouraged; European union is sought through a com-

[54] For a similar view, see the much-discussed "Mr. XXX" article, "Faut-il Réformer l'Alliance Atlantique?" *Politique Étrangère*, No. 3 (1965), 230-44.

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mon search for security while the distinction between ally and enemy progressively loses value; continued alliance with the United States is sought, but under the not always subtle threat of nuclear intimidation; nuclear power is used by France for its own national ends, the right of others to follow suit is blithely denied, and few assurances (and those guarded ones) are given that France will protect its neighbors; American and Soviet guarantees are sought for European security and union, while the political influence of the guarantors is lamented and suspicion is expressed that a nuclear condominium may develop between them at the expense of European interests; nuclear proliferation is decried, but little effort is made to originate a sketch of a regional or world security system that resolves the threat while responding to the various incentives nurturing the growth of national nuclear programs.

The specter cast by nuclear proliferation profoundly disturbs Beaufre. It threatens not only Beaufre's France but Europe and the world. The tension between Beaufre as strategist and Beaufre as French nationalist is most acute at this point. The cross-pressure does not yield a new design or political departure to resolve Beaufre's inner dialectic that personalizes in a sense the larger strategic dialectic of the international sphere. Instead, a tenuous, illusory hope is voiced instead as a temporary palliative: "The nuclear weapon . . . has given man exaggerated power. . . . It must inevitably reawaken his conscience and lead to the organization of a collective nuclear force as the secular arm of a true world authority. . . . As we stand at the threshold of this new stage of human development the inscrutable sphinx of history is asking us the question whether we have the good sense to reach our goal gradually and by peaceful means or whether we shall do so through monstrous and grievous upheavals."[55]

Is it Beaufre or the sphinx who asks the question? Beaufre himself has laid the basis for both the question and the answer in his broad and suggestive view of strategy. Man creates his history and the strategies that are intrinsic parts of its movement. The control of the future does not lie in applying discredited solutions that were inapplicable even in simpler periods. Beaufre opens himself to this sharp criticism on his own terms. He holds his standards high only to falter under their own weight.

Beaufre—strategist and Frenchman—remains unreconciled with himself. One Beaufre, detached and dispassionate, looks beyond the existing nation-state to the development of a more predictable and stable inter-

[55] *Ibid.*, 99.

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national system; the other, politically committed to the old regime like the elders in Plato's *Laws*, recoils from his initial vision and strives vainly to preserve an international order that his own critique finds gravely wanting. Imagination threatens to give way to worn formulas and tired maxims; the future, to the faint and receding memories of a once glorious past. Strategy as a tool of policy serves best when it informs, not when it weds itself unreflectively to unattainable or self-destructive goals. Beaufre as Gaullist strategist presently dominates Beaufre as strategist. Both are weakened by the struggle. The outcome weighs yet in the balance.

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THE POLITICAL ORDER AND THE BURDEN OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS

By PAUL Y. HAMMOND*

ONE of the major questions about foreign policy concerns the level of effort: How much should the state extract from the internal political system in order to pursue its external objectives? As posed, the issue involves the control of resources, and although the resources it deals with usually include material resources, the limiting factors are political. It should not be stretching the meaning of political things (although it would be changing the frame of reference) to identify the issue as one of allocating political "assets" among several (in this case, two major) sectors to deal with political risks or threats. It is easy enough to identify this allocative function as a requirement of independent governments and quite another to establish what is required to achieve it.

Modern governments—or would-be modern governments—frequently face allocative questions more methodically than do premodern ones. But they may do so only after obscuring the ultimate political weight of the stakes involved in order to deal with them as economic or material allocations—by treating political things solely as economic things. It seems to be necessary in some measure to insulate from interest-oriented politics the allocative processes involved before governments can formulate methodical allocative tasks. This is particularly true when the allocative tasks strain the limits of the political order—when they involve the largest possible quantities of political valuables. Then it is all the more important to utilize the symbols of government to avoid political conflicts that would reduce the capacity of the government to act.

Perhaps it is axiomatic, or deducible from the definition of modernity, that the political limits within which modern states allocate political valuables are much broader than they are for traditional orders. It may be helpful to clarify the relationship of modernity to political allocative capacities by turning back to a time before the democratic revolution in Europe had been accomplished—before ex-

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tensive political mobilization—when the political choices were much narrower, or at best very different.

I. Napoleonic Political Mobilization

We may consider the European states in the eighteenth century—France, Spain, the United Kingdom, the German states—traditional polities. Their middle and lower classes were politically passive and the regimes had little or no confidence that they could establish fruitful political relationships with them. Any task imposed upon nonpolitical groups which provided them with power, political skills, or expectations of more political rewards or status was potentially upsetting to the system. New sources and methods of taxing would have this effect. So, even more, would arming them and giving them military experience, for that would raise their political skills and expectations. Recruiting an army from the dregs of society and from abroad was one way to achieve essential military strength without disrupting the order of things—providing the army could be controlled.[1] Subordination and discipline could serve not only to assure the regime control over the army, but also to mitigate and possibly offset the politically awakening effects of military service.

Frederick William II rejected in 1794 a proposal to summon the *levée en masse* in answer to France's resort to "the nation in arms." The terms of his rejection suggest the internal threat to the *ancien régime* that had to be endured in coping with external threats. It was "infinitely dangerous," he declared, "to assemble such a mass of men."[2] He might have added that it was dangerous to teach them to use firearms and to plan and execute tactical moves. After Prussia's humiliation by Napoleon at Jena, the Prussian king evidently reassessed this balance he had struck and accepted the advice of the military reformers of Prussia, for he had patently underestimated the external danger in relation to the internal one.

Samuel Huntington suggests that political modernization involves (1) the rationalization of authority (or the establishment of secular sovereignty), (2) the differentiation of political functions and the

[1] The Comte de Saint-Germain, who as French war minister at the end of the *ancien régime* doubled the size of the French army, later wrote in defense of the way he had done it: "It would be destruction to a nation if it were deprived of its best elements. As things are, the army must inevitably consist of the scum of the people and of all those for whom society has no use" (as quoted in Hans Speier, *Social Order and the Risks of War* [New York 1952], 335).

[2] Herman Beuchema, "The Social and Political Aspects of Conscription: Europe's Experience," in J. D. Clarkson and T. C. Cochran, eds., *War as a Social Institution* (New York 1949), 119.

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development of specialized structures, and (3) an increased or broadened participation in politics.[3] At the close of the nineteenth century, Frederick William's authority reflected the first set of elements, though for Prussia, not the whole of Germany, of course. Napoleon's armies challenged the efficiency with which the second set of elements functioned and pushed the state into activities that would have a substantial expansive effect on the third set.

Frederick William's dilemma should indicate the character of the Napoleonic military challenge. The French Revolution, by destroying the *ancien régime* in France, had destroyed the limitations on the level of national military effort within the French political system which could be expressed (following Huntington) as an equilibrium among the elements of authority, function and structure, and political participation. France, then, upset the balance of power in Europe, not because she had suddenly increased her power potential or her economic capacity, but because her internal political arrangements made it possible (or necessary) for her to direct more of her power to military ends. "By the revolution," a remarkable contemporary American observer, Robert Walsh, wrote, "her relative situation was totally changed. One of its first effects was the destruction of all those interests by which the old government, in common with the rest of Europe, was influenced and checked. While the other states of the continent continued to revolve in the orbits in which their maxims and habits retained them—France was loosened, as it were, from the political firmament, and prepared to pursue any direction, or to receive any impulse, which her new rulers might choose to give."[4] The danger that this "total" mobilization posed for traditional regimes, or so they evidently feared, was that in forging a war machine sizable enough to defend themselves they would destroy themselves.[5]

[3] "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966), 378.

[4] *A Letter on the Genius and Dispositions of the French Government* (Philadelphia 1810), 5.

[5] Walsh expresses the limits against which traditional orders were thrust as follows: "It was computed by the most celebrated writers of political arithmetic, that no state could maintain at one time, without absolute ruin, more than one hundredth part of its military population in arms" (p. 6).

In his attack on revolutionary domestic and international politics, Ferrero has described the chaos that resulted in Europe as follows: "Crazed with fear to the point of violence, these regimes had completely ignored the limits beyond which force becomes suicidal. The guillotine, terrorization, tyranny by the police, the totalitarianism of the Consulate and the Empire—these were their methods of preserving internal order. And in their foreign policy they relied on war without rules, ephemeral victories, confiscations, unilateral annexations, oppressive treaties, despotic protectorates, wholesale manufacture of counterfeit republics, and, under the Empire, artificial monarchies" (Guglielmo Ferrero, *The Reconstruction of Europe* [New York 1941], 57).

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In at least two ways the conventional limits of the *ancien régime* were thrust aside by the mobilization. First, after military reverses in 1792, the French developed methods of conscripting and expending manpower for military advantage at rates that were not feasible for a traditionalist polity. In effect, the human resource for war had become less costly to the regime that procured and expended it. Napoleon seized upon this change in military resource cost as an opportunity. He could afford, for example, as Ropp has put it, to "trade stragglers for speed." In fact, many of Napoleon's tactical innovations were primarily ways to trade greater casualties for military advantage.[6]

Second, the Committee on Public Safety started an economic mobilization effort which, to the extent it drew upon the resources of the French economy and society, went well beyond anything attempted theretofore by a regime of the old order, even though the economy was in decline through the Revolutionary era.[7] Napoleon reimposed the indirect taxation that the Revolution had abolished. Public finance remained "sound" and credit unimpaired, though probably at the expense of economic growth. Land reforms won the peasants and kept them loyal to the regime, despite their dislike of conscription, but at the cost of retarded agricultural development.[8] Napoleon had to cope with internal political constraints, but they were much reduced.

Externally he also faced fewer inhibitions than did traditional regimes in the prosecution of war. He traded off internal for external political and economic costs by extending the expedient of having the army live off the land to the more ambitious objective of having warfare pay for itself—an objective never wholly achieved. So long as France was successful, many of the costs of war could be levied against the vanquished. Aldington, Wellington's biographer, has written that Wellington "came to see the French military system as designed to

[6] Theodore Ropp, *War in the Modern World*, rev. ed. (New York 1962), 107, 110-11. Meeting the quotas for the army remained a problem from 1792 until 1814. It varied in difficulty depending upon the changing popularity of the regime and its changing fortunes in war. How expeditiously the draft quotas were filled was not simply a reflection of the sentiments of prospective recruits. Often it was more an indication of how energetically the department officials carried out their assignments. Desertions were a reflection of troop morale, and the French armies were, because of their new tactics, both peculiarly vulnerable to desertion and all the more dependent upon mass recruitment. Robert B. Holtman, in his *Napoleonic Propaganda* (Baton Rouge 1950), 222-36, has conscientiously traced the ups and downs of government popularity and of recruitment for and desertion from the army.

[7] Historical findings on the state of the French economy during the period are summarized in Alfred Cobban, *The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution* (Cambridge 1964), 68-80.

[8] Leo Gershoy, *The French Revolution and Napoleon* (New York 1964), 459-62; Ronde E. Cameron, *France and the Economic Development of Europe, 1800-1914* (Princeton 1961), 26.

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render war a resource . . . and to throw the burden upon the country which unfortunately became the seat of its operations."[9] But France herself was not spared, either. "All France is but one immense piece of artillery," a disillusioned foreign participant in the French Revolution wrote, "which Bonaparte commands, directs, points, to cannonade the universe."[10] If they did nothing more, the manpower levies generated controls and tensions of grim proportions, as is indicated by a contemporary comment: "A man cannot walk a gunshot from his home without being measured and questioned."[11]

Walsh saw that Napoleon "and his immediate predecessors were conquerors from necessity as well as choice. To disband the armies would have been suicidal. . . . It is easy to show, from the representations of their own financiers, that no device of fiscal alchemy would have furnished the means of supporting the armies in the interim—and the foreign plunder was, therefore, a necessary resource.[12]

There were, of course, more favorable ways to put even the military manifestations of the French Revolution than did Walsh and Wellington: particularly, the virtues of the citizen army, the elimination of rank through privilege, and the potential fighting qualities of troops with a minimum of personal motivation. The military reformers in Prussia in particular stressed—even exaggerated—these virtues in reaction to defeat at Napoleon's hands.[13] The ideas of the military reformers were, however, not new in European military thinking. Frederick the Great had observed the great value of the citizen soldier: "With such troops," he wrote in 1746, "one would defeat the whole world, were victories not as fatal to them as to their enemies."[14] Along with other *philosophes*, he placed a high theoretical value on patriotism.[15] Patriotism could be the mortar for a national political structure.

[9] Richard Aldington, *The Duke* (New York 1943), 382.

[10] M. Faber, *Sketches of the Internal State of France* (Philadelphia 1812), 256.

[11] *Ibid.*, 212. For a concise statement, made before the development of twentieth-century totalitarianism, of the totalitarian scope of Bonapartism, see H. A. L. Fisher, *Bonapartism* (Oxford 1908), chap. 2.

[12] Pp. 19-20.

[13] Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945* (Oxford and New York 1956), 40, 41.

[14] Reflecting a narrower meaning of "revolutionary" as due to domestic unrest, it has been more common to think of this problem as though Jacobinism at once taxed and created the internal limits on national response. Thus, Walsh writes that the state that France challenged had to "contend, at the same time, against external attack, and against the danger of internal commotion . . ." (p. 16). In Crane Brinton's judgment, "there was little danger that the French Revolution might spread to Prussia" (*A Decade of Revolution, 1789-1799* [New York 1934], 77).

[15] R. R. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to National War," in Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton 1952), 55.

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Yet acquiring it and depending on it would require the revolutionizing of his kingdom. Even the concept of total mobilization, and its implications for other states, had not been missing before the French Revolution. In France, Guibert had published in 1772 his speculations about the state that would "break through the forms and trammels of the civil constitutions of the period; shake off fiscal solicitudes by a general bankruptcy; turn her attention exclusively to military affairs; and organize a regular plan of universal empire." In England, in 1767, Sir James Steuart, referring to the same possibility, had asked, "Would it not quickly oblige every other nation to adopt, as far as possible, a similar conduct, from a principle of self-preservation?"[16]

The regimes of the old order were hardly unaware of their limited capabilities to wage war without disrupting the delicate balance of internal political interests of which they were composed. The balance of power in Europe depended, in turn, upon these strong internal checks on the military weight each power could throw into the scales of international power. In 1810, Robert Walsh, fresh from residence in Paris, expressed the problem in this way: "The balance of power, which, for three centuries [*sic*], prevented the destruction of any one independent state by violent means, and exhibited, before the dismemberment of Poland, nineteen distinct powers of the most unequal strength, is to be ascribed, not to the moderation or to the jealousy of the four great rivals, but to what may be termed an equilibrium of weakness in their military constitutions."[17]

Viewed in this light, the threat posed by the armies of the French Revolution was at least as revolutionary as were the ideas of the Revolution: mobilization of the resources of the state on so great a scale that it would threaten or destroy the foundations of the old order. The threat of the French armies posed for regimes of the old order the grave choice of risking destruction either from without or from within.[18] It is small wonder that all of Europe at first chose to chance the first alternative.

The issue posed in 1815 by the peacemaking was of the same order: how to reconstitute the conditions of international affairs so that the demands of national security would not be so great that states would

[16] Both are quoted in Walsh, 10, 11.

[17] P. 5.

[18] Consider the following characterization of Austria's situation in 1809, after the Austro-French Treaty of Schönbrunn: "Here was the Achilles' heel of the old dynastic state of Austria; that the centralized efficient institutions required by the times could not be introduced without risking the defection of the historic political parties" (Enno K. Kraehe, *Metternich's German Policy*, Vol. I, *The Contest with Napoleon, 1799-1814* [Princeton 1963], 119).

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be confronted with that terrible dilemma again. The Restoration of 1815 was a return to the limited commitment of national resources to foreign affairs, effected by reestablishing regimes with internal constraints on their mobilization capabilities. The restored balance of power rested as much upon the internal limits on the behavior of each regime as upon the international arrangements—the treaty structure—which it established.[19]

II. Domestic and International Stability: Nineteenth-Century Dilemmas

Once one identifies military mobilization as a major experience in political mobilization and identifies revolutionary warfare as a challenge to mobilize politically as well as militarily, some interesting interpretations of nineteenth-century European history follow.

Prussia was the only state to respond directly to the military challenge of Napoleonic warfare with political reform linked to military reform. Austria could not do so without fostering the nationalistic sentiments that were to split it apart a century later under the stresses of World War I, although she did establish the principle of universal liability to service.[20] Russia and England were able to cope otherwise with the challenge. Both were less vulnerable geographically. Russia's middle classes were as yet less numerous and militant than those of Western Europe. Great Britain already had central governing organs that were politically responsive if not widely representational. She needed them to cope with the infections of Jacobinism; her middle and lower classes were probably the most susceptible in all of Europe. She minimized the impact of the war on her political and economic life by avoiding conscription (although aggressive and unscrupulous methods of recruitment engendered considerable political unrest and violence) and by relying upon her naval power and exploiting her

[19] "For 25 years Europe had been convulsed by an effort to achieve order through power, and to contemporaries the lesson was not its failure but its near success. It is not surprising then, that in their effort to create an alternative, the statesmen in Vienna looked back to a period which had known stability and that they identified this stability with its domestic arrangements" (Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored* [Cambridge, Mass., 1957], 172).

[20] An excellent source on the Austrian army during the early nineteenth century, which indicates both the limited amount of reform and a persistent concern with ethnic nationalism, is Ravichio de Peretsdorf, *Notice sur l'organisation de l'armée autrichienne* (Paris 1832). Peretsdorf (p. 117), as does Ropp (p. 147), indicates that army units were not normally stationed in their home provinces. Other sources on the Austrian army are Iskar Regele, *Feldmarschall Radetzky* (Vienna 1957); John Presland, *Vae Victie: The Life of Ludwig von Benedek* (New York 1934); and Nikolaus von Preradovich, *Die Führungsschichten in Osterreich und Preussen (1804-1918) mit einem Ausblick bis zum Jahre 1945* (Wiesbaden 1955).

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growing commercial strength—particularly in the use of subsidies to her continental allies. When reaction set in on the Continent, Britain shared only meagerly in it because of the mounting pressure for reform that arose out of the war and the burgeoning industrial revolution.[21]

The Second Empire, which followed the reaction in France, became a curious search for the political base on which effective central government could rest. While Bismarck consolidated Germany, the government of Napoleon III became paralyzed by internal political forces with respect to its military capacities. After winning domination over France with the political support of the rural classes, Napoleon III attempted to broaden his political base by appealing to the urban lower and middle classes. But he was losing the support of the bourgeoisie at the very time that he conferred upon it new political power in parliament. The result was immobility. When he tried to meet the new military challenge posed by Prussia's defeat of Austria in 1866, his efforts failed.[22]

The Prussia that France faced after 1866 was by no means similarly handicapped by the configuration of forces in her internal political system. Like Napoleon III, Bismarck had sought political cohesion by appealing to the liberal as well as the antiliberal elements of the society, but he had been more successful. In militarism Prussia had found an answer to the crippling effect of the antiliberal reaction on the conduct of foreign affairs.

Prussian military reform, even though it envisaged far-reaching modifications of society and the state, had been instituted to preserve the Prussian monarchy, not overturn it.[23] Bismarck had united the liberal with the traditional elements of the German states during the 1860's, expanding the popular base of the regime without political upheaval. He used the army not only to effect monarchical inroads against the parliamentary powers, but to construct the consensus that he needed to support these incursions. In part his willingness to develop a mass army reserve was only a reflection of the success with which the Prussian state had managed to contain the military man-

[21] British internal political reactions to the French Revolution have been written about extensively. Of particular relevance to the present treatment are Alfred Cobban, ed., *The Debate on the French Revolution* (London 1950); P. A. Brown, *The French Revolution in English History* (London 1918); H. F. B. Wheeler and A. M. Broadley, *Napoleon and the Invasion of England: The Story of the Great Terror*, 2 vols. (London 1908); and F. J. MacCunnan, *The Contemporary English View of Napoleon* (London 1914).

[22] Ropp, 148-52; Hajo Holborn, *The Political Collapse of Europe* (New York 1951), 39-41; Denis W. Brogan, *The French Nation, 1814-1940* (New York 1957), esp. 138-44; Theodore Zeldin, *The Political System of Napoleon III* (London 1958), esp. chaps. 10, 11.

[23] David Thomson, *Europe Since Napoleon* (New York 1957), 100; Craig, 65-68.

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power challenge of Napoleonic warfare within the political structure of an authoritarian monarchy. In part it was more than that. The Prussian experience with military mobilization lent continuity to Bismarck's broader accomplishment of relatively "wide" and "deep" mobilization of the body politic for the support of public tasks and national aspirations without yielding to the liberal aspirations of liberty and equality.

European governments, including that of France, regarded the Franco-Prussian War as a triumph of the Prussian military system. From the French defeat until 1914, Prussia—or Imperial Germany—set the standard for the degree of a nation's military effort and the speed with which it was to be thrown into the scales in an ultimate test of national power.[24] Prussia had shown how a nonrevolutionary government could at once win some allegiance from all classes of society and at the same time recruit and maintain a huge military capability. The challenge she posed to European statecraft in the late nineteenth century was how to modify the internal order to achieve the military capabilities that Germany, by demonstrating that they were possible, had made essential.

Prussia not only showed the effectiveness of a nation-in-arms, but raised the hope that, by rapid military mobilization, efficient execution of preplanned operations, and much emphasis on offensive methods, the nation-in-arms could achieve its military objectives without a protracted and costly struggle—that, indeed, the costs of the war could be shifted to the opponent as they had been in Napoleonic warfare. Without severe internal constraints on the scale of national military efforts, the international order could not be relied upon to limit warfare within the bounds of political feasibility. All the more, it fell to the individual state within its own compass to reconcile the burdens that modern warfare imposed upon the domestic order with the capabilities of that order to sustain them. Mobilization was designed to allow the preparation of the war machine at minimum cost prior to the need for its use in warfare. It was planned that, once mobilization became necessary, the war would be finished quickly and, in an adaptation of the revolutionary Napoleonic manner, its costs would be borne by the loser.[25] The French military manual of 1913 on the handling

[24] See J. D. Hittle, *The Military Staff: Its History and Development* (Harrisburg 1949), 120-27, 152-58, 194-210; Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff* (New York 1953), 97-98; Spenser Wilkinson, *The Brain of an Army* (London and New York 1890); Paul Y. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense* (Princeton 1961), esp. 13-17; Franklyn A. Johnson, *Defense by Committee* (London 1960), 36, 48-50.

[25] Alfred Vagts, *Defense and Diplomacy* (New York 1958), 387-95.

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of large units, for example, urged commanders to seek an immediate military decision because the interruption of social and economic life made it mandatory. The burdens of mobilization could be carried, but not the costs of modern war.[26]

III. Domestic Burdens and International Stability: The Onset of World War I

In recent years, World War I has taken on renewed interest as an example of a war that nobody wanted, but that came about because of the reciprocal behavior of several states. Each one, acting within the constraints of its own mobilization plans and driven by its perceptions, either mistaken or accurate, of the motives and intentions of the others or by its fears, failed to perceive the consequences of its actions in combination with reciprocal actions on the other side. It is commonly inferred that war came without any of the rulers or regimes realizing the risks they had been running.

It is true that at the onset of World War I national military postures were similar to a vulnerable first-strike nuclear capability in that they at once invited attack and encouraged the commanders to preempt. But the reasons for these postures lay not simply in the stupidity of the military and their political chiefs nor in the failure of adequate liaison between the two groups. Preemptive postures were assumed to be the only way to keep the burdens of military preparation required by the circumstances of the early twentieth century within bearable political limits. The assumption was that no state could bear for long, without destroying itself, the enormous burdens of prolonged warfare of the scale that each could at least initially mount. Far from not anticipating the disproportion between war costs and national capabilities, the military preparations of the continental powers between 1870 and 1914 indicated a strong awareness of that disparity. To be sure, that awareness usually appeared as a perception about the weakening of some political element in the war-fighting capability of the nation-in-arms, as when Commandant Driant, speaking in the French Chamber in December 1912, referred to "the fickle psychology of the crowds which today constitute the armed nation." Because the public could not be expected to support a sustained conflict, he argued, "the victorious army will be the one that, disdaining reserves and fortresses, will

[26] Hoffman Nickerson, *The Armed Horde, 1793-1939* (New York 1940), 244; Richard D. Challener, *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1866-1939* (New York 1955), 106-7.

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first hurl itself at the throat of the adversary, and will, as a result, acquire that moral superiority that takes control of events."[27]

As Driant's remarks suggest, in order to avoid disproportionate costs, great emphasis was placed on offensive over defensive strategy—an emphasis that, as Bernard Brodie has lucidly explained, was so exclusive and extreme that it became highly romanticized.[28] Fay saw it as one of the major underlying causes of World War I: "Military officers generally held to the theory that it was advantageous to take the offensive. It meant also that the war, with all its frightful economic devastation and demoralizing political and psychological effects, would be carried on in the enemy's country instead of within one's own frontiers. In a political crisis, therefore, the military leaders were always quick to conclude that war was 'inevitable'. . . ."[29]

In effect, each power "solved" its national security problem by gambling on winning and imposing the collateral costs of victory on the opponent.[30] Like Napoleon's, their objective was to export the revolution; unlike Napoleon's, however, their motive was to avoid "revolution" at home—to avoid, that is to say, imposing an unbearable burden on the political order.[31]

It would appear, then, that much of the volatility of the military

[27] As quoted in Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Modern France: Problems of the Third and Fourth Republics* (Princeton 1951), 40-41.

[28] *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton 1959), chap. 1.

[29] Sidney Bradshaw Fay, *The Origins of the World War* (New York 1931), 40-41.

[30] In a badly neglected field, two published accounts of some utility on economic mobilization problems—both in pre-Keynesian terms, of course—are M. J. Bonn, *German War Finance* (New York 1916), and S. B. Clough and C. W. Cole, *Economic History of Europe* (Boston 1941), chap. 21. The latter is an excellent summary of economic mobilization in World War I, although, as it is without useful footnotes, it is a dead end for the historian.

[31] The historiography of the war has done a disservice to this issue. In their concern to achieve balanced judgments about premeditation (after earlier efforts to prove devil theories), historians have been at pains to show accurately how limited were the war objectives with which particular states entered the war. See, e.g., Hans W. Gatzke, *Germany's Drive to the West* (Baltimore 1950). If one must find someone to blame or exonerate, the presence or absence of premeditation is a good way to do it. But judging premeditation has limited utility to the understanding of statecraft in this particular situation. Gatzke and other historians neglect to consider the political vulnerability of a regime that is dependent upon quick victory for its own war plans. Once the quick victory fails to occur, the state is forced into raising war aims to counteract internal political disappointments. Exporting the costs of the war then enters a new phase. In World War I historiography, the significance of the limited character of the war aims should be discounted in the light of the gamble to shift war costs to the other side. A country willing to run that risk was willing to raise its war aims if the risk failed. Some substance is lent this view by the militancy of public opinion at the outbreak of the war and for at least several years before it. For an excellent recent summary of the militancy of public opinion, see Michael Howard, "Lest We Forget," *Encounter* (January 1964), 61-67.

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postures of 1914 was due to the fact that, because each power gambled on a victory that would minimize the cost to it and each could anticipate that its opponents were gambling on its defeat in the same way, the potential difference between winning and losing grew until each power regarded no risk of war large enough to justify risking defeat. It was this combination of national political balances—the ultimate balance of national politics which attempts to equate the internal with the external risk to the political order—which, when put together, was so volatile. It constituted a profound threat to international order as each state was poised to destroy the political order of its opponent in order to preserve its own.

IV. State Actors as Stabilizers in the International System

Suppose we take stability as a major value in the international system. Suppose, also, that stability is dependent on the behavior of individual state actors in the system and that their behavior is determined not only by the limited capability of statesmen to perceive its international-system implications but also by the limits on choice imposed by internal and external political constraints. If states are not really interested in stability, then they cannot be expected to use their available options to maintain stability. But we have supposed the contrary. We assume that they will seek stability if given a chance, that, short of desperation and providing system-perturbing adventurism appears as a high risk rather than a "free ride," they will restrict their interests so as not to jeopardize the general stability. Obviously, these provisos direct us to a limited case, but it is not an irrelevant one in a period when, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union have found some common, even if elusive and limited, interests.

Perhaps the traditional way is the best way to cope with national perturbations of the international order: restrain states from increasing their capacity to perturb the order and then rely on the unperturbed order to keep the behavior of states within bounds. Or perhaps a variant, a Holy Alliance against political mobilization, would be the best solution. It has its contemporary proponents among reactionary realists, such as George Kennan.[32] Doubtless the functional relationships between national and international politics which traditional methods of control relied upon and modern international methods have culti-

[32] Sidney Hertzberg, "Can Old-Time Diplomacy Check Soviet Power? Mr. Kennan and the Politics of Containment," *Commentary*, III (April 1952), 336-43. Hertzberg argues that Kennan is a "classical reactionary." A similar theme is developed in Joseph G. Whelan, "George Kennan and His Influence on American Foreign Policy," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, XXXV (Spring 1959), 196-220.

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vated are essential components of a stable international control system. Yet, it seems unlikely that control can be effected in the contemporary world without more intensive concern with the management of growing national capabilities than is normally evident in the serious literature of the field.

At the very least, we do not know enough about the relationship of the foreign policy behavior of particular states to the general values sought in or attributed to the international system—peace, stability, optimum rates of system transformation, specific subsystem adaptations, or whatever—to justify avoiding in foreign policy analysis any particular class of state or interstate options. These options include maintaining or increasing the internal political resource extractive capabilities of the state and the additional option-development possibilities that those increased capabilities make possible.

There are many implications to this observation. I shall here single out three important ones to stress. They concern national command-control problems, national flexibility in the management of foreign policy, and the marginal dynamics of national political costs and gains. All three derive from the focusing of attention on the behavior of national states as principal controllable variables in the international system.

COMMAND-CONTROL

The military analogue may, again, be limited but helpful. Some force posture analyses now give to the reciprocal or systemic effects of unilateral behavior the attention these effects should have whenever national action is involved. More particularly, the intensive concern in recent years with safety and control problems, under the rubric of command-control, has depended on an approach to operational capabilities that should be applied to other foreign policy activities: Whereas variations between actual behavior and intended behavior had previously been regarded as a persistent and conventional problem in military direction, to be solved primarily by drilling and discipline, recently quite a different set of requirements has been developed for certain kinds of military behavior. These requirements are of two types: positive control and varied option. Responsible civilian officials—the President, the Secretary of Defense—have come to value much more highly than they had before the importance of being certain about what choices they had and, once they had made choices, about what would in fact be done by the military instruments under their ostensible control. Because of the enormous potential consequences of specific military

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acts, the importance of operational control has increased by orders of magnitude.

Nuclear strategic analyses may rarely credit sufficiently the difficulty of predicting responses to specific military behavior; they have come to direct primary attention to the most manageable portion of the intractable problem of national military interactions, the posture and behavior of one's own forces. Similarly, in the U.S. military establishment at least, command-control has continued to be regarded all too often as a hardware-and-communication-system problem and all too rarely as a task that requires the reciprocal adaptation of politics and strategy to hardware and communications. Yet a beginning has been made in dealing with the problem by recognizing that if military operations are to be subordinated to national policy, purpose must be linked to discriminating control. The point is not that these problems have been solved in the military realm, but that they have been addressed.

A state's military posture and control capabilities can have a major effect on the behavior of other state actors and, reciprocally, on its own behavior as well. In a wider sense, the state actor's behavior and posture in external affairs—both its realized and its potential capabilities—are major parts of a complex set of interactions. Since the system is complex and the behavior of one participant is in some considerable degree inextricable from that of the rest, designed changes in a participant's potential or kinetic behavior are important points of control and direction in the system. To make use of these behavioral changes, however, we must ask, as we now ask about nuclear strategic interactions, what their systemic effects will be. The trouble is that nuclear strategy takes us only a little way with this problem because it usually assumes some form of rational response and counterresponse by actors in the strategic system, an assumption that simply does not square with some rather important facts. We may not be able to get very far with the tracing of systemic changes in this manner, but strategic analysis has at least addressed the question of national interaction with a semblance of the attention it deserves.

We in this country, for example, may not be able to figure out, either, what other actors will do in response to our changed posture or behavior or how the posture or behavior of third parties will change. We will even have great difficulties in determining what another actor perceives about the changed posture or behavior of the United States. But at least we ought to be able to acquire better control of ourselves by obtaining better information about ourselves. We can begin by

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finding out what it is that we do—what our behavior is in external relations. The point is an obvious one, just as the need for military discipline in military operations is axiomatic. What is not obvious is the extent of the attention it deserves.

The auditing and control problem in foreign relations is closely related to the military operational reporting and control problem, but it is by no means identical with it. If, for example, we fail in Vietnam and want to know why and are not content to take as a final answer the axioms that hold defeat to have been inevitable, we shall need to know what we did and did not do there—not simply what we tried to do or set out to do or intended to do—across the full range of our activities, from military operations to social and economic operations.[33] In fact, not knowing better than we now know, we yet may accept wrong answers about, for example, the efficacy of insurgent forces, attributing to their strength what could as well be laid to our weakness or confusion.

What the United States needs to know, then, it needs to know intensively, rather than in the conventional way that organizations "know" what they are doing. As with the problem of military command-control, while it may be possible to make do with traditional levels of capability, the challenge is to explore the potential utilities of new, much higher, levels of knowing.

FLEXIBILITY: THE DESIGN AND MAINTENANCE OF OPTIONS

In a similar vein, perhaps because the military establishment must concern itself with long lead-times for the achievement of its force posture, the issue of the range and character of policy options in the exercise of military functions has been a matter of intensive concern. Presidents like to keep their military options open as long as they can, and that is usually much longer than their subordinates want them to.[34] More broadly, the "vertical" struggle for control of an organization—a struggle over how much effective direction the central executive will exercise—often takes the form of a dispute over how early the executive will commit himself and how limited a set of options he will have available. The fewer his options, the easier it will be for his subordinates to play their particular roles but usually the harder it will

[33] See, e.g., Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam* (London 1966).

[34] William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York 1964), chap. 2. For a detailed account of Franklin D. Roosevelt's maneuvers to evade the pressures from his own staff to tie him down, see Paul Y. Hammond, "Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy," in Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions* (University, Ala., 1963), 380-82, 397-400, 408-17, 420-21, 425-26.

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be for him to play his. It is true that he may prefer not to have certain options—not to have to be seen to have said "no" or "yes" or not to be open to negotiation on some matter. Option avoidance is certainly an observable technique in political life, one that has not been absent, to say the least, in nuclear strategy.

But it is a subsidiary, not a general, objective; it is better for stratagems than strategies. Given the uncertainties that must be faced in external relations, state actors rarely may exercise their ingenuity to make choices without appearing actually to have done so, but they want to have the choices to make. Since subordinate officials are faced with the same uncertainties, but not with the same breadth of responsibility as the highest political authorities, they need, and can be expected to demand, a narrowing of options.

In the performance of military functions, these pressures for and against options have been intense. Among other things, they have produced some rather formal strategic doctrine about flexible options. But the value of this doctrine, and the contemporary performance of particular officials in protecting their own military options, is not our concern. Rather, our concern is with the analogous use of the concept of options applied to the more inclusive foreign relations function, where the pressures for and against options are taken in a much broader sense, as political system pressures that bear on the central government's efforts to acquire and maintain flexibility.

One way to increase the stability of the international order is to provide the central governments of state actors with flexibility in coping with the relationship of internal costs to external risks, or with room to maneuver, so to speak, between internal and external constraints. The achievement of flexibility, in turn, can be thought of as a problem in how to acquire and maintain the options that give a government that room to maneuver. It follows that options must be defined in terms not only of external goals and constraints but of internal conditions as well. What we are concerned with, then, is the political management of external affairs in the light of both internal and external constraints. We have already excluded the "free ride" problem, the situation in which the state actor finds or thinks that it can, by external adventurism, make political gains internally as well as externally at practically no risk. We have limited ourselves to the case where foreign policy "costs" the domestic political system political valuables, imposing demands for material resources and other social valuables to be spent in order to achieve a range of political objectives. Flexibility, then, may

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be viewed as the product of skilful political management operating on this general set of internal and external constraints.

Taken broadly, the political management of external affairs suggests two sets of hypotheses. The first deals with the relationship of the extractive capabilities of the government to the foreign policy instruments available to it. Suppose we postulate a national political system model consisting of groups that (a) have different levels of perceived threats and (b) would have to pay unequally for the implementation of foreign policy, their unequal burdens varying according to both the kinds of instruments used and the level of the effort made. The objective of the government defined in terms of this model would be to optimize foreign policy effectiveness (meaning to increase the ranges of quantitative and qualitative options) with minimal internal political costs. The costs could be reduced, according to the model, by seeing to it that burden-carrying groups coincided with threat-perceiving groups, by minimizing aggregate domestic costs, or by raising the perception of risks. The best foreign policy would then be the one that established the most favorable relationship between inputs (costs) and outputs (effective foreign policy).

What is striking about this formulation is how important a role the availability and choice of policy options plays in it. According to the model, the "best" foreign policy would be that combination of foreign policy options which optimized political cost-effectiveness. Strictly speaking, of course, the capacity to manipulate threat perceptions (in order to get a different set of threat-perceiving groups) could also play an important role in establishing the optimum options schedule. But threat-perception manipulation is a less attractive alternative than optimizing on options because it is more likely to get out of control.

The second set of hypotheses deals with a question that reflects contemporary interests in political modernity: Do modern or developed political systems have greater flexibility in foreign relations than the less developed states? At least two interesting and somewhat divergent hypotheses supply answers to this question.

First, if "modernity" means that a state has developed its extractive capacities—its ability to mobilize its political, social, and economic resources to serve public objectives—then modern states are more flexible in their foreign policy behavior than are less developed states.

Second, if "modernity" means the development of a complex set of articulated interests that can be aggregated only by complex log-rolling and pork-barrel transactions, then modernity is hardly to be associated with flexibility. On the contrary, it will produce "immobilism," which

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can be visualized as a particular set of relationships between internal and external threat perceptions, extractive capabilities, and policy options and costs which prevent effective foreign policy behavior of any kind. The behavior that is its product may take the form of the Smoot-Hawley tariff or the French and British paralysis at the onset of the war in the late 1930's or France's rejection of the European Defense Community in 1954 or something else. Conversely, a traditional order may be able to move with much dispatch in coping with at least certain kinds of problems, or it may be paralyzed by its own limited capabilities. The traditional orders of Europe, which we considered in sections I and II, particularly as they appeared at the beginning of the nineteenth century, preferred solutions for their foreign behavioral capability requirements which stressed flexibility at a cost that placed strict *limits on the levels of their effort. In fact, the cost also severely limited* their flexibility by denying them the options that were available only at higher levels of effort. Seeking flexibility in a narrow sense, they rejected the option of a grander form of flexibility.

MARGINAL DYNAMICS

While the emphasis of this article has been on the traditional order under heavy stress from a major outside security threat engaged in a "total" war of attrition, other combinations of internal and external conditions may be more relevant in the 1960's. Crises, or major, short-term threats, of course merit particular attention. Moderate, longer-term threats that impose moderate demands on political management, emphasizing marginal costs, may be even more common phenomena.

A strategic nuclear crisis in the 1960's imposes quite a different set of behavioral requirements on a major participant than does a total war of attrition. It is a much less stringent test of the extractive capacities of the state but a greater test of short-term military responsiveness and control and of public and governmental "nerve."

In addition to the sharp stress of crisis and the prolonged stress of conventional total war, the national political system must be able to endure varied limited stresses. By definition, these stresses do not test the ultimate limits of the system, but they do test its marginal dynamics —its ability to endure marginal costs without their accumulating at a rate that can be exploited by political rivals within or outside the national system. The Korean War "cost" the Truman administration in this sense, as the war in Vietnam is "costing" the Johnson administration. Perhaps more significant, militants in Peking, Hanoi, and elsewhere seem to believe that they can accumulate, in the middle or long

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term, decisive superiorities over the United States from their comparative marginal advantage in the ability to endure political burdens. Given this perception of the opportunities in international conflict, one of the most difficult tasks which the U.S. government has faced in its conduct of the war in Vietnam has been to convince hostile but quite different audiences in South Vietnam, Hanoi, and Peking that its expressed intentions to continue and, if necessary, increase its efforts will in fact be carried out over the middle and long term.

It is not uncommon to think of states as provocative, destabilizing, or, more simply, revolutionary when the internal political costs of their external efforts are, on the margin, less than zero (which means that they can make net gains domestically for their foreign efforts). It may also be that they are *vulnerable* to the point of being provocative when the internal political costs are much *greater* than zero. Patriotism is often seen as a "cause" of war. But it is also a war deterrent. The fact that a state is capable of a "rallying 'round the flag" response discourages its opponent from threatening it overtly or attacking it. Even in crises, where political costs may not be paid until after the event, this may be the case. It may be important that the immediate response has low net political costs. In the first place, some events become crises rather than quick capitulations because one state could respond to the other's threats without incurring for itself high immediate political costs. The Battle of Britain would seem to fit this category. It may be that the Berlin crises of 1961-1962 also fit it. Had the British public failed to respond the way they did in 1940—to push to a simple and extreme conclusion—the German attack might have been increased, or at least prolonged, and Britain defeated. Had the U.S. public failed to "rally 'round" President Kennedy in 1961, giving the impression that he had even made an internal political asset out of the tensions in Berlin, the threat to Berlin might have escalated further.

When we concern ourselves with crises, and with the seeming volatility of international affairs, it is all too easy to condemn the marginal dynamics of domestic politics for propelling states toward the abyss when a different set of dynamics might have driven them further toward it even faster. Fascination with the delicate balance of internal and external political costs should not be left to the revolutionary, whether of the Peking or of some other variety. This balance deserves the attention of those who would stabilize as well as those who would transform the international order. At any rate it is noteworthy how explicit the anticipation of marginal response has become for the United States in the mid-sixties. Both at the conventional military and

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"grass roots" political mobilization levels—most particularly in Vietnam—and at the central, big-power level with respect to strategic military posture, in considering whether to drive the Soviet-American arms race into a new generation of weapons, marginal response is a dominant consideration.

V. Conclusion

Since the Restoration of 1815, and concomitant with economic and political development, the modernizing states have increased greatly their capacity to mobilize their resources for public purposes, including foreign policy enterprises, first as the nation-in-arms and then as the "nation in public life" (to overstate the case somewhat). Statecraft now rarely excludes internal power aggregation or further domestic political mobilization (either *ad hoc* or long-term) as too dangerous an option to take seriously, although the nostalgia for what amount to pre-Napoleonic solutions remains surprisingly strong.

The function of statecraft, whether in war or in other foreign policy enterprises, is to control the forces that it must bring to bear in pursuit of the interests within its cognizance, managing them in relation to their political costs and to the political constraints on their aggregation and utilization. These are matters of national capability. By dealing with them, statecraft fashions the style of behavior of the national actor in foreign relations. That style is expressed by the aggressiveness with which the national actor pursues perceived interests, the riskiness of its ventures, the extent to which it hedges against defeat or miscalculation, its capacity to learn and adapt as it proceeds, the effects of its behavior on other actors in the international system—to stabilize or disrupt the system, to moderate and reassure or aggravate and alarm, to raise or lower the level of effort and the degree of risk in turn endured by other actors.

With minor exceptions, it has been part of the widely proclaimed fashion for political realism to attribute major significance to states as the principal actors in the international system, yet to avoid at the same time the full implications of this acknowledgment. The avoidance has been accomplished in perhaps three ways. First, traditional realists, as I have already suggested, have sought to suppress the major options of modern statecraft associated with the engagement of domestic political resources and commitments in external affairs.[35] They want to disengage the major powers from their military confrontations in order

[35] George Kennan and Walter Lippmann are eloquent proponents of this viewpoint, but others are equally to be associated with it, though each approaches it from his own premises.

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to reduce the level of commitment and, thus, the extent to which the conduct of external relations depends upon internal consent and support. It may be that they want to reduce the prominence of national actors in the international system in order that the stabilizing forces of the system not associated with national behavior can play a great role. At once, they see international stability as something so fragile that it can be shattered by strong assertions of national power, yet sufficiently durable to survive without the energetic support of national states. At bottom, one may suspect, is a Wilsonian distrust of, or a sense of guilt about, states' seeking their self-interest in the international arena.

Second, the pervading realism has found a place for optimism about the transformation of the system through the integration of national interests in the form of collective security arrangements. Optimistic expectations, at least in the United States, about transforming an international system by integrating it have been applied mostly to Western Europe. They are nevertheless important in the large picture of integrationist aspirations because Western Europe has occupied such a prominent position in U.S. policy.

Third, a variant on this alliance integrationism has been the pluralists' fascination with political, economic, and military integration, including particularly functional integration, to the neglect of the gatekeeping function of the regime in national policy.[36]

Together, reactionary realism, alliance integrationism, and pluralist integrationism all deflect attention from the importance of national external policies as components of an international order that can influence significantly the attainment of the values sought in the international realm. The premises of all three positions have been weakened with the passage of time in the postwar era, but without a commensurate refocusing of attention on the dimensions of national actor behavior. It would be well to pursue more persistently than we have the implications of acknowledging that the international system is dominated by its national actors.

To construct the analytical methods we need in order to do that we have a long way to go. We shall not get there so long as we are bored

[36] Stanley Hoffmann makes this point in his "Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System," in F. O. Wilcox and H. F. Haviland, Jr., eds., *The Atlantic Community: Progress and Prospects* (New York 1963), II. Although he is often identified with another viewpoint, Karl W. Deutsch makes a similar point in his "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (March 1960), 46. See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "East African Economic Integration," in *International Political Communities: An Anthology* (Garden City 1966), 436.

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at the prospect or ashamed of examining the management and control of national capabilities in external affairs as a serious analytical problem. But until we treat such an examination as a serious analytical problem (without prejudice to the many other things that it also is), the management and control of foreign relations will continue to confront us more than may be necessary with unanticipated hazards, some of which, like the equivalent dangers of a badly engineered command-control system for strategic forces, are avoidable. Foreign policy undertakings, at the very least, ought to "fail safe," too.

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SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ABROAD

Problems and Remedies

By KLAUS KNORR*

COMPLAINTS and resistance encountered by American scholars pursuing social science research abroad can be attributed to the following clusters of attitudes: (1) the fear complex, (2) political hostility, (3) cultural sensitivity, (4) the exploitation syndrome, and (5) the saturation factor.[1] In this article I shall briefly analyze these different sources of resistance, then point to changes and variations in their incidence, and finally address the question of remedies.

The Fear Complex

Some resistance to American social science research abroad is generated by the fear that the results may be used by the United States government or its military services for the purpose of intervening, by diplomacy, subversion, or military means, in the affairs of the country concerned.

In many countries that were recently colonies, this kind of fear is in part a legacy of their colonial experience. Thus, Moroccans remember that French colonial administrators and military commanders encouraged and exploited sociological and anthropological studies in their area for the purpose of perfecting control over the local population. British orientalists and other scholars are known to have put their knowledge at the service of colonial government. These practices demonstrated to colonial populations that knowledge is power and that academic knowledge about them could be used by governments adverse to their aspirations and interests. While this legacy of distrust will no doubt diminish over time, its residues are still substantial, especially in many parts of Africa.

Moreover, in many countries, the fear complex is now being fed by a new anxiety involving the United States. This anxiety is aroused particularly by social science research financed by United States government departments and military services. By and large, foreigners assume that the Department of Defense or the U.S. Army or the CIA supports research only for purposes that are, at least potentially, hostile

* This is a slightly revised version of a paper written originally for the trustees of Education and World Affairs, New York.

[1] It should be noted that research conducted by scholars in the humanities is also capable of provoking or encountering resistance.

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to the countries in which the research is carried on. The highly publicized instances involving American University, Michigan State University, and M.I.T. have served to blur the distinction both between the private scholar and the servant of government and between private research funds and public funds that may come from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. military services.[2] Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that scholars, universities, and foundations are suspected of serving the CIA or other government agencies. Such suspicion does in fact greatly distort reality. But the suspicion, which inspires fear, is itself a reality with which we must cope. Nor does the suspicion lack foundation, for the actual situation, as we in the United States know, is rather messy. It is true that such government agencies as the Department of Defense support social science research abroad, that this source of funds is concealed in some cases, and that many of the scholars involved are consultants of government or are, upon their return to this country, "debriefed" by one of the intelligence agencies. It is also rumored in this country that the CIA has established some "private" foundations that support research. Finally, although much of the research financed by grants from government agencies has in fact no immediate intelligence purpose but rather is supported with the objective of augmenting the capabilities of the social sciences and hence the future ability of their practitioners to provide policy advice or knowledge upon which civil servants can draw when the need arises, the foreigner is unaware of these fine differences. Even if he is made aware of them, he may retort that he is still unable to identify the purpose and sponsor of any particular project.

Political Hostility

The second source of resistance—political hostility—is motivated by ideological or political opposition to the United States and its foreign and domestic policies. Hostility may be directed against the general way in which the United States comports itself as well as against specific American actions, such as the landing of troops in the Dominican Republic or the bombing of targets in North Vietnam. This hostility is widespread and intense among professors, students, and civil servants in many parts of the world. It animates not only Communists and their close political allies; the fact is that intellectuals in many developing countries are, while not necessarily Marxist, largely left-wing and are

[2] I understand that CIA funds granted to M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies were not to finance research abroad. But foreigners may not have accurate information about such grants or may be unwilling to make fine distinctions.

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disposed to look upon the United States as a capitalist, imperialist, and militarist power. The animosity associated with these views is readily projected onto anything American, including American scholars and scholarship. It produces a tendency to fasten on any aspect of American research enterprise that lends itself as a target for hostile criticism.

In addition to political hostility, there is also political caution, which is observable in some of the countries rigidly adhering to a posture of nonalignment in the cold war. This is a phenomenon engendered by the fact that visiting social scientists are overwhelmingly and conspicuously American. The nonaligned governments are bothered by the fact that these American scholars are not competing with social scientists from Communist and neutral countries.

Cultural Sensitivity

The third source of resistance is a phenomenon of bewildering complexity. Cultural sensitivities in any country are many, and communication across national and cultural boundaries is beset with difficulties that the seasoned scholar understands and the "plunger" ignores. The American scholar abroad can be disrespectful of local manners, customs, tastes, and taboos, of local achievement, of privacy. He can be disrespectful by having taken little trouble to familiarize himself with the country he is visiting, by being condescending, and by parading his comparative affluence. He can be disrespectful by being a poor researcher, wasting a respondent's time with questions that are perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be ignorant or crude. To make mistakes is easy in a research environment that is usually very different from the familiar one.

Whether the sensitivities of foreigners are jarred depends, of course, largely on the reciprocal sensitivities of the American scholar. But if these sensitivities are shocked, the reaction will not only reduce the value of the contact to the offending researcher, but will also, especially with repetition of the experience, make his successors less welcome.

The Exploitation Syndrome

Some resistance results from attitudes similar to those that people in less developed countries express toward American oil or mining companies. These companies are accused of taking out something of value that is then lost to the country and that should really be reserved for the local inhabitants to exploit. In the same vein, the local scholar may feel that the information gathered by American social scientists should really be his, for him to exploit, and that this opportunity is denied him

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because he lacks the funds and other resources so richly available to his American counterpart. He chafes under an inequality of opportunity that he feels to be unjust.

The Saturation Factor

There is, finally, resistance stemming from sheer saturation, from too many American scholars requesting too much local assistance: access, time, information, hospitality, and many other forms of help. No doubt there still are countries, ranging from Jordan to Swaziland, where few American scholars have trod and where their visits are still eagerly awaited as events signifying the country's importance or breaking the monotony of parochial life. Yet such places are becoming fewer. As the visits multiply, eagerness gives way to fatigue and annoyance, and these feelings in turn breed the protective devices with which everyone heavily favored by "visiting firemen" is familiar.

The people who "get saturated" are not, of course, the general population, but those whose cooperation is sought because of their position in government and politics, in academic life and libraries. Saturation also tends especially to affect persons of high position and renown or those in charge of valuable information. It tends to be concentrated in the main centers of a country, especially in its capital city. Saturation is also partly a function of the number of targets of inquiry in a country and of the relative leisure people in these positions enjoy. The fact is that in many less developed countries, the targets are relatively few, and government officials and educators overworked.

Underdevelopment of the Social Sciences

It is clear that foreign resistance to American research abroad is also affected by differences in the stage of development of the social sciences, and of their public appreciation, in the United States, on the one hand, and in virtually all other countries, on the other hand. Although appreciation and state of development tend to go hand in hand, they are separable phenomena.

In the United States, the social sciences (except for economics) are less appreciated than are the natural sciences; but they are more appreciated here than elsewhere, with the possible exception of a few nations such as Norway and Sweden. Public appreciation and support are stimulated by the recognition of the valuable services these disciplines are able to render to societies and governments. As societies become more complex as a result of economic and technological progress, and

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the rate of change more rapid, so will greater need be felt for the analytical tools available within the province of the social sciences. "Modernization" means, among other things, an increased control over the human as well as the physical environment, a control that rests on improved knowledge. Thus, rational planning tends to become more important and to require a capability for identifying and forecasting trends. But the development of a keener demand for the services of social scientists tends to be checked by two considerations. One is the fear that social science research is subversive to the hold enjoyed by prevailing social arrangements, myths, and norms. This makes the public less tolerant of new knowledge about human society than of new information about nature. The other consideration is skepticism, sometimes well informed, about the adequacy of the tools so far developed by social scientists.

In the social sciences, local scholarship abroad is, by and large, more often geared to traditional modes of teaching and research and is less receptive to what has been called in America the "social science revolution." This difference in the state of development makes for a clash of concept, style, and idiom that may act as a barrier to cooperation and does sometimes interfere with the acceptance of American social science researches. American methods have by no means met with universal appreciation. Survey research, in particular, tends to be held in low regard abroad, yet it is most demanding of contact with foreigners. Modern American social science is concerned with a much broader range of human phenomena than was so a few decades ago, and at the same time it puts more reliance on empirical data than on speculation. For instance, political scientists are pressing beyond the study of institutions and official records to probe in depth all those attitudes and values that determine "political culture." This orientation calls for a more embracing contact with foreign individuals and groups, who are often mystified by the operations of American social scientists.

Nevertheless, if this complex of attitudes touches off serious resistance to American scholars working abroad, it does so only in some places, sporadically and diminishingly. The fact is that in many developing countries, as well as in Europe and Japan, governments display an increasing appetite for the knowledge created by the social sciences. It is for these reasons that the attitudes described in this section do not rank as a major source of resistance. Critical attitudes by foreign scholars who are dedicated to traditional modes of teaching and research can perhaps be regarded primarily as one kind of cultural sensitivity.

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Variable Conditions

The first thing to notice about the five major sources of resistance is that our information about their origin, composition, and incidence is impressionistic and incomplete. For example, we do not know enough to rank the sources by their importance either for individual countries or on a global basis. The subject is, of course, susceptible of empirical research—in fact, of the very kind of research with which we are concerned—but such research has not been carried on, at least not rigorously. As a result, analysis and prescription must rest largely on guesswork. Unhappily, we do not have even simple statistics about the number of American social scientists who have gone to various countries to pursue research since the end of World War II, or even in the most recent years. If we had such information, we could get a better bearing on the problem of resistance in particular countries. We could discover trends in the amount of resistance and, by comparing them with data on numbers of students and professors, might hazard projections. However, even in the absence of such research we can recognize some of the complexity of the problem.

First, it is obvious that the various sources of resistance interact. Fear leads to hostility, hostility and saturation tend to sharpen cultural sensitivity, saturation is reached sooner as more resistance is generated on other grounds, and so on.

Second, it is also clear that resistance varies from country to country and, over time, may vary in any particular country. Fluctuations downward may occur even when the general trend is upward. Resistance may also vary from place to place within a particular country: the capital city may be saturated while lesser cities are not. Some sets of local persons, e.g., leading politicians, members of the government bureaucracy, or well-known scholars, have been much more in demand than others. Finally, resistance may vary with regions and types of countries. Thus, the problem is different in the highly developed countries than it is in the less developed countries. In the Western European countries and Japan, fear of the United States is hardly a significant source of resistance to American scholars; and political hostility to the United States or to specific American policies—though by no means absent from the intellectual communities of England, France, or Japan—is less compact than, say, in Santiago, Algiers, and Cairo. On the other hand, the other sources of resistance, especially cultural sensitivity and saturation, are active also in the highly developed countries, though perhaps to a lesser degree. The appropriate sets of officials in Brussels,

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Paris, and Bonn must by now wince at the thought of more American scholars coming to study European integration or NATO. But, unlike officials in the less developed countries, the higher officials in Europe have plenty of subordinates with whom they can share the burden. Between these two sets of countries there is also a difference in the local development of the social sciences. The highly developed countries have many social scientists of their own, even though their number is tiny compared with American abundance. These countries are used to social scientists and accord them a measure of respect even if they withhold the degree of enthusiasm characteristic of the United States and may look askance at some of the newer methods of research favored by Americans.

Third, there are a number of variable conditions that affect the arousal and impact of resistance. There are differences among social science disciplines. Economists tend to encounter less resistance than do political scientists. The leadership in many less developed countries is extremely sensitive to research on contemporary politics. Surprisingly, anthropologists may meet a lot of resistance where, as in some African countries, elites bent on rapid modernization are determined to weaken and supersede tribal structures and resent researches that tend to play them up.

But much depends upon the subject of the particular project. Even the economist may pry into areas of sensitivity, and the political scientist may focus on matters of indifference. Another variable factor is the method of research. Work in libraries and archives may be more readily tolerated than intensive interviewing or broad surveys. Traditional scholarship has tended to be casual and hence accommodating in dealings with informants. Modern scholarship tends to be more systematic in its field work and hence less adaptive to circumstance. The scholar's professional qualification makes up another dimension of the problem. He may be in superb command of his tools and hence command respect. He may also be mediocre and sloppy as a scholar, badly informed and dull, and may provoke corresponding boredom, disgust, and contempt. In this respect, it is a mistake to conceive of the problem only with reference to professionally competent scholars. An increasing number of undergraduates as well as graduate students have been going abroad, for a year or a term or the summer, to do research. Many of these necessarily lack the competence of the mature scholar. Finally, and obviously, the behavior of the individual scholar is a crucial factor. He may be sincere, modest, tactful, and patient, or he may lack these qualities. Unless all these dimensions of the problem are recognized,

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our analysis will lack perspective and our search for remedies will be handicapped.

Assumptions on the Volume of American Research Abroad

We know that American scholars conducting social science researches abroad have already encountered resistance. In the absence of empirical inquiry, we do not know how much resistance; nor are we clear about its causation. As indicated in the foregoing, resistance is related, though by no means related only, to the very volume of research carried on abroad. How large this volume is we shall not know until we attempt to measure it. It is assumed in this article that, whatever this volume is now or was in the past, it will tend to expand. This assumption is based on well-known projections about numbers of professors, graduate students, and undergraduates. There is no reason to assume that the proportion specializing in the social sciences will decline or that the propensity to undertake empirical work will decrease. Finally, there is no reason to assume that the volume of research funds will shrink. On the contrary, it is likely to become larger. To the extent, then, that our problem is sensitive to the very volume of social science researches undertaken abroad, we assume that foreign resistance will tend to rise.

Remedies

Since the factors making for resistance are complex, we must expect the search for remedies to turn up complex problems. Since our empirical knowledge about the causes of resistance is vague, we must, for this reason alone, expect our discussion of remedies to be very speculative. We must, moreover, expect that most, if not all, conceivable remedies will in turn raise problems of their own, and about these problems we are also bound to lack rigorous knowledge. Any conceivable remedy has its price. It will cost something in money, inconvenience, onerous restrictions, and other effects diminishing something of value. The question will often arise of whether the probable advantages of a specific remedy are worth its probable costs.

Finally, some parts of the problems suggest remedies that are so clearly impractical they are not worth raising. For example, anyone familiar with the academic profession knows that, for a considerable proportion of those doing research abroad, the primary motivation is to travel. It is the desire to travel that induces the search for an appropriate project that will attract the necessary funds. The "travelers" add to the phenomenon of saturation. But the problems of dealing with this factor are obviously prohibitive. Some of these people do, after all,

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perform competent research. Above all, there is no way to separate the basic tourist from the basic scholar.

Any search for remedies worth discussing can proceed best, at least for a start, with reference to the sources of resistance we have distinguished.

Coping with the Fear Complex

The problem here is to reduce the fear that social science researches are part of an intelligence effort directed against a particular country and serve to enhance the capabilities of the U.S. government to intervene in the affairs of other countries by means of diplomacy, propaganda, subversion, or coercion. To begin with, we must squarely face the fact that such fear, though it may be exaggerated or unfounded in particular cases, is not wholly a figment of the imagination. It is indeed impossible to assure anyone subject to this fear that his anxiety is unjustified. Even if agencies of the U.S. government refrained from supporting any social science research abroad, they could still draw on the findings of the private scholar working with private funds. While many research subjects seem far removed from any topic of interest to government, there is little knowledge about a society that could not, under appropriate circumstances, be used against it or against some of its members. Knowledge is unquestionably a condition of control. Yet we can hardly expect the U.S. government to cease all interventionist policies abroad. This departure would be incompatible with the present posture of the United States as a world power.[3]

However, the question must be raised of whether the fear complex could not be reduced if the U.S. government, or those of its agencies close to the formulation and execution of interventionist policies, would stop supporting social science researches abroad. No doubt fear would decline if this were done. However, the price of achieving this effect would be inordinately high if all federal support of research ceased. In the first place, private funds are insufficient to permit the social sciences to flourish. If these disciplines are to make solid progress, they require empirical work, here and abroad, and empirical research is expensive. Second, there is obvious advantage in a pluralistic structure of financial sources of support. The administrator of funds, whether he wants to or not, acquires and will exercise control over research subjects, methods, and personnel; and such control is the more likely to limit freedom of inquiry, and to follow the lure of fashion, the more centralized it is.

[3] And even if the United States took this step, the knowledge accumulated and published by American scholars would remain available to *other* governments.

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We must, however, distinguish among different sources of public funds. Funds coming from such agencies as the Department of Defense or the U.S. Army or Navy are more suspect of serving the immediate operational needs of interventionist policy than are funds coming from the National Science Foundation or from agencies that might be established for the sole purpose of supporting academic research (e.g., a Social Science Foundation, or other agencies that might be established under the International Education Act of 1966). Even if some foreigners were unable or unwilling to recognize the difference, many others would see it. (After all, the overwhelming proportion of research funds of other countries is public money.) It might be argued, therefore, that most operating governmental agencies should stop financing social science research abroad (though not at home) and leave this job entirely to those public agencies whose exclusive function is to serve the legitimate needs of private scholarship. Indeed, this is a tenable position. However, the price of such a shift would still be high—perhaps excessive—unless the new scholar-oriented agency or agencies received adequate funds and could be administered without fear of congressional criticism inspired by ignorance of, or hostility to, the social sciences. It is far from clear that these conditions could be guaranteed in the United States.

Even if *all* other operating agencies of the U.S. government were not denied the opportunity to finance social science research abroad, this ability might be removed from *some*. It would not be easy to draw the line of separation, but it seems fair to assume that researches supported by AID or the Department of Agriculture or the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare are less suspect abroad than those financed by the military services or the Department of Defense or the CIA. Furthermore, as long as government agencies, aside from those having no function other than to support researches designed by the private scholar, do finance social science research abroad, there are two possible conditions that could be made mandatory and that would diminish adverse impact abroad. One condition is that the federal source of finance always be announced. Concealment is surely objectionable on both ethical and practical grounds. The ethical problem is obvious. The practical problem is simply that resistance to American research is increased, sometimes explosively, when deceit is unmasked. The unmasking of deceit tarnishes the image and reduces the prestige of the scholar and will inevitably provoke the suspicion that any research project, ostensibly financed by private funds, may actually be paid for

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by the CIA or the Department of Defense. The suspicion already is widespread abroad. But we should be able to weaken it gradually by a consistently clean record on disclosure.

The other condition is that the operating agencies of the government not support social science research in another country unless the approval of that government has been obtained. This would be an act of courtesy as well as prudence. It would help to allay, though not necessarily prevent, foreign fears, and it would have the further advantage of relieving the Department of State of its present onerous function of approving or disapproving of researches by judging their likelihood of creating political problems.[4]

The case of Michigan State University raises another question worth pondering. Since the CIA is a particular *bête noire* in many parts of the world, and since it is known to undertake covert operations of necessity, it is debatable whether American universities and colleges should enter into any contractual relations with this agency. Much of the research conducted by the CIA is in fact of a character indistinguishable from studies taking place at academic institutions. It is also clear that the CIA can benefit from social science researches carried on at academic institutions. On the other hand, appearances do count, and foreign misinformation and misunderstanding are part of the reality with which we are concerned.

Still more difficult is the problem arising from the fact that scholars may play a dual role—the role of the scholar dedicated to the advancement of academic knowledge and the role of a servant or informant of government, a role that is assumed out of a sense of public service. There is no question that the requirements of the two roles may conflict. It is surely extreme to argue, however, as some have, that the academic scholar must choose flatly between one role and the other. Such a rule would deprive scholars of a range of loyalties open to others, and it would hardly be enforceable. The practical problem is one of reconciling the two role demands in a reasonably acceptable fashion; and this can be done by clarifying the consequences of *particular* practices. For example, a social scientist can refuse to give his government information that he gained under the assurance that such information would be used exclusively for purposes of private research.

[4] Where the foreign government is authoritarian or dictatorial, or where violent civil strife is in progress, the political opposition will, of course, draw no satisfaction from the fact of government approval. Indeed, it may suspect and claim that the research in question is designed to help an unpopular regime supported by the United States.

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Reducing the Problem of Political Hostility

Resistance bred by ideological and political hostility toward the United States and its policies offers the scholar virtually no scope for remedial action. The United States will scarcely change its posture and policies in order to facilitate academic research abroad; and the American scholar will rarely be allowed to separate himself from his national identification. The only adjustment to be considered, especially in connection with large-scale researches of the survey type, is the substitution of local citizens or other foreigners for American personnel. This measure is not without costs if non-American personnel are less competent and less reliable than American researchers. But the costs may be small; and employing local research teams or European survey organizations for the empirical job, once the research instrument is designed, is a way to reduce the visibility of American research. This kind of substitution would also be helpful in countries where dedication to political nonalignment makes local governments uneasy over the conspicuous presence of American scholars.

It is worth exploring seriously whether certain large-scale projects of the survey type, involving comparative research in a number of countries, could not be organized under *international* auspices. UNESCO is probably unsuitable for this purpose. It has at its center a multinational bureaucracy with many dispersed veto powers. But it might prove possible to form *ad hoc* international consortia, perhaps with the help of the international professional associations. Social scientists from the United States, the subject countries, and third nations could be represented in consortia. The price would be extra expense, more delay, and, from the viewpoint of the American scholar, less control. Yet the benefits of cross-national management might more than compensate for these drawbacks.

Meeting Cultural Sensitivity

Neither the individual scholar nor the entirety of social scientists conducting research abroad has much control over most of the sources of resistance to social science research. They have a great deal of control when it comes to cultural sensitivities. All they need to do is learn about the sensitivities and then avoid violating them. The sensitivities in question are normative and hence predictable. Since the effectiveness of research abroad depends in part on such avoidance, the scholar has also the incentive to prepare and conduct himself with care.

The specific things that the scholar should do are, for the most part,

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obvious and well-known. They fall into six classes: Each scholar should (1) take the trouble to brief himself thoroughly by consulting the relevant literature and experienced colleagues, (2) enter into and foster relationships with local scholars qualified to give additional advice, (3) avoid all offensive behavior unrelated to the nature of the research project, (4) shun research subjects of marked sensitivity, (5) probe unavoidable subjects of sensitivity with tact and proper preparation, and (6) use, whenever feasible, local personnel for investigating matters of sensitivity.

To be sure, these rules are more easily laid down than observed. To begin with, the scholar must be aware of the problem. Perfect adherence to the rules requires in the scholar a degree of sensitivity and empathy, patience and tact which many individuals lack. It is said that Englishmen have a distaste for uncovering other people's private feelings. This is a disposition with which Americans are less endowed and which conflicts with the very vocation of the empirical social scientist. To draw on local personnel may be expensive and worrisome on grounds of competence. The dedicated scholar may be loath to minimize in his research design the penetration of sensitive areas of foreign behavior. He may find it hard to adjust to the slower tempo of activities in many less developed countries. Above all, the individual scholar lacks all control over the behavior of scholars who preceded him and who produced a sharpening of sensitivities either by misconduct or by the cumulative impact of sheer numbers.

One way of protecting sensitivities abroad, in addition to the rules listed above, is the organization of research as a joint enterprise—in design as well as execution—with scholars and, when applicable, with officials of the subject country. Of course, this option is often unavailable. But provided the American researcher is in possession of sufficient funds and is willing to expend extra effort and tolerate delay, the use of foreign scholars as collaborators rather than as tools could be activated more often than is now the case. Moreover, the joint enterprise has the merit of coping with the exploitation syndrome as well as with cultural sensitivities.

Dealing with the Exploitation Syndrome

To the extent that resistance expressed by the exploitation syndrome can be lessened, the appropriate measures involve, as in the case of American oil and mining companies, either a sharing of enterprise and profit or a *quid pro quo*. But the individual American scholar has only partial control over the available remedies. His control is largely lim-

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ited to remedies providing a sharing of enterprise and results. We have already noted that the employment of local research personnel is desirable in coping with resistance emanating from political hostility and cultural sensitivities. It is also a way of sharing with local scholars. It is equally desirable that, in the case of survey research, the recording of oral history, and so on, the American scholar make the resulting information available to local scholars and institutions as soon as possible. The conflicting desire to hoard data until one has used them oneself should not be allowed to stand in the way of such sharing.

However, when it comes to extending a *quid pro quo*, the American scholar has little control. He can, of course, help foreign scholars desiring advice about the United States; and he can subdue, if not entirely shed, any professional arrogance that prevents him from inviting colleagues from less developed countries to conferences in the United States or makes him treat those who do attend such meetings with scarcely concealed indifference or contempt.

But if other remedial proposals that have been made are to be adopted, their implementation goes far beyond the resources of the individual scholar. Inviting more foreign scholars to conferences in the United States is expensive. Inducing American social scientists, whether professors or graduate students, to do a teaching stint abroad, in order to free overworked local scholars for research, is obviously hard and expensive to do; and, if it could be done in appreciable numbers, the practice might engender a saturation phenomenon of its own and stir up political hostility. It has been suggested that for each dollar spent on American social science research abroad the United States should make one dollar, or an appreciable fraction thereof, available for education and research in the country concerned. This would clearly be very expensive for the donors of research funds and would raise difficult problems of administration. Moreover, if the expenditure of such funds were limited—as are tied loans in international capital transactions—to expenditures (on fellowships and research) in the United States, foreign critics might object and decry U.S. "cultural imperialism."[5] Yet despite such obstacles, the search for appropriate sharing and *quid pro quo* merits serious effort.

[5] India's reaction to President Johnson's proposal for an Indian-American Foundation, to be financed by the equivalent of $300 million in counterpart rupee funds, revealed some of these problems. Fifty-four professors at Delhi University objected because the foundation would mean foreign involvement in Indian education policy and would undermine the Indian system of values (see the *New York Times*, July 28, 1966, 8). We should not, on our part, treat such fears as if they were parochial. Not only have the Indians a right to protect what they cherish, but we also should not assume lightly that we know what is best for India.

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Relieving Saturation

There is only one way to mitigate saturation, when and where it occurs as a result of sheer numbers, and that is rationing. Unfortunately, as in all cases in which rationing is a possible mode of relief, voluntary rationing is unlikely to accomplish much. If involuntary rationing were contemplated, we should want it to be equitable, to favor the most interesting and best prepared projects, and, of course, to prove acceptable. But who could, or would, administer the rationing of research in keeping with these criteria? Indeed, who could, or would, administer and enforce it at all?

This expression of skepticism does not mean that relief is completely infeasible and rationing impossible if resistance caused by saturation becomes an unmistakable reality. After all, whatever its causes, resistance will predictably diminish the fruitfulness of research and, near the margin of indifference, some tentative projects will be abandoned. To that extent, there is a measure of built-in relief. But it is at the sources of funds, where information about the conditions of research abroad is watched and where the eagerness for any particular project is less than that of the scholar who wants to carry it out, that we might expect some rationing to take place. It would be neither planned as rationing nor called that. What would probably happen is simply that funds would be forthcoming with less ease. And this would be acceptable to scholars precisely because neither the word nor the principles of rationing would be invoked. American scholars are used to the withholding of funds; formal rationing they would fight vehemently, and for good reasons. But the procedure would be rationing just the same, and it might be especially arbitrary for not being regarded as such. It is possible, for instance, that the "big shots" and the smart operators in the social sciences, the prestigious institutions, and the projects conforming to the tastes of the administrators would receive preferential treatment. Yet, partly because the administrators would be aware of, and self-conscious about, the shortcomings of quasi-rationing backed by the power of the purse, it is unlikely that the aggregate cutback would be of sufficient volume to relieve saturation.

As indicated in the preceding analysis, saturation—if it occurs—will result in considerable part not from the researches of professors but from those of graduate students and from numerous programs, especially in area and language studies, that release each year a mighty stream of graduate students and undergraduates to the outside world. Most of these programs make good sense to foundation executives, col-

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lege and university administrators, program directors, and the students themselves; they look like an excellent method of teaching and training. It is no wonder the tendency exists to do more along these lines. But the administrators have rarely taken into account the dimension of the problem with which we are concerned; and even if it were taken into account, there would be a disposition to feel that one small program does not, after all, add much to the stream. The fact is, of course, that there are many such programs at many American institutions, and interuniversity programs as well, and that the large total may cause serious congestion abroad—a saturation perhaps particularly serious since, as it often involves half-baked scholars and variously motivated students, this kind of deluge might also grate on foreign cultural sensitivities. Even though much can be said for the worth of these programs in educating and training young Americans, the fact may have to be faced squarely that we are treating foreign countries essentially as a kind of practice field, as a sort of research game park, and that local populations may resent this.

Once again, however, it is hard to see how the opportunities for study abroad could be feasibly and acceptably rationed. Again, some contribution toward this end could perhaps be elicited by making foundation officials and university and college administrators aware of the problem.

Defenses in the Host Countries

The countries that American social scientists favor for research are, of course, in a strong position to control the influx and activities of American scholars. Burma's resort to prohibition is extreme. The Communist countries carefully control the influx and activities of American scholars. There is, in principle, reciprocity in the arrangements with the Soviet Union, and everything of interest to its government is subject to control. As the case of Professor Barghoorn indicates, the scholar who is careless about the sensitivities of Soviet authorities may find himself in serious trouble.

Thailand is perhaps a more interesting example. Other sending countries, especially Japan, add to the activities of American scholars there. It has been reported that between twenty and thirty foreign anthropologists have been working recently in the northern part of the country alone. Evidently the Thais have experienced saturation. They have become alarmed and have set up a National Research Council, attaching it to the office of the prime minister. A scholar desiring a visa in order to do research in Thailand must give the Council detailed

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information on his plans and the source of his funds. He must accept the obligation to report to the Council on his research results and deliver to it the data he gathers. The Council asserts the right to assign to him a research assistant who is expected to receive training in field work and for whom the foreign researcher must pay travel expenses and a per diem allowance. The Council has made it clear that Thailand is unable to accommodate every scholar who wants to come and that it will give preference to research from which Thailand itself expects to derive some utility. At this time, Thailand lacks a sufficiency of personnel to assign an assistant to every foreign researcher. But it has established a system designed to regulate the influx of scholars, to reject research subjects to which it is sensitive, to insist on sharing information, and to exact a reasonable *quid pro quo*. At the same time, the foreign scholar benefits from official authorization and from local assistance.

If the flood of visiting scholars rises, no doubt more and more governments will step in to impose controls. This could hardly be regarded as illegitimate. The visited countries having recourse to such measures would act fully within their rights, and they have the power to ration. The use of such controls might acquire considerable momentum since rising barriers in some countries would cause the pressure on others to mount.

However, this possibility should not lead to the comfortable conclusion that, since the host countries are able to protect themselves, nothing need be done on the American side. The degree of regulation would presumably depend on the numbers and conduct of American scholars. And whether the results of such developments would be acceptable to American scholars as well as to the host country would depend on the purpose and nature of the controls. They could be highly restrictive, onerous, and inhibitive of social science research. Nor should the United States government lack a thoughtful policy position in order to negotiate with governments contemplating regulation.

General Aspects of Remedies

The preceding analysis does not leave us with the hope that effective remedies will come forth quickly in the United States if resistance to American social science research becomes a more serious problem. One reason for skepticism derives from the complex nature and motivation of this resistance, its variation in different countries, and the resulting fact that, since local conditions will differ, uniform solutions will not do. Another reason is that, in respects directly relevant to our problem,

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scholars are used to extreme independence. They prefer anarchy in this crucial respect and are ready to fight any control of research activities as illegitimate invasions of free inquiry. Even though it may be admitted that freedom may be abused occasionally, it is generally felt that any corrective measures would have consequences worse than the abuse itself.

These conditions make the problem very difficult, but not wholly irremediable. One thing that can be done, and that should probably begin now, is to make American social scientists fully aware of the problem. They can be informed by means of publicizing the problem and urging its discussion and by enlisting professional associations in this process. Adequately informed, many scholars will voluntarily adjust their research plans and modes of operation. How much this adjustment will amount to is beyond conjecture; but it might well make a considerable difference. Similarly, the stimulus of awareness may cause many foundation officials and academic administrators to take a second look at programs for study abroad and to select and prune rather than expand. They might also become readier to insist on careful preparation and to consider programs involving reciprocal exchange or other forms of sharing and compensation.

The question has been posed of whether professional associations should not be moved to formulate a code of behavior covering at least some aspects of conducting research abroad. This is indeed a question that academics, though accustomed to unfettered freedom of research, should be required to face. In fact, the question of any restraints on the conduct of research must be viewed as part of the larger problem of whether freedom of research should be absolute.

We are dealing not only with *technical* problems resulting from difficulties of cross-cultural transactions, but also with *ethical* problems turning on the question of whether the scientific ethic, according to which nothing must stand in the way of approaches to the truth, is sacrosanct. It is not just that some people are too benighted to recognize the validity of this ethic. The trouble is that it is a crude ethic. It does not make proper distinctions between the things that should, and the things that should not, block the path to scientific truth. From the viewpoint of society as a whole, research requires control, though preferably in the form of self-restraint, whenever the *process* of research causes injury, or risk of injury, to people. The problem has been recognized in connection with medical and psychological experimentation to which human beings are sometimes subjected without informed

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consent.[6] The National Institute of Health now requires that for all research on human beings that it supports (including interviewing) the scholar's institution set up a multidisciplinary board in order to ensure that the informed consent of any subject is solicited and that his interests are protected. Similar questions might well be raised with reference to the social sciences. Should the zeal of researchers be permitted to override the privacy, integrity, and other interests of people except by truly informed consent? It is not enough to say that it is up to the respondent to look out for his rights and to control the researcher accordingly. The respondent is not always sufficiently free and informed to protect himself properly. There is thus a general problem of making the social scientist more sensitive to the side effects of his researches. Such sensitivity is also a prerequisite to reducing foreign resistance; it would alert the scholar to the fact that effective research operations abroad demand clear definition and acceptability of his role, purpose, and attitude. The manipulative approach of the social science researcher may prove offensive when it ignores the sense of privacy and integrity of respondents abroad.

At this stage, however, it is difficult to believe that the professional associations are prepared to assume the responsibility for control, or rather that their members will wish them to do so. The universities are more likely to act, especially if the receipt of funds is made conditional on procedures—such as those enacted by NIH—for protecting individuals from the zealous researcher. But concerning partial remedies for coping with some aspects of foreign resistance to social science research abroad, it is the institutions dispensing funds that could introduce appropriate policies.

It is not easy to propose or decide what these policies should be. Their subject and form must derive from the labor and judgment of many. The task of this article is to give structure to the problem and thus to facilitate the discussion of relevant questions and answers. One suggestion, however, seems worth mentioning because it aims at important parts of the problem we have examined, and also because it is not obviously infeasible. This is the establishment in the United States of a clearinghouse concerned with social science research abroad, especially (or perhaps only) in the less developed countries. There are certain kinds of services that such an organization could render as a minimum; additional functions may be desirable but are more debatable. Among the minimum functions might be these: (1) to collect information about the number of American scholars and the nature of their research

[6] See *Science* (May 13, 1966), 865.

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projects in various countries; (2) to collect and make available information about various conditions of research, including government regulations, in foreign countries; (3) to build up a file of contacts, especially with academic institutions abroad, available to researchers planning to visit foreign countries; (4) to maintain a file of social science studies under way in foreign countries, so that graduate students planning field work for dissertations, as well as postgraduate researchers, might become aware of projects affecting, and perhaps duplicating, their own plans; and (5) perhaps to offer an appropriate set of services to foreign scholars interested in the United States.

It seems to me beyond doubt that a clearinghouse—properly organized, staffed, and directed—could serve a valuable liaison function. Thus far, there has been no systematic effort at disseminating information about the opportunities and problems of American research abroad. As one observer has noted, the result has been a "dismaying waste of time, resources, and opportunities—not to mention the attendant personal distress and frustration. . . ."[7] And the incitement of foreign resistance has been another result.

To set up and operate such a clearinghouse would be a major and expensive undertaking. But the benefits might make the costs look small. Its establishment could be greatly assisted by the cooperation of the several professional associations. The capability and effectiveness of a clearinghouse could be assured if the organizations dispensing research funds—the foundations, federal agencies, and universities—were to make it mandatory for the traveling scholar to check in with the agency while planning his research and to report to it upon his return. It also seems to me that such a clearinghouse should be a private agency, and this means that it would have to be financed by the foundations.

Two Immediate Recommendations

The problem presented by foreign resistance to American social science research is already serious. Whether it is at present serious enough to call for drastic action is debatable. If one believes that the problem is bound, or likely, to get worse, then it should receive serious study now. In that case, two possible efforts merit immediate attention.

The first is the commissioning of serious research on the subject, beginning with a collection of statistical data and proceeding to systematic interviewing of an appropriate sample of American scholars, on the one hand, and of foreign officials and scholars, on the other. Perhaps even some rigorous and penetrating survey research is indicated.

[7] Robert E. Ward and others, *Studying Politics Abroad* (Boston 1964), 2.

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The second is a widespread airing of the issue and, by means of publications and meetings, discussion of possible remedies.

Whatever we do, we must begin to come to terms with the fact that neither the United States nor its social scientists own the world.

Postscriptum

Since this article was written, there has been disclosure of CIA support of several foundations which, in turn, have supported programs of foreign activities by U.S. students and scholars. None of the major U.S. foundations, from which U.S. scholars have received massive support, has been involved.

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Research Note

POLITICAL INTEGRATION AND POLITICAL STABILITY

A Hypothesis

By CLAUDE AKE

THESE notes are part of a study on the problem of political integration. My hypothesis is that the political system driving for integration maximizes its chances for achieving a high degree of integration and remaining stable, in spite of the short-run destabilizing effects of the drive for integration, if it is authoritarian, consensual, "identific," and paternal. If any of these four characteristics is absent, and to the extent that functionally compensating factors are also absent, the destabilizing effects of the drive for integration are increased.

The problem of political integration may be broadly defined as follows:[1] how to build a single coherent political society from a multiplicity of "traditional societies"; how to increase cultural homogeneity and value consensus; and how to elicit, from the individual, deference and devotion to the claims of the state.[2]

The primary prerequisite of political integration is the existence of political culture. Political culture "consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place."[3]

A few points about the concept of political culture must be underlined. First, as Pye has pointed out, not all beliefs about politics are

[1] The historical context of this research problem is the experience of the new states. For the purposes of the study, "new states" refers to the newly independent states of Africa. But since I am attempting to lay the groundwork for a general theory, my concern is not entirely limited to the African experience.

[2] For an overview of the impediments to political integration in the new states, see James S. Coleman, "The Problem of Political Integration in Emergent Africa," *Western Political Quarterly*, VIII (March 1955), 44-57; W. Howard Wriggins, "Impediments to Unity in the New States: The Case of Ceylon," *American Political Science Review*, LV (June 1961), 313-20. For related analyses, see Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 358 (March 1965), 52-64; Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York 1963), 105-57; Edward Shils, "Political Development in the New States," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, II (April 1960), 265-92, and (July 1960), 397-411.

[3] Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton 1965), 513.

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relevant to the concept of political culture. The concept refers only to those beliefs that affect politics in a fundamental way.[4] Second, some beliefs—such as beliefs about the trustworthiness of other people—which are not, strictly speaking, political in nature may affect politics in a fundamental way. Third, we cannot deduce a high degree of integration merely from the existence of commonly held political beliefs without inquiring into the nature of these beliefs. To use Sidney Verba's example, the belief that political power ought to be used to promote the interest of "a parochially defined group" may be commonly held; but if the members of the political system differ on the particular parochial group whose interest is to be promoted, this belief may cause conflict.[5]

This research note is concerned with the belief the individual has about his political identity; it is concerned with the process of inculcating and deepening the belief that the individual ought to identify with the state and defer to its interests.[6] Thus, we may define the process of political integration somewhat more explicitly as the progressive development among members of a political system of a deep and unambiguous sense of identity with the state and other members of the civic body.[7]

The requirement that members of the political system identify with and trust one another must be stressed. Without some basic mutual trust among members of the civic body there can be no stable expectations about the modes of acquisition and exercise of political power, no coherence and predictability in political life. In these circumstances political competition becomes particularly hazardous. Since there are

[4] Lucian Pye, "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development," in Pye and Verba, 8.

[5] Verba, 526.

[6] For more on political identity, see Lucian Pye, "Personal Identity and Political Ideology," in Dwaine Marvick, ed., *Political Decision-Makers* (New York 1961), 290-313, and Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven 1962); Erik Erikson, *Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History* (New York 1958); Verba, 512-60.

[7] For other definitions of political integration, see Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces* (Stanford 1958), 16; Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton 1957), 31. In these works, political integration is understood as the uniting of distinct national entities. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., in *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley 1964), 9, define political integration as "the progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing a participant community." The process here described as political integration bears a close resemblance to the process often referred to as national integration. See Leonard Binder, "National Integration and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, LVIII (September 1964), 622-63; Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building* (New York 1963), 6ff.

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no stable expectations about what those who win the struggle for the control of the government can and cannot do, the security of the political competitor lies only in winning; lack of predictability increases—psychologically—the price of losing and encourages extremism.

If the different cultural entities within the political system are so profoundly dissimilar that they cannot "communicate" with one another, mutual trust and a sense of collective identity cannot develop. The essential preliminary for political integration is the broadening and intensifying of "social communication."

For the most part, the improvement of the communicative facilities of the new state depends, in turn, on social mobilization—"the process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken down and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior."[8]

Social mobilization entails breaking down physical barriers and facilitating a greater flow of goods and services between the different parts of the country, developing the mass media and urban centers, inculcating new norms, and so on. Involving as it does a massive transformation of an old way of life, social mobilization generates tensions.[9] Those whose power is eroded in the process may seek to destroy the new order. Those obliged to leave their folk cultures may be lonely and insecure and perhaps inclined to doubt the meaning of their new life. Such loneliness and insecurity may breed alienation.

This brings us to the question of the political context of social mobilization. What type of political system is most suitable—i.e., most likely to minimize the politically disintegrative short-run effects of social mobilization—for carrying out this process? This research note suggests that the politically disintegrative effects of social mobilization are minimal in the context of a political system that is authoritarian, paternal, "identific," and consensual.

These concepts will be briefly discussed and an attempt will be made to give them operational meaning by breaking them down to empirical questions. The questions listed under each concept do not necessarily exhaust its empirical indicators; each list of questions is meant to be demonstrative rather than exhaustive.[10]

[8] Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, LV (September 1961), 494.

[9] For more on the process of social mobilization, see Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration," *World Politics*, V (January 1953), 168-95; Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," 493-514; Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (New York 1953), esp. 75-102.

[10] Some of the questions listed under the concepts need to be refined and broken

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1. AUTHORITARIAN

Given the latent instability of the political systems over which the leaders of the new states preside, their political authoritarianism is understandable.[11] Democratic diffusion of power implies a high degree of political integration, which in turn presupposes a "mature" political culture. Democratic diffusion of power presupposes the existence of internalized and institutionalized restraints potent enough to prevent the different pockets of power from destroying one another (and the state) through uninhibited self-assertiveness.

The pursuit of integration further underscores the need for authoritarianism. In the short run, the quest for integration aggravates political instability. It demands social and economic adjustments of immense proportions, and this adds to the social confusion of the transitional society. An attempt to manipulate the economic structure in order to increase integration is certain to arouse the hostility of certain vested interests. So will the attempt to make people relate to national symbols rather than to tribal ones. The quest for integration will make powerful enemies for the new order. To maintain a minimum of political stability, it is crucial that the government be strong enough to deal with the centrifugal forces that the drive for integration will activate; the government must also be able to decide and act quickly.

Empirical indicators:

a) Are political resources (i.e., means of gaining political power, such as money) concentrated in a few hands?
b) Is the social structure such that the influence of the ruling elite is cumulative? In other words, does control over political resources give the elite control over other resources?[12]
c) Does the "output of messages" from the government outweigh the "input of messages" from society?[13]
d) Is the coercive personnel of the government large, loyal, and effective?
e) Is interest articulation largely limited to suggestion of policy alternatives within the governmental structure?

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down into subquestions because, as they stand, they operationalize the concepts only in a crude sense.

[11] The instability exists because the development of their political cultures is in an embryonic state. See Verba, 519.

[12] Robert Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs 1963), 32-35.

[13] Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 17.

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f) In the light of the division of power in the constitution, is the central government strong in relation to regional and local governments?

g) Can the central government easily evade the constitutional checks on the exercise of its power?

2. PATERNAL

The leaders of the new state must not only concentrate power in their own hands, they must also "father" social transformation. To the extent that they are committed to integration of their culturally pluralistic societies, these leaders are "innovating" leaders.[14] To integrate, they must change—on a massive scale. They must destroy or modify certain habits of mind and undermine certain traditional symbols of collective identity; they must induce the people to accept new norms, new goals, new motivations; they must readjust patterns of social and economic relationships. They are, in effect, introducing a style of life that is quite alien to their people. They must supply the initiative for realizing it. Inevitably, politics takes on a paternalistic tone.

It should be emphasized that in the context of this study paternalism implies not only an oligarchic concentration of initiative but also ability and willingness to lead. The unsettling effects of social mobilization will breed uncertainty and anxiety.[15] People in the grip of anxiety may seek therapy in extremist mass movements or sink into defeatist apathy. Political leaders have to give their followers confidence and a sense of purpose and help them to find coherence and meaning in their new life.

Empirical indicators:

a) Does the "output of messages" from the government outweigh the "input of messages" from society?

b) Are associational interest groups controlled by the ruling elite?[16]

[14] This analytic distinction is borrowed from Carl J. Friedrich, "Political Leadership and the Problem of Charismatic Power," *Journal of Politics*, XXIII (February 1961), 3-24.

[15] On the causes and political consequences of anxiety, see Franz Neumann, "Anxiety and Politics," in Herbert Marcuse, ed., *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and Legal Theory by Franz Neumann* (Glencoe 1957), 170-95; Harold Lasswell, "The Psychology of Hitlerism," *Political Quarterly*, IV (July-September 1933), 373-84. Related works include Ann Willner and Dorothy Willner, "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 358 (March 1965), 77-88; Emile Durkheim, *Le Suicide* (Paris 1897); Sebastian de Grazia, *The Political Community: A Study in Anomie* (Chicago 1948).

[16] On associational interest groups, see Almond, 34.

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c) Are political leaders more oriented to system innovation than to system maintenance?
d) Do political leaders see themselves as "fathers" of the nation?
e) Does the ruling elite presume to know what is best for the nation?
f) Has the ruling elite been able to devise some means (e.g., an ideology) for giving its followers a central perspective on life?

3. IDENTIFIC[17]

One of the most striking features of the newly independent state is the sociocultural gap between the elite and the masses.[18] This sociocultural gap poses the threat of mutual alienation of the ruling elite and the masses. To lessen this threat, the political style and the way of life of the ruling elite must be calculated to dramatize its concern for and identity with the masses. Political leaders must eschew corruption, conspicuous consumption, and social snobbery and give their politics a distinctly "populistic" tone.

Empirical indicators:

a) Is the "political formula" of the ruling elite widely accepted?[19]
b) Is the incidence of anomic interest articulation low? (Note that a low incidence of anomic interest articulation is not always indicative of mutual identity of rulers and the ruled; it may also indicate that the government is severely repressive.)
c) Are there cultural symbols and historical experiences that can be exploited for reinforcing social solidarity?
d) Is there a general feeling that political leaders are not enjoying an unduly large share of the economic rewards of the system?
e) Is there a general feeling that political leaders are diligent and honest servants of the public interest?

4. CONSENSUAL

It may seem somewhat odd to maintain that a political system should be authoritarian as well as consensual. However, these characteristics are not incompatible in the present context. "Authoritarian" describes the way that the elite rules the masses; "consensual" describes intra-elite politics.

[17] I have coined this word to describe a political system characterized by mutual identity between the rulers and the ruled.
[18] For an excellent exposition, see Shils, 265-92, 397-411.
[19] "Political formula" is the "legal and moral basis, or principle, on which the power of the political class rests . . ." (Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* [*Elementi di Scienza Politica*], trans. H. D. Kahn [New York 1939], 70).

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The ruling elite should be a coalition of key figures from the main social, professional, and ethnic groups of the society. As much as possible, every major group should be represented. Policies should be formulated in a way that will win the broadest possible support for them within this coalition, and care should be taken to ensure that at least one representative of every major group occupies an important government position. Emphasis should be placed on the collective responsibility of the elite.

While there are many similarities between this idea of a coalition of the elite and the one-party system, there are also fundamental differences.

Perhaps I can best clarify the idea by contrasting it with the one-party system. What is proposed here bears a closer resemblance to Weber's "party of notables" than to the one-party systems of the new states. In the scheme, consensus is sought at the leadership level by enlisting the support of leading personalities from disparate social groups. Party organization is minimal; the government gains support through the personal influence of leading personalities. These leading personalities mediate between the government and society. Consensus is considered expedient, but it is not pursued with great passion; the possibility of organized opposition to the government is not excluded.

In contrast to this, the one-party system seeks consensus at all levels of society; this is one reason why the masses must be politicized. Support for the government does not depend on the personal influence of its leaders but on the ability of the party machinery to mobilize the masses—hence, the passion for organization and discipline. The party's claim to being synonymous with the nation impels it to eliminate all organized opposition and to seek unanimity with a fanatic zeal.

The advantages of a politics of consensus on the elite level are obvious. The fact that the government represents the major interests reduces the chances of its being regarded as an instrument for promoting particularistic (as opposed to public) interests. This, in turn, increases the government's chances of winning the confidence of the citizenry.

One other consequence of this politics of consensus is to reduce the divisive effects of social differences. It is possible for a country to achieve a degree of integration quite out of proportion to its social homogeneity. Social differences are politically divisive particularly when people begin to exploit them.[20] The elite coalition will be obliged to impose

[20] Douglas E. Ashford, *The Elusiveness of Power: The African Single-Party State* (Ithaca 1965), 14.

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restraints on the modes of acquisition and exercise of political power for the simple reason that if its members exploit social differences without restraint, the coalition cannot be solidary or effective, and the state over which it presides may disintegrate. So, a coalition is invaluable for reducing the political importance of social differences and taking some of the fierceness out of political competition.

Empirical indicators:

a) Are there strong deterrents (coercive, economic, and so on) to factionalism within the ruling elite?

b) Is every major social and ethnic group adequately (as judged by numerical strength, economic power, and so on) represented in the government?

c) Is there a symbol (e.g., a charismatic leader, an ideology) that commands the loyalty of the ruling elite?

d) Is the number of influential people openly hostile to the government small (in relation to the number of influential people openly supporting the government)?

e) Is there a machinery for resolving conflict within the ruling elite? Are the decisions reached by means of this machinery generally respected and accepted?

Testing the Hypothesis

It is pertinent to ask whether historical political systems that successfully made a drive for greater integration and those that withstood the impact of rapid and massive social change manifested the characteristics described here. The experience of a few historical societies will now be examined in terms of the hypothesis. The following historical survey does not pretend to constitute proof of the empirical validity of the hypothesis. It is merely intended to facilitate the testing of the hypothesis against historical data by making, in terms of the hypothesis, falsifiable propositions about the experience of certain historical political systems.

American history is an interesting test case of our view of political integration. On the surface, the political system of the nascent American nation seems to lack all four characteristics except the paternal element. But a closer look at American history reveals that the American political system manifested all four characteristics when it was making its drive for integration, especially in the four decades after the War of Independence. The paternal element was prominent. The movement for "a more perfect Union" was initiated and directed by a

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handful of leaders, such as Washington, Franklin, the Pinckneys, James Wilson, Rufus King, the Morrises, John Marshall, Hamilton, Madison, and so on.[21]

The Federalist party—if, indeed, we may call it a party—was not a mass party but an organization linking notables from different parts of the country. There is no doubt that the Federalists considered that their leadership was absolutely necessary for the survival and prosperity of the new nation.[22] They were "Founding Fathers" in every sense.

The identific element was not as strong. Federalist leaders did little to enlist the support of small farmers and frontiersmen; this was one reason why they were later defeated by the Jeffersonians. The aristocratic contempt for the common man of Federalist leaders such as John Adams and Alexander Hamilton was quite open. Still, the political system was considerably identific. There were no language barriers; the common background of European culture was a unifying factor. George Washington's charismatic appeal and the unifying experience of the War of Independence also strengthened the identific element.[23]

Despite factionalism and the political competition between Federalists and Antifederalists, the consensual element was much in evidence. It should not be forgotten that Hamilton and Jefferson were both members of George Washington's cabinet. So, to some extent, the conflict between Federalists and Republicans was an intraparty conflict. As Lipset has pointed out, Washington's prestige was "so great that he commanded the loyalty of the leaders of the different factions as well as the general populace."[24] Washington strove to make his administration nonpartisan. Although the impetus of the movement for greater political integration came from a handful of men, the movement enjoyed the support of many influential groups and institutions. During its ascendancy (especially before 1797), the Federalist party was supported by the industrialists of the northern states, most of the press, the chambers of commerce, the New England Congregational churches, and, for a time, the wealthy farmers of the South.

There are other indications of the operation of the consensual element. The choice of George Washington for a second term was unanimous. Again, as Roche has pointed out, nearly all the delegates at the

[21] Eugene H. Roseboom, *A History of Presidential Elections* (New York 1959), 11.

[22] For more on the paternal element, see John P. Roche, "The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action," *American Political Science Review*, LV (December 1961), 801.

[23] On George Washington's charismatic appeal, see Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (New York 1963), 21ff.

[24] *Ibid.*, 22.

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Constitutional Convention were supporters of a strong federal government; the differences of opinion that plagued the convention were tactical rather than ideological.[25]

At first sight, American society seems to have achieved political integration without authoritarianism. What emerged after the Revolution was, in George Washington's words, "a half-starved, limping government." Congress had virtually no coercive personnel to enforce its enactments. It could make treaties, issue currency, and borrow money, but it could not levy taxes or enlist troops. Nevertheless, authoritarianism played an important part in the integration of the United States.

To begin with, it should be noted that the American political system was elite-dominated during the postrevolutionary era. William Miller estimates that of 3,250,000 people (excluding American Indians) in the United States at the close of the Revolution over one million were "unfree." Among the "unfree" were 600,000 Negro slaves, 300,000 indentured servants, some 50,000 convicts who had no legal standing because they had entered the country illegally, a few thousand vagrants and debtors subjected to forced labor by court order. Another million—women who were neither slaves nor servants—had few legal rights. Married women could neither hold property nor will it; women could not hold public office. The states that had "inadvertently" given the vote to women proceeded to disenfranchise them.

According to Miller, by the mid-1780's no more than 400,000 free adults could be found in the United States, and some of these people, because they were busy battling the wilds of the frontier, had little time for politics.[26] "All told, at the close of the revolution, perhaps 120,000 Americans could meet the property, religious or other qualifications to vote. . . . Fewer still could hold office."[27]

The United States was, in effect, a one-party state for over four decades. The Federalists had dominated the system until 1800, when power shifted to the Jeffersonians. "From 1809, when Madison took over from Jefferson, each President was followed in office by his chief cabinet officer, the Secretary of State. And a national two-party system did not emerge until the 1830's when Jackson's opponents united in the Whig Party."[28]

Many American leaders recognized the need for a more authoritarian government. Washington was under great pressure to be more authori-

[25] Pp. 804ff.
[26] *A New History of the United States*, rev. ed. (New York 1962), 104ff.
[27] *Ibid.*, 106.
[28] Lipset, 44.

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tarian.[29] Hamilton wanted a "Governor" of the United States elected for life. This Governor was to appoint state Governors who were to have absolute veto over state laws.[30] Political expediency made such propositions unacceptable. But the spirit of politics was clearly authoritarian. George Washington's distaste for party politics was unconcealed. His farewell address is ample evidence of this fact. Other Federalist leaders were equally unfavorably disposed toward party competition. Indeed, the Federalists tended to view organized opposition as "seditious . . . and treasonable."[31]

In the case of Bismarckian Germany, the paternal element was strong. Bismarck was committed to reshaping Germany. The authoritarian element was easily the most dominant. Bismarck had at his service what was probably the most efficient and best organized bureaucracy of his time. The Prussian government was strong and centralized. Constitutional checks did little to curb Bismarck's authoritarianism. When the Liberal majority in the Prussian parliament refused to approve the taxes that Bismarck wanted, he collected them anyway.

The identific element was not as strong, but it was quite evident. Unlike Austria-Hungary, the German states had a common language. Germany had experienced an intense cultural nationalism, especially since the Napoleonic Wars. The military, economic, and diplomatic successes of Bismarck's government helped to legitimize it and buttress its prestige.

The consensual element was not as weak as a cursory examination of the Bismarckian era may suggest. Bismarck was backed by the royal authority of King William I; he also enjoyed the support of Moltke, who commanded the powerful Prussian army. In spite of Bismarck's clashes with the Prussian parliament, his policies were quite popular, even among Prussian liberals.

David Thomson argues that, until 1871, Prussian liberals and progressives found in Bismarck's political militarism an instrument for realizing their cherished goals—economic reform, scientific progress, German unification. Even before Bismarck came to power, the liberals and progressives had taken steps to promote German unification. By 1858, German industrialists were agitating for greater economic integration. In 1861, they established the *Deutscher Handelstag* (National Chamber of Commerce). Jurists were also working for a unified legal system. Politically conscious progressives had founded the *Deutscher*

[29] Miller, 115. [30] *Ibid.*, 20.
[31] Marshall Smelser, "The Federalist Period as an Age of Passion," *American Quarterly*, x (Winter 1958), 394ff.

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Nationalverein (1859) to unify liberals and democrats in all states. This body enjoyed the support of leading industrialists, such as Werner Siemens and Heinrich Hermann Meier. The consensual element was evident in Bismarckian Germany.

Russia under Stalin is not an example of a political system driving for integration. Nevertheless, Stalinist Russia is relevant to our hypothesis because it is a good example of a political system that survived massive social change. The authoritarian element is particularly obtrusive here. This is explicable by the incomparable organizational ability of the Communist party and its firm grip on the society; Russia also had a strong, well-established central government backed by an efficient and elaborate coercive machinery. The paternal element was strong because of the elitism of the Communist party. Considerable elite consensus was achieved through coercion, Marxist ideology, and common fear of the "capitalist conspiracy." Because of the avowed elitism of the Communist party, the identific element was very weak. But the unifying influence of Marxist ideology may have prevented Russian society from being dangerously polarized.

Stalinist Russia presents an example of the excessive use of violence to effect societal transformation. The Russian experience seems to indicate that when authoritarianism is thoroughgoing enough, the identific element can be dispensed with without risking the collapse of the political system. But it does not follow that the political system of the new state can do without the identific element. The historical circumstances under which Stalin worked were markedly different from the conditions under which most leaders of the new states are seeking integration. In Russia, the state was well-established; its legitimacy was not in doubt. There was a powerful, well-articulated ideology, an elaborate, efficient bureaucracy, and an efficient secret police backed by modern communication techniques—all these helped to prevent people from expressing their resentment at such excessive coercion in "disintegrative behavior." The new state does not boast such facilities. It is arguable that, despite these facilities, Stalin's thoroughgoing authoritarianism cost Russia dearly. Apart from the resulting loss of life caused by the purges, the liquidation of the kulaks and the drive for collectivization led to considerable economic subversion. It is telling that de-Stalinization took place.

Let us take a brief look at the new states. Most of the new states of Africa are not consensual. Despite "unipartyism," intraelite competition is intense. The regimes that were overthrown in Algeria, Nigeria, the Republic of Sudan, the Central African Republic, Congo (Léo-

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poldville), Congo (Brazzaville), Togo, Dahomey, and Upper Volta were victims of palace revolts rather than of popular uprisings.

The weakness of the consensual element was one of the main causes of the collapse of the Nkrumah regime. Nkrumah never won the support of the Ashanti and their leaders, of the universities, or of some leading intellectuals such as J. B. Danquah and Dr. Busia. He alienated powerful interests in the civil service by trying to politicize it. Finally, he alienated the military elite by distrusting it, enforcing the premature retirement of senior officers, and building up the "Chinese" Presidential Guard as a personal army.

If we look at Nigeria in the light of the hypothesis, we find that the recent coup d'etat is not really as surprising as it seems at first. The consensual element was weak. Although the federal government was a coalition, ethnic rivalries bred distrust among political leaders. The paternal element was very weak: the Balewa government failed to give leadership; the country lacked a sense of purpose. The identific element was also very weak: the politicians emphasized their privileged position by indulging in conspicuous consumption.

Lastly, an examination of the Castro regime in terms of the hypothesis suggests that the regime's chances of survival are good. The regime has been consistently authoritarian since 1959, when in the name of "revolutionary justice" Castro executed 557 people. Castro's "popular militia" provides him with more than sufficient coercive personnel to enforce his authoritarian policies. A manipulated voluntarism does little to conceal the fact that power and initiative are concentrated in the hands of Castro and his lieutenants. As Fitzgibbon has pointed out, Castro dominates Cuba so completely that the history of Cuba in the last few years "is the biography of Fidel."[32] Castro has come to symbolize the aspirations of the common man for a better life, not only in Cuba, but in Latin America as a whole.[33]

The consensual element is also strong. Shortly after Castro came to power in 1959, the opposition against his regime collapsed. A substantial number of the leaders of the opposition went into exile. Most of those remaining either pledged allegiance to him or sank into apathy; others were imprisoned or executed. Castro and his lieutenants—Raúl Castro, Major Ernesto Guevara, Major Camilo Cienfuegos, Antonio Núñez Jiménez—were left to dominate Cuba.

[32] Russell Fitzgibbon, "The Revolution Next Door: Cuba," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 334 (March 1961), 113-22.

[33] George Blanksten, "Fidel Castro and Latin America," in Morton A. Kaplan, ed., *The Revolution in World Politics* (New York 1962), 113-36.

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The identific element is also strong. Castro is generally said to have a charismatic appeal.[34] In Cuba his reputation as a guerilla leader is legendary. Castro's political style and personal life dramatize his concern for, and identity with, the Cuban masses. He lives modestly and works hard. "An amazing variety of charges and accusations has been hurled against the Castro regime, to be sure, but graft and corruption are significantly absent among them."[35] It is characteristic of Castro's political style that one of the first things he did when he came to power was to create the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) to effect sweeping agrarian reforms that favored the small farmer.[36]

It bears stating explicitly that this research note does not pretend to supply a magic formula to explain everything. What is offered here is merely a heuristic device. Political reality is complex. Whether the new state fails or succeeds depends on many more factors than our four variables encompass.

[34] On the charismatic appeal of Castro, see Fitzgibbon, 114-17; Blanksten, 120-21; Lloyd Free, *Attitudes of the Cuban People Toward the Castro Regime* (Princeton 1960).
[35] Blanksten, 124.
[36] *Ibid.*, 125-26.

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Review Articles

THE COMMUNIST PHOENIX AND THE INDONESIAN GARUDA*

Reflections on Cyclical History

By ANN RUTH WILLNER

Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1964, 380 pp. $8.50.
Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1965, 510 pp. $10.00.

AT LEAST one element of consistency has continued to characterize the course of political events in Indonesia—its capacity to confound the expectations and defy the predictions of most Western observers and scholars. The fate of the Communist movement provides the most recent example. Donald Hindley concluded, in his 1964 study of the policies and development of the Indonesian Communist party since national independence, that a "Communist rebellion is out of the question in the foreseeable future" (p. 301). Guy Pauker's analyses in 1964 and early 1965 of political developments stressed the probability that Indonesia would imminently become a Communist state, either by acclamation or in default of opposing forces.[1]

Pauker's observations were not untenable inferences to be drawn from a survey of the surface of the Indonesian political scene. There were the apparently growing strength and visibility of the PKI (the Indonesian Communist party) and its allied mass organizations. There was the discipline the leadership apparently was able to exert upon its followers. Finally, there was the apparent support increasingly given in recent years by Sukarno, whose public pronouncements seemed close to the PKI line.

Similarly, the consequences of the abortive Communist coup of October 1965 could not easily have been anticipated. Indonesians and those who have studied them have stressed their tolerance of opposition, their disinclination for sustained violence, and their readiness to

* *Garuda* is the name of the bird that is the national symbol of Indonesia.

[1] Guy J. Pauker, *Communist Prospects in Indonesia*, The RAND Corporation, R-4135-PR (November 1964); and "Indonesia in 1964: Toward a 'People's Democracy'?" *Asian Survey*, v (February 1965), 88-97.

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come to terms with past enemies. Attempted coups and domestic insurrection have been far from infrequent on the Indonesian scene, but the treatment accorded in the past to insurrectionary groups certainly did not augur the widespread, bloody, and prolonged massacre of members of the Communist movement and their ostensible supporters.

Further, the assumption of political control by the military in the wake of the attempted coup did not follow the prevalent pattern of Afro-Asian military takeovers. One major feature of this pattern is the summary disposal of the preceding head of government and his chief lieutenants by death, imprisonment, or exile. However, Sukarno continued as nominal head of a government that exercised authority in his name if not necessarily in accord with his initial preferences. Another feature of the usual pattern is the imposition of an unambiguously military regime (even if specified for an interim period) with the concentration of powers of decision in the hands of a small military elite. There is an undoubtedly military cast to the transitional regime in Indonesia, but military leaders seem to have preferred to share and diffuse decision-making powers rather than to monopolize them. It is true that Sukarno's attempts to halt the decimation of the Communists and to protect leading officials associated with them failed. Moreover, some of his former opponents have gained formal power and achieved the reversal of many of his policies. Nevertheless, as of mid-1966, Sukarno cannot yet be completely discounted as an influence on Indonesian politics.

Does this suggest that Indonesia presents an anomaly for political scientists seeking to discern patterns and regularities of political behavior in order to increase the range of political predictability? Do the developments summarized above lend support to those skeptical of surmounting the "accidents of history" approach, in which outcomes are considered not susceptible of prediction but only of *ex post facto* explanations couched in terms of the particular factors influencing the actions of particular individuals under the particular conditions prevailing at a particular time and place in history?

Perhaps one can attempt to elicit pattern and coherence within the seemingly unpredictable universe of Indonesian politics by exploring some of the less obvious and more nearly intangible factors that have been marginal or residual units of orthodox political analysis. For however paradoxical and inconsistent overt political behavior may appear at one level of analysis, at a deeper level inconsistencies may be resolved and disparities reconciled as we find constant or recurrent

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elements or relationships underlying and influencing observable behavior and events.

In the Indonesian case, the focus on such conventional units of political analysis as political groups, their assumed social bases of power and support, or the policy professions of political leaders may be misleading. It might be useful to look instead at the process of politics as a game of internal psychological warfare or diplomacy, conducive to an environment with many actual and more potential sources of social cleavage. This environment, despite its diversities—or, it might be suggested, almost because of them—reflects certain norms and values. The rules of the political game are partly derived from and its boundaries are partly delimited by this cultural matrix of norms and values. And the game itself may be seen as a mechanism of political integration that serves to maintain a precarious equilibrium.

I

In the search for regularities, one is reminded that the rise, development, and sudden eclipse of a Communist movement as a major political force is by no means a new phenomenon on the Indonesian scene. On the contrary, this theme has been recurrent in Indonesian political history in the last few decades. Twice before, once in the early 1920's during the colonial period, and again during the independence struggle in the late 1940's, the PKI rose to prominence, and twice before it suffered a dramatic demise. To superimpose upon each other the three lives of Indonesian communism is to have the makings of Javanese *wajong* drama. I employ this metaphor because such dramas are not played precisely the same way each time from identical scripts. But despite the individual variations and embellishments that enrich each particular performance, there is a basic scenario for each traditional drama, including the same stock characters, the same major episodes, and the same denouement.

Similarly, a comparison of the three periods of Communist emergence, flowering, abortive rebellion, and dramatic destruction reveals a striking similarity of major elements that transcends the historical peculiarities. There are as stock characters the intellectually oriented leaders, educated abroad or influenced from abroad and committed to an alien ideology that they try to adapt or repattern to local conditions. There is the dominant strategy of growth through cooperation and frequent compromise with other larger, more indigenously rooted political movements whose nationalist and "bourgeois" ideologies are fundamentally at odds with the Communists' own. There is the contra-

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puntal strategy of attempting to dominate the leaders of these groups or to co-opt segments of their supporters or both. Finally, in all three cases, Communist leaders, or a few among them, decide upon or are impelled or provoked into a sudden reversal of strategy, resulting in an ill-timed or poorly coordinated rebellion that precipitates the downfall of the movement.

The repetitiveness of this drama of the birth or resurrection, development, and seemingly premature extinction of the Communist movement in Indonesia shows a curious correspondence with the traditional Indonesian deterministic and cyclical view of history.[2] It certainly suggests a pattern, if only inadvertent, in the way in which the Communist leaders have tended to play the game of politics.

Outcomes of a game are the result of the moves and countermoves chosen by critical actors at critical points of decision from among the various alternatives perceived by them as available at those points in time. In theory, these choices presume some rational assessment by the actors, given available information, of the particular circumstances, of their own strengths and weaknesses compared to those of their opponents, and of the probable reactions of the larger audience for whose loyalties, support, or capture they contend.

In practice, there are probably few universal games, or at least few political games, the logic of whose moves would be universally recognized. Choices that appear irrational or mistaken when viewed retroactively or from the perspective of the hypothetically omniscient observer may of course reflect inadequate information or faulty judgment. They may also reflect a more limited range of alternatives open to the actors than might be visible to the hypothetical outsider whose vision is presumably not circumscribed by cultural myopia. The actors within a political system are influenced by the norms of the political game internal to the system in which it is being played. These norms serve as real or imagined stimuli toward or constraints upon action. And the actors' choices can be further narrowed by the degree to which they have psychologically internalized these norms, a process limiting still more their perceptions of alternatives that might be actually open to them.

Theoreticians of Communist strategy would find no difficulty in maintaining that Indonesian Communist leaders played, by and large, one of the standard Communist games. It can also be argued that they played or appeared to play an Indonesian—more specifically, a tradi-

[2] See Soedjatmoko, "The Indonesian Historian and His Time," in Soedjatmoko, ed., *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography* (Ithaca 1965), 409-12.

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tional Javanese—game of politics. Most of them were, after all, Javanese, which made the game a comfortable and familiar as well as a profitable one to play, and which may have accounted for its being overplayed, if only unconsciously, at times. However revolutionary and militant may have been the basic ideology and ultimate goals to which the Communist leaders were personally committed, their dominant public strategy and many of their tactics either accorded with the major tenets of the Indonesian value system or could be made to appear not incongruent with them. And this accounted, certainly in the recent period, for both their major gains and their ultimate losses.

Before pursuing this point, I should like to outline in rudimentary fashion some of the characteristics of this game and to suggest their corollaries.[3] One characteristic is the appeal by actors to the Indonesian preference for maintaining the appearance of unity.[4] The value placed on unity, often referred to as a traditional emphasis on harmony, does not reflect a naive belief that individuals and groups can easily exist in a harmonious state. It is rather a sophisticated theory of conflict control based upon recognition of the difficulties of confining the potentially destructive powers of discord, once discord is permitted to become overt. Indonesian history and legend are replete with instances of the evils that befell past realms rent by the "devils of division."[5]

The observance of ritual is believed to activate or maintain a desired state of affairs. Therefore, part of the procedure of controlling conflict has been the ritual of deliberate minimization of external signs of hostility and dissent. On the interpersonal level, this ritual has involved either repressing expressions of disagreement or communicating disagreement only in oblique form. Intergroup dissent and criticism have also tended to be manifested only by indirection.

Confrontation, despite the popularity of that term in recent years with respect to Malaysia, has not been a popular procedure internally. Attempts have been made wherever possible to resolve disagreements and arrive at consensus by a lengthy process of bargaining and mutual adjustment. Where actual consensus could not be reached—a frequent occurrence—there have been expressed overt, if fictional, formulas and declarations of apparent consensus, even when these are tacitly recog-

[3] The term "game" here does not imply a reference to the theory of games, although some similarities might be inferred.

[4] This characteristic may well be less specifically Indonesian than it is typical of changing societies in which emerging cleavages threaten previous bases of unity and impede the establishment of a new unity on a basis other than consciousness of community or ethnic group or nationalist opposition to colonialism.

[5] Bernard H. M. Vlekke, *Nusantara* (The Hague 1959), 47-51.

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nized as temporary. This mechanism presumably decreases the level of tension and dissipates the dangers of extremism. At least it tends to postpone the likelihood of conflict. Often, the stronger has been the disagreement, the greater and more prolonged have been efforts to achieve or maintain fictional unity.

It is important to note that political contests in Indonesia have generally been multiparty rather than two-party games. This has not only allowed but encouraged the formation and dissolution of alliances, counteralliances, and coalitions, often of a temporary nature. In accordance with the Indonesian term *aliran* or "current," the main lines of ideological division have been broadly classified as nationalist, Islamic, and Marxist. But the relevance of these divisions for the process of politics has been rather limited. During the parliamentary period of the 1950's, alliances among major and minor parties and even between factions of nominally opposed parties often tended to cut across rather than to parallel these orientations. In the struggle for power, prestige, and control over resources, the leaders, parties, and factions aligned and realigned in blocs tending to check the assumption of predominance by any single party or coalition. Sukarno and competitive elements of the military also threw their weight into one or another of these shifting internal balances.[6] Guided Democracy reduced the number of significant actors, with Sukarno serving to balance the increasingly polarized forces of the PKI and the military at the most visible level. But with the absence of cohesiveness within the military and with the efforts of the disunited Nationalist party, the Orthodox Islamic party, and other political forces to maneuver within this context, the pattern of shifting coalitions continued.

One might indeed compare the operations of the Indonesian political system to that of the classic balance-of-power system in international politics.[7] There has been no effective central organ capable of controlling or at least coordinating the activities of various political and administrative units that have been in effect almost autonomous. Even within a single formally hierarchical structure, whether political, civil, or military, the highest leaders frequently have not been able to command but have had to negotiate compliance. Lower-echelon leaders have exerted countervailing pressures for concessions by virtue of their own cross-cutting alliances.

[6] For details of the parliamentary period, see Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca 1962).

[7] In *Power and International Relations* (New York 1962), Inis Claude provides a most illuminating analysis of the balance-of-power concept and its uses.

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Such a situation inevitably makes useful certain operational tactics, some analogous to the "rules" of the international balance-of-power system.[8] Players find it inadvisable to extend themselves so far in any direction as not to allow an avenue for graceful retreat. They are careful not to antagonize or humiliate opponents to the point that the door is closed on future rapprochement, for it is never known when today's opponent may prove useful as tomorrow's ally.

This type of environment and the norm of surface unity have a number of implications for the style in which the game of politics has been played in Indonesia. Only a few of these will be mentioned here. One of the most significant aspects of the Indonesian situation, perhaps, is that there have constantly been two games, the overt one and the more covert one. And while this is certainly not a unique phenomenon, the discrepancies between the two have probably been greater here than in many other countries.

In the overt game, players have derived advantages from repeatedly and publicly indicating willingness to negotiate or compromise a dispute—after attempts to prevent the dispute's emergence into the open have failed. The corollary of this willingness has been the disinclination, even on the part of the most confirmed opponents, to pursue an open adversary process of debate. Rather than attempting to clarify and make more explicit their differences on basic issues, opponents have tended to blur or subdue them, to attempt to subsume them under some abstract symbol generally subscribed to, or otherwise to display publicly the desire to reconcile them.

When, in the course of negotiations, parties to a dispute have failed to gain their objectives, they have not infrequently made token concessions, which they were not likely to honor subsequently. When implicit threats or bluff have not succeeded in the probing and testing stage of a bargaining process, the relative losers have been inclined to withdraw gracefully to await a more favorable opportunity to bring the issue to the fore again and possibly then to wring real concessions from the opposition. Relative gainers have not been intent upon publicly proclaiming their victories and have often cooperated in saving the face of those who were bested.

[8] See Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957), 22-36. Of the rules of the system elucidated by Kaplan, those that most closely approximate my perceptions of the Indonesian system are these: "1. Act to increase capabilities but negotiate rather than fight. . . . 4. Act to oppose any coalition or single actor which tends to assume a position of predominance with respect to the rest of the system. . . . 6. Permit defeated or constrained actors to re-enter the system as acceptable role partners or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification" (p. 23).

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None of this, however, has inhibited the parallel playing of the covert or semisubterranean game. I term it "*semi*subterranean" because there is little that long remains secret on the level of the political elite in Indonesian society. It is merely a matter of time before even the most subtle moves come to the attention of those against whom they are directed. Even when the victims have not yet picked up all the cues, they are likely to suspect and anticipate the existence of such maneuvers and to prepare countermeasures. The moves against them are, after all, just such as they themselves might make in equivalent positions.

In this environment it is not surprising that the covert game has featured devious, rather than direct, tactics of weakening the position or undermining the actual or presumed power of both opponents and temporary allies. Criticism by innuendo, analogy, ridicule, and exaggeration, as well as by hyperbolic flattery designed to ridicule, has been the common weapon against which there is no easy defense or protection. The repertoire of verbal modes of distorting an opponent's political pronouncements and recasting them with a slant never intended would make Senator McCarthy appear to have been a crude amateur.

Not the least effective of techniques has been that of exploiting the latent rivalries and jealousies in competing organizations by sowing suspicion among superiors of the trustworthiness of their subordinates and vice versa. This technique has also been useful in keeping apart potential partners in the formation of a coalition or splitting a coalition already in existence. Hints that one can barely restrain one's supporters from public and perhaps violent demonstrations have often sufficed to wring concessions in a bargaining situation or to defend one's position from further attack.

One of the operational problems of maneuvering in such a fluid political environment is the frequent discrepancy between the presumed and actual power and influence of any figure or group. There is the risk that the radius of one's support in a showdown might not extend as far as one anticipates, while one's opponent's might extend further. Moreover, the looseness of intragroup discipline and cohesion may be such that one cannot necessarily depend upon one's assumed adherents. Therefore the covert game has involved constant probing and testing of one's own strengths as well as the strengths and defenses of the opponent, in the effort to assess the utility of intensifying or varying one's attacks and to protect oneself from the possibility that the attacks may boomerang.

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Another way of weakening an opponent and his group or faction is that of spreading hints and rumors of plots they are purportedly engaged in. These suggestions have been plausible and therefore effective. An atmosphere of endemic intrigue, combined with the Indonesian reluctance to take risks until sufficient support has been elicited and until the time has seemed propitious, has resulted in the simultaneous existence of many germinating plots, most of which never fully develop. However, the risks have not been too great to discourage this plotting, for losers may have been down but have rarely been irrevocably out, as is exemplified by Nasution in the past and Malik most recently.

One of the more complicated but not uncommon strategies of coping with a situation of uncomfortable pseudosolidarity is that of attempting to maneuver the other party into making the initial break. This strategy has been used in the course of negotiations aimed at resolving a public crisis or when a dissident group has hovered on the brink of overt insurrection. No one would prefer to appear intolerant or unwilling to make "reasonable" concessions to attain or maintain peace. Therefore, even when a state of negotiations or a previously attained *modus vivendi* has been recognized by all parties concerned to be untenable, each party has tended to force the others into the public position of responsibility for the dissolution of the status quo and for the consequences.[9]

II

That playing the Indonesian game of outward unity, cooperation, and compromise has been characteristic of Indonesian Communist leadership emerges from both McVey's study of the first phase of the movement and Hindley's study of its most recent phase. McVey traces the history of the movement from its inception under the leadership of a few Dutch Social Democrats shortly before World War I to its ill-starred revolt and consequent repression in 1926-1927. She has painstakingly provided students of Indonesian and Communist affairs with invaluable and impressively documented material on the successive leaders and their problems and debates in formulating and implementing policies, on their internal splits and disputes on ideology and organization, on their positions and maneuvers on issues at party conferences and congresses, on their activities in organizing the Indonesian labor

[9] Thus, in the early 1950's, parties intent upon dissolving coalition cabinets frequently acted to precipitate a first move by their opponents. Between 1956 and 1958, the central government negotiated at length with the regional dissident councils; it was only when the councils found it necessary to move from tacit defiance to open rebellion that they provided the pretext for strong retaliatory action.

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movement, and on their relations with other Indonesian political groups, with the Comintern, and with other Communist leaders and groups abroad.

Admittedly, it takes some effort to elicit patterns from this work, partly because it is organized largely on a chronological basis and partly because the author seems too conscientiously and perhaps too modestly concerned with avoiding generalizations in the interest of presenting readers with a wealth of historical detail from which to draw their own conclusions. Her elaborately woven account tends to stress the fluidity, contingency, and almost accidental nature of decisions, actions, and outcomes. From only a cursory reading, one might gain the impression that the leaders of the movement were less major actors upon any part of their environment than they were, to paraphrase John Donne, slaves to fate, chance, colonial and Comintern kings, and desperate men.

Nevertheless, certain themes reappear with some consistency. Proponents of the strategy of cooperation with bourgeois nationalist forces repeatedly prevailed over the ideological purists who placed primacy on the class struggle, as did the advocates of mobilizing broad if diffuse support from below over those who favored a hard-core, proletariat-based, and well-indoctrinated membership. Thus when the Islamic Association sought to rid itself of its troublesome Communist component, Communist bloc leaders made repeated if only token concessions first to prevent the breakup of the alliance with their Islamic partners-*cum*-competitors and then to attempt to restore it. And especially during the keen rivalry for membership after the final rupture, doctrine was not only diluted but distorted as campaigns were launched to gain mass support through exploitation of local and regional grievances and factionalism, appeals to traditional myths, and reinterpretations of communism in Islamic terms.

From McVey's data the reader can also derive patterns of response to both internal and external pressures and of resistance characterized by compromise and conciliation. Initial decisions that produced dissension within the movement, such as decisions involving attempts to reorganize on a tighter basis, tended to be revised. Related to these fluctuations was the repeated failure of the leadership to develop or sustain organizational discipline. It was easier to arouse dissatisfaction and demands than to channel and control their expression. Plans for concerted militant action, such as strikes, went awry as impatient party branches or affiliates precipitated untimely action on their own initiative, pulling reluctant leaders after them.

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In passing, it might be noted briefly that the dominant PKI strategy during the Indonesian struggle for independence against the Dutch was that of repeatedly pushing for a united front in the hopes of gaining control of the revolution through a coalition government. When the PKI was in opposition to a cabinet from which it was excluded, it continued to urge a national unity program on one level while at the same time instigating opposition to government policies among unions and military units under PKI influence.[10]

That the reemergence of the PKI from political obscurity to political prominence during the late 1940's and the 1950's involved essentially the same combination of simultaneously working toward a united front above while building its own organizational base below is clear from Hindley's study of the strategies employed by the Aidit-Lukman-Njoto triumvirate in reconstituting the movement. The major difference between the two earlier periods and the 1950's appears to have been that in the most recent period a now unified leadership pursued this course with long-range consistency, short-range tactical flexibility, and extreme caution in the effort to avoid the errors of its predecessors.

Hindley's work, dealing with the period 1951-1963, is more analytical and more systematically organized, if less comprehensive and less replete with fascinating detail, than McVey's treatment of the earlier period. Beginning with the logic apparently underlying the PKI's strategy of attempting to develop the "progressive" forces, to form alliances with the "middle" forces, and to isolate the basically antagonistic forces, the author covers in sequence the organization of the party, the mobilization of allied front groups, and the tactics utilized in dealing with other political groups and in coping with and exploiting major political issues. He elaborates in considerable detail the various appeals developed to enlist support from workers, women, youth, peasants, and other strata of the population. He repeatedly stresses the efforts to project an image of the movement as "fervently patriotic, sympathetic to religion, peaceful in pursuit of its goals . . . moderate in demands, and self-effacing in the friendliness shown toward most other Indonesian political forces" (p. 283).

As these themes are developed by Hindley, one gains the impression of a party only ritually and minimally concerned with doctrinal purity and rather Javanese in its compromises with and adjustments to the status quo, at least on internal issues. Militancy was by and large confined to the anticolonial issues, with domestic criticism directed mainly

[10] For details, see George McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca 1952), 256-303.

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at failures to implement policies for which support existed elsewhere or at opponents the party shared with some stronger ally. In cautiously testing the scope of its influence and the limits of criticism—the standard Javanese two-step-forward, one-step-back maneuver—the leadership seemed determined to avoid arousing the antagonism of its potential allies and to avoid open confrontation with its opponents.

Thus, in building its alliance with the PNI (the Nationalist party) when the PNI was competing with the Islamic Masjumi and the Socialist parties during the middle 1950's, the PKI supported protection of national entrepreneurs and similar bourgeois groups. During the last cabinet dominated by the Masjumi and the Socialists, it attacked rather than supported that cabinet's drive against corruption. In allying with Sukarno to obtain his protection, it organized demonstrations in favor of his conception of Guided Democracy and subsequently subscribed to Sukarno's political philosophy of *Pantjasila* as the national doctrine and complied with the bans on party activities and labor strikes.

In view of these stands, I find rather surprising Hindley's generally implicit and occasionally explicit admiration for the PKI as the major advocate of rational and remedial economic policies and the strongest proponent of democratic freedoms (p. 289). To regard tactical maneuvers as basic policy positions suggests some naiveté in a student of Communist strategy. Perhaps one might better attribute Hindley's admiration of the PKI to the not unnatural sympathy developed by some scholars for the objects of their research.

Developments subsequent to the period covered by Hindley's study also seem to correspond, in some salient respects, with the circumstances surrounding the earlier Communist revolts. In these revolts, it is clear that what might be termed the "recessive strategy" came into play. As McVey's account details, the original 1925-1926 plan for open insurrection was a contingent one, to depend upon the results of a prior general strike. Likewise, in 1948, when Musso arrived home from Moscow to take control of the PKI, his "Gottwald" plan apparently envisaged a rebellion in the event of failure to come to power through coalition tactics, but only after the front elements had been reorganized under tight party control and increased popular support had been mustered.

In each case, however, local units, aroused to anticipate action, had become increasingly militant. Agitation and intimidation by PKI branches and affiliates in rural areas incited resistance and attacks upon them by anti-Communist groups, attacks often condoned by the author-

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ities. The atmosphere became highly charged with tension and rumors of impending uprisings. In both cases, the government undertook preventive measures. During the first period, second-echelon party leaders who had seized the initiative from their superiors came under close surveillance, as government intelligence had cracked the secret party code. Ignoring instructions from the national leaders, who were at a distance and were unable to check the momentum of the revolt, the local leaders attempted sporadic and uncoordinated action that was either prevented at the outset or rapidly suppressed.

The Sukarno-Hatta government in 1948 was already suspicious of a group that seemed too ready to sacrifice the national revolution on the altar of its social revolution. To counter the appeal of the Communist front, Sukarno released from prison the leaders of its rival radical labor front (who had earlier attempted a coup against him). The rival organization now opposed the PKI and supported the government. The government's military retrenchment program was stepped up by the retirement or transfer of known pro-Communist officers from key posts in the regular army and by increased pressure upon PKI-allied paramilitary units to hasten demobilization. These units prematurely precipitated the Madiun revolt while Musso and other important Communist leaders were on speaking tours.[11]

How far the PKI had succeeded in substantively shifting the balance of power in its favor prior to the events of October 1965 is an open question and is likely to remain a subject for speculation for some time to come.[12] Its influence on foreign policy was undeniable; its members and supporters manned many middle- and lower-echelon civil service posts; Sukarno increasingly echoed its line in his public pronouncements. However, it had gained no opportunity to test further the electoral strength it had earlier demonstrated. And the army had succeeded in checking its demands for more participation in the chief organs of government and for paramilitary support through a people's volunteer force.

Once again as in the 1920's and in 1948 the atmosphere in the capital and in other centers of political intrigue had grown more than usually charged with tension, as rumors multiplied about Sukarno's failing

[11] See Kahin. It might be noted that the Communist version of this government action calls it deliberate provocation.

[12] One of the interesting debates of recent years has revolved around the question of whether Sukarno was "domesticating" the PKI or vice versa. See, for example, Hindley, "President Sukarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestication," *American Political Science Review*, LVI (December 1962), 915-26; Pauker, *Communist Prospects*; J. M. van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia* (Vancouver 1965), 296.

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health and about maneuvers and plots in preparation for a forthcoming succession crisis to be preceded or accompanied by a significant army-PKI showdown. As before, the PKI, while still playing the national-front theme, had adopted a posture of increased militancy. This may have resulted from its increased confidence in Sukarno's support or may have reflected an effort to refurbish and strengthen its image as the chief champion of radical economic and social reform. Again, agitation and intimidation by its peasant and youth fronts in rural areas, especially on issues of land and crop redistribution, had begun to provoke hostility, resistance, and violence, not only from the strongly Islamic elements among landed peasantry, but from others whose interests and authority were threatened.[13]

It is highly likely that the PKI had formulated a tentative plan with a flexible timetable, as before, for a concerted insurrection. Decision to activate the plan probably depended either upon the likelihood of the party's gaining its major objectives within Sukarno's lifetime or upon the perceived necessity of preclusive action against anticipated army attack. It is not unlikely that the army Council of Generals had in reserve its own contingency plans for a coup, should Sukarno have officially acceded to PKI demands. And neither Communist nor army leadership was unaware of moves being contemplated by the other—moves including approaches to Sukarno.[14]

The details of the abortive coup need not concern us here, save to emphasize the denouement as before.[15] Once again, an obviously premature rebellion was triggered by a subordinate group, as in 1948 by a military group with close ties to the PKI. Whether Untung's action was instigated directly by or with the approval of central PKI leadership as a calculated risk, whether it was undertaken autonomously under the stress of psychologically unbearable tension, or whether it had been planned jointly for a later date but was precipitated earlier through fear, is not clear.[16] But once again, PKI leaders were scattered at the outset of the uprising, were unable to coordinate their forces, and

[13] See J. M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's 'Revolutionary Gymnastics,'" *Asian Survey*, v (May 1965), 218-22.

[14] The permeability of the respective intelligence curtains might be indicated by the fact that the chief of army intelligence was a close relative of a member of the PKI politburo.

[15] For a highly plausible reconstruction of many of the details and some interesting hypotheses, see Arthur J. Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia," *China Quarterly*, No. 25 (January-March 1966), 144-70; Daniel Lev gives a brief summary, reserving judgment on the extent of PKI participation, in "Indonesia 1965: The Year of the Coup," *Asian Survey*, vi (February 1966), 103-10.

[16] For a relevant discussion of provocation through reciprocal fear of surprise attack, see Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 207-29.

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could not rally on their behalf even a small part of the public support or protection they might have anticipated.

III

The widespread and savage massacre of an estimated several hundred thousand Communists and their presumed supporters during the months succeeding the coup defies any single explanation. Much of this slaughter seems to have been the work of army units and, in some areas, of extremist Islamic youth groups goaded to "holy war." But apparently some of the worst atrocities in rural areas were committed with the cooperation or acquiescence of a broader spectrum of the population. How can this be reconciled with the emphasis placed by students of Indonesian communism on the extensive popular appeal and impressive organizational strength gained by the movement in the countryside?

It may be that popular appeal and organizational strength were far more tenuous and ephemeral than appearances had led observers to infer. How can one estimate popular appeal in a country in which political demonstrations are a form of recreation? Where does one place those people who can be induced to demonstrate for one group one month and for another with a different orientation the next month? Or how does one classify those who join whichever party has managed to secure a near monopoly of the minor bureaucratic posts in their district or to control access to the bureaucrats whose signatures are required on the countless permits necessary to carry on daily business?

If we assume that the Communist movement primarily appealed to and enrolled the economically deprived in various communities and areas, the recent holocaust takes on the dimensions of a class war. It can be argued that a cleavage between landed and landless peasantry, reinforced in some areas by parallel differences along religious lines, had become so exacerbated by PKI actions to implement legislation on land reform that "rightists" seized this opportunity to eliminate "leftist" threats.

However, it is somewhat simplistic to accept such an assumption and its implications without considerably more knowledge of the lower levels of the movement than is provided by studies, such as that of Hindley, based primarily upon documentary sources, party publications, and interviews with leading officials. The attention Hindley lavishes on the appeals and tactics utilized by the PKI elite and on the considerations presumably underlying or justifying their selection is not matched by information on who responded to those appeals and in

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what ways. I do not feel it is asking too much of contemporary political scientists examining contemporary political movements to devote some effort to lower-echelon leaders and rank-and-file members, using at least one or two of the methods employed by sociologists and anthropologists. The perspectives on the "underbelly" of a movement provided by the reports and evaluations of its highest leaders can be limiting, if not misleading.

As a foreign observer, Hindley may have been impressed by the PKI's protests against infringements of democratic rights under Guided Democracy. But the fact of such protests scarcely constitutes evidence for his assertion that "millions of Indonesians have come to regard the P.K.I. as the most sincere and courageous defender of democratic liberties in general" (p. 127).[17] We do not know how PKI members were regarded by other elements of the population among whom they lived, unless we know who the members were and in what relation they stood to these other elements. What ties or cleavages of kinship, community, religious association, and other traditional or more recent bases of solidarity or conflict cut across or correlated with Communist affiliation in different localities and regions? What uses did Communists who obtained bureaucratic posts or positions of influence at local levels make of them?

I raise such questions because my own observations of rural village and town life in Java during the mid-1950's suggest that, at least during that period, one could draw no facile inferences concerning the basis of recruitment and commitment to the PKI and its front organizations. Traditional leadership and kinship ties were often more crucial than ideology or socioeconomic status in determining allegiance to one or another political group. Some hamlets and villages tended to affiliate almost as a unit, following major authority figures. Those with a high proportion of landless laborers and sharecroppers were not necessarily tied to the more radical parties.[18] Often a local man of influence joined one political party largely because his traditional rival was already entrenched in another.

[17] One might just as easily argue, by the same method of projecting one's normative biases, that millions of Indonesians who chafed under the strains of Guided Democracy did not forget that the PKI was its earliest and in some ways its most enthusiastic proponent, when Sukarno first broached his proposal.

[18] For example, of two villages with similar socioeconomic structures, each composed mainly of landed farming families, the members of one were almost to a man members of the Orthodox Islamic party and those of the other almost completely PKI. The head of the first village was the adopted son of a noted Islamic teacher; the head of the second, who was one of the wealthiest men of the district, had been converted to communism in the course of his travels as a merchant.

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It is therefore not unlikely that many of the Communist victims were killed for motives other than anti-Communist sentiment and that many of those ultimately slain were neither committed PKI members nor their supporters. The attempted coup and its immediate aftermath may well have served as a convenient solvent for many long-simmering personal, kinship, village, or ethnic rivalries and feuds whose political component was a minor factor in settling old scores.

Ironically, the PKI may have unwittingly contributed to its own martyrdom by its role in generating considerable diffuse but thitherto relatively repressed hostilities. Resentments against economic hardships had been building up with increasing intensity. Aggressive impulses had been stimulated in campaigns directed against the Dutch on the issue of Irian, against Malaysia, and against the "neocolonial" nations. Both the criticisms of the economy and these campaigns had been spearheaded by the PKI. Yet with all these incitements to violence, especially among the youth, few real outlets had been provided for its expression. The attempted coup and the circumstances surrounding it may well have provided the pretext for this latent violence to be unleashed blindly, with the Communists as the chief objects at hand for its displacement.

The strategy of playing for national unity and the efforts to create a reassuring and unmilitant image internally had apparently borne fruit, at least among those leaders and segments of the population not fundamentally opposed to the PKI. It conformed to cultural norms and gave rise to perceptions of the movement as being within the family, so to speak, willing to work within the rules of the game. As long as the Communists could appear to be playing a legitimate game, both confirmed opponents and progressively more uneasy allies were inhibited by these same rules from overt opposition. The Communists' oldest and most consistent political opponents, the Masjumi and Socialist parties, were restricted by the government in openly playing politics and could express their resentments and fears only through the covert means of sowing suspicion.

However, the very success of the dominant PKI strategy carried within it the seeds of Communist destruction. As long as the Communists observed the political proprieties and afforded no pretext for direct attack, they could expect some degree of tolerance, despite increasing apprehension of their apparent growth. But when they violated the rules and the expectations they themselves had carefully cultivated, they opened themselves to reprisals. Because they had succeeded in conveying in some quarters the image of moderation and restraint, the

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shock effect of action so much at odds with this image was increased by virtue of such action's being unanticipated. Their opponents' accusations that they had always been basically inimical to many of the principles they had publicly espoused then became more than plausible.

The PKI could be pointed to as having been responsible for the first overt and particularly brutal step to destroy the precariously balanced harmony of the national community. It had exceeded the permissible limits of the game. In unleashing the barely contained "devils of division," it was devoured by them—at least for the time being.

IV

The aura of a shadow play within a play, of symbolic masks being donned and doffed, surrounds the ambiguous position of Sukarno within the last year. He retains (as of this writing) his formal post and many of its prerogatives, although his actual power to influence government policy clearly has been curbed. That this power has not been completely absent, however, has been indicated several times, notably in his ability to delay both the meeting of the People's Consultative Congress and the implementation of policies directly at odds with those he formerly pursued. Apparently, current leaders have felt the need to consult with him and to persuade him to endorse their stands.

When one considers that Sukarno has no orthodox power base and that student and other groups have been agitating for his removal, the fiction of maintaining his supremacy and the ritual of placation and persuasion might appear superfluous. Pragmatists have questioned the caution with which General Suharto and his associates have moved, especially since Sukarno's mandate has given legality to Suharto's directives. With the military apparently so clearly in the saddle, its reluctance to institute a clearly military regime, as has been installed in other countries, is indeed interesting.

Sukarno's stand with respect to the Communists in the months after the attempted coup, including his reluctance to dismiss high government officials, such as Subandrio, who were viewed as having been in tacit alliance with them, might well have served as a reason for his complete removal from the scene. Admittedly, his public pronouncements were sufficiently vague as not to be easily construed as a defense of the PKI's actions. Assuming one of his familiar roles as arbiter and mediator above the conflict, he couched many of his exhortations in terms of the hardly assailable themes of restoring peace and national unity, maintaining the balance of nationalist, socialist, and religious elements, and protecting the state against external enemies.

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The slow pace of action on the part of military leaders and their willingness to diffuse authority and retain Sukarno may well have been dictated in part by the necessity to restore and maintain some semblance of unity and stability. The army may have unleashed and encouraged extremist Islamic elements to destroy the Communists and curb Sukarno. But it is hardly likely that many of its leaders and their followers or most of the reemerging political groups would wish to see the pendulum swing too far in the other direction—toward the establishment of an Islamic state.

To counter this possibility and prevent the polarization that might emerge between strongly Islamic and anti-Islamic forces, the army appears favorably inclined to resume the multi-actor balancing game on a new basis. It would seem that the military has assumed the place of Sukarno as the chief role-balancer, using him and his radical and nationalist supporters as countervailing weights against the more militant of the Islamic forces and vice versa, while relying on the more moderate civilian leaders to help maintain the balance.

Implicit in the composition of the triumvirate that emerged after March 1966 are the themes of unity and balance. Suharto stands for the military; Sultan Hamengku Buwono would seem to symbolize tradition and continuity on the one hand and, on the other, a modernist orientation to the problems of economic reconstruction and development; and Adam Malik can be seen as representing the anti-Communist radical element as well as his home island, Sumatra, and, by extension, the other outer islands.

Some of the same reasons that restrained the army in the past from taking political control by coup may also explain its reluctance to monopolize power under recent conditions.[19] Its often precarious internal cohesion might completely dissolve in a struggle for the distribution of power. Perhaps more important are the implications of undertaking the direction of restoring Indonesia's chaotic economy. However great have been the impatience with and criticism of civilian politicians and bureaucrats by military men in the past, the military probably has few illusions of its superior capacity to solve the country's many pressing problems. Having increasingly shared the tasks of administration in the last few years may have been personally profitable for some, but it has not added to the military leaders' confidence in their expertise beyond the areas of their specific training.

[19] See Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," in J. J. Johnson, ed., *The Military in the Underdeveloped Areas* (Princeton 1962), 185-230; and Daniel S. Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVI (Winter 1964-65), 349-64.

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To take on formal responsibility for government is to invite the hazards of blame for the shortcomings of government. If policies turn out to be misguided, if programs for coping with problems are inadequate or difficult to implement, and if popular dissatisfactions and frustrations accelerate, the onus of criticism too easily falls on those who are visibly at the peak of the political pyramid. By sharing control with civilians, military leaders share the risks of planning and the risks of failure. They are, in fact, in a more advantageous position than if they were to assume the burden of full control. Even more than in the past, they are sufficiently strong to advance and protect their own interests as a group, through wielding influence behind the scenes, and to maintain and augment their personal gains. And they limit their vulnerability while maximizing their future potential to act in a situation that is fluid and will probably remain so for years to come.

None among them, at least as is so far evident, possesses the genius so long displayed by Sukarno in rechanneling and deflecting frustration and manipulating contending political forces. Probably not the least of the reasons for retaining Sukarno is his potential utility in dealing with those elements of the population among whom he is still a legend. In a sense, Sukarno can be seen as a form of insurance. Although he has become the target of attacks by student groups, intellectuals, and other urban elements, it is not clear whether and to what extent his influence has declined in rural areas. And because he has become a target for attack, he may be more manipulable.

Furthermore, he can serve present and future governments as another form of insurance held in reserve for future contingencies. Student fronts and other groups overtly responsible for recent changes are likely to be impatient for results and to want to see visible improvements in conditions. Furthermore, these groups are not likely to recognize the complexities of the problems facing the government and the time and effort necessary to yield the benefits promised by the changes of policy. Resentments and violence, once unleashed and encouraged, remain close to the surface and can easily be turned against other objects. Just as in the past Sukarno made skilful use of scapegoat mechanisms, so he himself could prove a useful scapegoat during the remainder of his life, or even posthumously. It is not inconceivable that Sukarno might someday be regarded as the Stalin of Indonesia.

This may be attributing more Machiavellian foresight to the current leadership than is warranted, although I doubt it. Certainly there are other reasons for Sukarno's staying power. He is still the symbol of legitimacy. His removal could be accomplished comfortably only if he

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were to step down voluntarily, which he shows no signs of doing, or through his opponents' use of means that would appear legitimate, as is being attempted. As has often been noted, Sukarno's style has been that of the traditional monarch, a factor that has partly accounted for his charismatic appeal. The person of the traditional Javanese monarch was not only sacred, but it symbolized the welfare of the realm. To dispose of the ruler by force might be seen even today as symbolically to cut at the heart of the realm. And for a realm that has been already so deeply rent by violence, it is of critical importance to sustain some aura of legitimacy and stability.

One must also consider two other important values of the culture: the sense of obligation and the reluctance to humiliate those whose intentions could be interpreted as sincere, despite the unfortunate consequences that may have resulted from them. Whatever their opinions of his errors of judgment, many of Sukarno's opponents probably cannot forget his role as nationalist leader and "father" of their country. And whatever its foundation in fact, the line that Sukarno was misled by evil advisers serves a dual function. It is not surprising that Subandrio has been seen as the man responsible for the ultimately misguided direction of Guided Democracy, even by some of its opponents who were imprisoned, such as Simbolon. This attitude avoids shaming the head of state and, by association, the state itself, which he has so long personified; at the same time it absolves of guilt and frees from retribution those who collaborated with him.

Finally, one might infer an element of national pride and calculated if circumspect nonalignment in the decision not to jettison Sukarno abruptly, if only because the West so patently expected it. He, after all, stood up to the West and constantly asserted Indonesia's right to its own identity. His mistake was in ultimately leaning too far in the other direction. But lest getting rid of the Communists and destroying the Djakarta-Peking axis be construed as too close a commitment to the opposite pole, Sukarno can be retained, if only temporarily, as a symbol that Indonesia still goes its own way.

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THE TRAGEDY OF SYRIA

By LEONARD BINDER

Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War 1958-1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics*, Chatham House Essays 10, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1965, 139 pp. $1.70 (paper).

Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945-1958*, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1965, 344 pp. $6.75.

SEALE and Kerr, the authors of the two books under review, have covered between them a series of events from 1945 until 1964, but they have done so from quite different points of view. Seale's book, entitled *The Struggle for Syria*, covers the period from 1945 until 1958, while Kerr's, *The Arab Cold War*, covers the period from 1958 until 1964. The struggle for Syria that Seale describes is supposed to be a struggle between Egypt and Iraq, but the cold war that Kerr describes is a war of ideology, and perhaps one of wills, between Egypt's President Nasser and the leaders of the Syrian Ba'th party. Although both authors include a reference to dates in the titles of their books, the chronological element is not equally important in both. Seale's work is a review of the high points of Syrian politics through the period indicated, whereas Kerr is primarily concerned with a summary and analysis of the unity talks that took place between Nasser and the Ba'th leaders in 1963.

Kerr establishes the wider context, but he does not attempt to touch all of the important events of the period he deals with. For example, he says very little about the emergence of the Ba'th government in Iraq and its demise, although he does indicate that there was a possibility of an early unification of Iraq and Syria when both were under Ba'th governments. Why this unification did not take place is not made entirely clear, but Kerr does suggest that the Ba'th leaders in Syria and Iraq were unable to move without the approval of President Nasser.

Seale on the other hand has not only covered the main events of 1945-1958, but he has also held extensive interviews with most of the important participants in the events of those troubled times in Syria. However, Seale has added very little to the known record. His choice of the major events appears to be taken from the front pages of the newspapers to which he has contributed throughout the period. His

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analysis does not go behind the scenes or into the social and ideological backgrounds of the events in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East. While we are always grateful for a comprehensive summary of what has been written about the events of an interesting and very recent period, this sort of report, despite its scholarly pretensions, falls far short of what we require in contemporary history and certainly short of what is to be expected in social science analysis.

The trouble is not that the facts described by Seale are incorrect. The trouble is in understanding why he chose these particular facts other than because they were, so to speak, available. But even if we start from an alternative point of view and argue that the known facts as presented in the mass media are indeed the facts that have to be explained, we must conclude that the type of explanation that Seale employs reveals a fertile imagination but a quite consistent lack of discrimination. There is no dearth of explanation offered for the events described. On the contrary, many, perhaps too many, explanations are offered for each event. All of these explanations are presented as having the same degree of importance. No reason is considered more significant than any other reason, and all bundled together they lead to the inevitable conclusion that whatever happened had to happen. These compelling reasons are ideological, personal, strategic, geopolitical, historical, and economic. Sometimes they are even contradictory in their interpretation of background factors.

Seale's interpretation of the way in which the Syrian political leadership was brought to request immediate unity with Egypt in 1958 does not differ very much from the standard interpretations in earlier works. Where Seale differs somewhat from the authors who have dealt with Syria and Lebanon before is his justification for writing this book, i.e., the supreme strategic and geopolitical importance of Syria for the Middle East. In fact, Seale goes so far as to make the extreme and unwarranted statement that whoever holds Syria will hold the Middle East, or at least the Arab part thereof. Egypt, as we now know, held Syria but was unable to control the Middle East. These broad assertions concerning the pivotal position of Syria are never explained or justified. Presumably, the events from 1945 to 1958, which demonstrated the great concern that all of the countries of the Middle East and some of the countries of the West had for the fate of Syria, are considered proof enough of the importance of that country. But it is patent, nowadays, that every country in the world is important; and during the period covered by Seale's book the great powers, conceiving of themselves as

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engaged in some sort of bipolar struggle, tended to exaggerate the importance of all countries, great and small.

But the strongest refutation of this notion of the pivotal geopolitical position of Syria is suggested by the title of Kerr's book. Frequently, the conflict between Egypt and Iraq over the Baghdad Pact has been referred to as a kind of Arab cold war. To find the same term being used to describe a contest between Syria and Egypt, not so much over Iraq—although that, too—but over the ideological leadership of the Arab world shows just how little sense it makes to transfer this bit of terminology from the great-power setting in which it emerged to the very peculiar situation of the Arab Middle East. The political patterns of the Middle East are to a very large extent separated from the patterns of the major international system—at least to the extent that the power alignments of the dominant international system are not and cannot be directly reflected in the power alignments of the region. As I have pointed out elsewhere, the disparities in power among the countries of the Middle East, and indeed of most subordinate international systems, do not appear to be significant enough to eliminate any country, no matter how small and weak, as a potential threat to any or all other countries in a region.[1] Hence, it was possible for Syria, for a long period of time, to appear to be the sacrificial lamb for the ambitions of Iraqi and Egyptian politicians, but then, for a period of time that may have ended now, Syria took the place of Iraq as the aggrandizing power, and Iraq with its minority problems played the role of the sacrificial lamb. Who knows but that Jordan or Lebanon may not themselves exchange roles with Syria or with Iraq in the near future.

What, therefore, is the proper point of view for us to take? Is it that of a struggle for Syria or is it that of an ideological cold war between Syrians (or Ba'this) and Egyptians? Both Seale and Kerr, despite the divergence in their points of view, have seen affairs from the standpoint of Beirut. Would someone examining the situation from Cairo or Baghdad or Jerusalem see developments in the same way? Certainly there are many possible points of view that could be used in probing more deeply the contemporary history of Syria and in attempting thereby to understand better the recent history of the Middle East and its present situation. The *Gestalten* of both authors have tended to emphasize personalities above social circumstances. Seale's more ambitious book, in particular, must be criticized for not going deeply enough into Syrian society nor broadly enough into Near Eastern international

[1] "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," *World Politics*, x (April 1958), 408-29.

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relations. What he describes as a struggle for Syria was but one aspect of a very complex pattern of struggle that characterized the international politics of the entire region. What Kerr characterizes as an ideological cold war was more likely the dual swan song of both Ba'th socialism and Nasserist nationalism as serious contenders for the hearts and minds of Arab intellectuals.

I don't know that there is a geopolitical pivot of the Middle East, but if there is one I very much doubt that it is Syria. The very notion that there are or must be geopolitical compulsions or strategic necessities for all regions or for any given region is without basis; but even with all these doubts in mind, if we look further for strategic rigidities within the Arab Middle East, accepting the political and military limitations that must characterize the policies of these countries, we must come to the conclusion that the most strategic piece of territory in the Middle East (judged by the possibility of boundaries' changing) is that territory held by Israel. It might well be that were Israel part of an Arab state, say the Kingdom of Jordan, the strategic significance of Syria might be enhanced—but that is a condition contrary to fact. Were not Israel separating Egypt from Syria, it is quite clear that the problems of understanding first the union of Syria and Egypt and then the separation of those two countries—problems that led these two scholars to write their books—would not now be troubling us. Moreover, the interest in preventing unification of the countries of the Fertile Crescent, which led Egypt into the Arab League in the first place, would have resulted much earlier in a more direct and honest Egyptian interest in cooperation or possible union with the Arab countries of Southwest Asia. Egypt's concern to prevent a unification of the Arab countries of the Fertile Crescent is, at least in part, the consequence of Egypt's inability to reach those countries. In this sense, the arena of Arab politics that comprises Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan is insulated by the regional situation from the full weight of the influence of the neighboring powers. Thus it is not only the lack of a clear sense of national identity which disrupts the political stability of these countries, but it is also lack of a credible threat from beyond their borders which permits what would otherwise be intolerable internal political conditions to persist.

Syria is strategically important, therefore, only as a part of the land bridge that constitutes the whole of the Middle East. It must also be noted that Syria's part of the land bridge is very little used except, indeed, by and for Iraq. The airports of Lebanon, of Egypt, and of Israel are used to a far greater extent than Syria's. Pipelines do

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pass through Syria, but the strategic importance of this means of commerce and transport has declined in favor of shipping and as a consequence of the discovery of new oil reserves in North Africa. Syria is of minor military importance for the defense of Turkey, and it would constitute no great barrier to a Soviet land sweep from the Caucasus toward the Suez. Far from affording a strategic jumping-off point for the dominance of the entire region, outside control over Syria, as evidenced by the Egyptian experience, would result only in increased burdens upon the overtaxed and foolhardy government that would attempt such a conquest.

The fact that certain Iraqi political leaders did seek to acquire control over Syria, especially between 1954 and 1958, and that such attempts were opposed by Egypt and by Saudi Arabia is not evidence of the pivotal character of Syria. The whole episode of the postwar attempt of the regent of Iraq to gain control over Syria has about it a certain air of unreality. When the story is told as Seale tells it, and the details are laid out, one cannot help wondering what the Egyptians and the Saudis were worried about, since it was not their prudent preventive action that stopped the unification of Syria and Iraq as much as it was the fumbling indecision and lack of confidence on the part of the Iraqi authorities. The simple fact is that Iraq lacked the power to take over Syria, and everyone knew this except the regent of Iraq himself.

These considerations lead us to the further conclusion that it is incorrect to see in Syria the territorial objective of a bipolar struggle. It is quite likely true that the Iraqi regent was seeking a throne that would comfort him after he gave up that of Iraq to the young Faisal (during whose minority he was able to enjoy royal authority). We are told by Seale, further, that there were Iraqi plans for military operations in Syria—to be coordinated with uprisings favorable to Iraq instigated by certain Syrian politicians. It is also indicated, however, that these plans were not developed by the Iraqi high command. In fact, one of the most important parts of Seale's contribution has been to present to a wider reading public some of the content of the Iraqi treason trials held after the revolution of July 14, 1958. The trials revealed various activities of leading Iraqis aimed at gaining control of Syria. Despite the revelation of what might be termed bad intentions on the part of some of the leading political figures in Iraq in the pre-1958 period, none of the attempts against Syria appears to have been very serious at all. Furthermore, it is the generally accepted judgment of most observers, including Seale, that the fear of an Iraqi

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takeover played a very small part, if any, in Syria's precipitous decision to join with Egypt in the United Arab Republic. Syria's great fears at the end of 1957 and at the beginning of 1958 were that there might be an internal Communist takeover or that the Ba'th might lose the political leverage it had gained over the previous three years or that there might be a renewal of Turkish and Western pressure. The Iraqi threat was of the least concern. It is further interesting to note that almost immediately after the union of Syria and Egypt it was the Hashemites of Iraq and Jordan who felt on the defensive, and it was they who formed a similar union in order to counterbalance the ideological impact of the founding of the United Arab Republic. Finally, in July of the very year in which the UAR was founded, the Iraqi regime was overturned.

By far the most unacceptable part of the thesis that Syria was the objective in a bipolar struggle is the suggestion that Egypt sought territorial control over that country. Once again, it is generally agreed by most observers that the union of Egypt and Syria took place as a consequence of Syrian urging and against the better judgment of President Nasser. This conclusion emerges quite clearly from the discussions described by Kerr in his book on the Arab cold war. The 1963 unity discussions did rehash the events of December 1957 and January 1958. Nasser was at great pains to point out that it was not he who had been anxious for the union at that time. Presumably he did so in order to avoid a precipitous announcement of a formal or ceremonial union in 1963, which could have been of symbolic benefit to his Ba'th opponents. The evidence that Seale presents sustains the view that the government in Egypt was quite content during the entire period before 1958 merely to prevent outside control over Syria. It did not insist on exercising direct control itself and certainly did not seek to obtain territorial control. Since the breach of the union in 1961, however, matters have taken on a somewhat different coloring. Now, the unconditional reunification of Syria and Egypt would appear to be a necessary condition for real cooperation between Egypt and any Syrian regime—this to restore the prestige of Nasser rather than to fill any strategic lacuna that affects Egyptian foreign policy.

As Kerr points out to a far greater extent than does Seale, the real importance of Syria is in part paradoxical because of the weakness of Syrian intellectual and cultural development. This is a point to which we shall return. This negative consideration regarding the ideological significance of Syria must be counterbalanced by one important ideological development that is correctly noted and emphasized by both

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Seale and Kerr. The most outstanding and most compelling of the Arab nationalist writers appeared in Syria: the founder of the Ba'th party, none other than Michel Aflaq. Seale and Kerr have done more than stress the significance of Aflaq and the Ba'th ideology. They have also indicated the extent to which they are favorably inclined toward this movement. There is no doubt that the secular and romantic Arab nationalist theory propounded by Aflaq has had a great appeal for Western scholars as well as for Arab intellectuals. But our own predilections aside, it is more than apparent that the Ba'th ideology has not swept the entire Middle East and does not look as though it is about to conquer the minds of all the Arab moderns. The ideological importance of Syria is, therefore, not so much due to any positive contribution it has made to Arab nationalist ideology as it is due to the fact that Syria has functioned as the arbiter of what is *not* Arab nationalism.

In recent years Arab writers in Lebanon, in Egypt, in Syria, and in Iraq have written a libraryful of books attempting to describe the nature and content of Arab nationalism. Most of these works have been written by people of substantially lesser talent than that of Michel Aflaq, but there are quite a few interesting writers and a good number of these have tended to copy Aflaq's style and themes. Nevertheless, none of these works has captured the imagination of the Arab nationalists. None of them has become the fundamental work on the subject. No design for an ideology has resolved the basic question of what is an Arab and what is Arab nationalism. The search for an ideology goes on and the search for an identity definition continues. How earnest this search is may, of course, be doubted. It may be doubted how earnest it is for the Lebanese, who in their heart of hearts appear to be contented with their present regime. It may be doubted for the Iraqis, who are mostly Shiites and who have a Kurdish problem that can be only exacerbated by a solution of the Arab nationalist problem. It may also be doubted for Saudi Arabians and for Jordanians, whose traditional forms of government may find a popular nationalism a source of embarrassment. But the earnestness of the search for a definition of Arabism on the part of the Syrians cannot be doubted. Their need and their very strong desire for a solution to these ideological problems do not make the task of finding an adequate solution any easier. On the contrary, the Syrians, and some others in the neighboring countries as well, have tried several solutions and have rejected each of them after a brief and disappointing trial. Union with Iraq, union with Egypt, union with Jordan, these and other similar halfway houses have all been rejected. With the collapse of the unity talks of

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1963 it is clear that the Syrian nation has once again declared what Arab nationalism is not and that it still searches for an adequate answer. As Kerr points out, the mere fact of secession in 1961 was enough to impugn the genuineness of the nationalism of the Syrians involved in those events. The fact of the secession itself has, nevertheless, hurt the claim of the Syrian Nasserists to be the purest of Arab nationalists.

Recent events have brought another aspect of the strategic significance of Syria to the fore. This aspect may be temporarily and wholly dependent upon these recent events but it is, nevertheless, worth noting. The difficulties on the Syrian-Israeli border point to the fact that Syria is, at the present time, the most vulnerable point for an Israeli attack upon the Arab countries and for an Israeli intrusion into the inter-Arab political process. Given the peculiar situation that prevails now among the Arab countries after the secession and after the breakdown of the unity talks, it is apparent that Nasser's prestige is presently vulnerable as long as there is very little prospect of a real coordination of policy or of military operations on the part of the Arab states. The present involvement of Egyptian troops in Yemen constitutes a continuing temptation to Israel to bring about a serious embarrassment of the Egyptian regime. It is further clear that the outbreak of hostilities on the Asian boundary of Israel would lead to just such an embarrassment. The Syrian front is the most likely place for the outbreak of hostilities for the simple reason that both Lebanon and Jordan have maintained tacitly cooperative policies toward Israel with regard to both refugee infiltration and the Jordan waters disputes. The Syrian leaders, on the other hand, because of their weakened claim to nationalist orthodoxy, have felt compelled to be more truculent in their attitude toward Israel. Their game, of course, has been to embarrass Egypt by demonstrating that the Egyptian government is less willing than they to initiate hostilities with Israel, but it is also their game not actually to drive the Israelis into fighting. It is questionable, of course, whether they can maintain the delicate balance required by such a subtle policy. The strategic importance thus attributed to Syria as a consequence of the possibility of an Israeli attack is not due to Syria's intrinsic power-political significance. This importance is due rather to the history of Syrian-Egyptian relations, for the same sort of results might be obtained by Israel's opening of hostilities with Jordan.

A final consideration regarding the strategic position of Syria is the near impossibility of great-power influence upon that country. We are led to this strange conclusion by an examination of the relations of Syria with the great powers during the periods studied by both Seale

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and Kerr. Admittedly, great-power relationships among the great powers themselves and with the various states in the Middle Eastern area shifted about during the twenty years we are now considering. But for all of that, there has been practically no direct impact on Syrian policy from outside the Middle Eastern area itself. This result is particularly unexpected in view of the Syrian colonial experience, but it would appear that, once the French imperial power was withdrawn (with the urging and assistance of both Britain and the United States), very little French political influence was left. Seale points out that the French government generally supported the Shishakli regime and indeed all Syrian efforts to remain free of incorporation into any of the British spheres of influence. On the other hand, French support neither created nor was able to maintain the Shishakli regime. It is further to be noted that Syria steadfastly withstood the temptation to accept even so much as technical assistance from the United States, while the relatively early acceptance of both Soviet arms and economic assistance did not result in the Sovietization of Syria but rather in the, to the Russians, undesirable union with Egypt. Perhaps the best example of a Western effort to influence political developments in Syria occurred during the summer of 1957 when a border crisis between Turkey and Syria was precipitated by the growth of Western fears of the advance of Soviet influence in Syria. As Seale points out, Syrian resistance, Saudi diplomatic skill, and Egyptian political-military tactics prevented the Turkish threat from being carried out. In another form, the point I am now trying to make is simply that, even were there to be a regime in Syria that suited the purposes of either the Western powers or the Communist powers, neither bloc would be capable of sustaining that regime against either regional pressures or domestic political upheaval. Nor does it seem likely that the great powers could topple such a regime.

To top off these considerations, no country in the Middle East is more immune to ideological influence and propaganda pressure from outside the Arab world than is Syria. For the Syrian intellectual elite, more than for that of any neighboring country, Arabism, and Arabism alone, is the topic of concern. This consideration leads us back to the conclusion that the major importance of Syria is of an ideological nature and not of any other. The ideological salience of Syria is a concomitant, paradoxical though it may seem, of the insignificance of the country from almost every other point of view.

The issue is not whether Syria is a good country or a bad country, but simply whether it is important at all from an intellectual, cultural,

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political, economic, military, or strategic point of view. It seems to me that the salience of the ideological problem in Syria is a direct result of its insignificance from all of these other points of view. The limited importance of Syria from a strategic standpoint has already been elaborated, but it is also the case that Syria, despite its production of a couple of Arab nationalist theorists, has played a relatively small part in the renaissance of Arab culture and certainly has attained no position of leadership in the intellectual revolution that has overtaken the more advanced segments of Arab society. There are no great universities in Syria, nor does Syria boast an important center of traditional or religious learning. In comparison with their situation in Lebanon and Egypt, the arts and the sciences have languished in Syria. On the political side, Syria has not distinguished itself either in internal achievements or in its influence over the neighboring countries. Syria's only outstanding contribution in the area of domestic political institutions has been the bloodless coup d'etat. In external political influence, despite the short-lived prominence of the Ba'th in 1963 and after, the Syrians have been able to do no more than make their neighbors briefly uneasy. Economically, Syria has been much happier in many ways than other countries of the Middle East, with occasional agricultural surpluses and many more years of economic expansion than of decline. Nevertheless, Syria does not boast extensive resources, and it lacks any substantial means, such as petroleum, of earning hard currencies on a regular basis. Finally, from the military point of view, it does not seem that Syria poses any kind of a threat to the surrounding countries, although it is quite true that the Syrian army distinguished itself in several small engagements during the Arab-Israeli War. Since 1948-1949, however, that army has not been tested, and it is uncertain what its value would be in any future confrontation.

The main point of this discussion, as I have said, is not that Syria is a bad place or that Syria is a totally unimportant state, but that Syria is important because of its people and who they are, not because of what they have done nor because of their influence beyond their boundaries. Syria embraces nearly five million people called Syrians—some of them Muslims, some of them Christians, some of them townsmen, some of them tribesmen, some of them Sunnis, some of them Alawis. But the fundamental fact about Syria is not that these people call themselves, or are called, Syrians, but rather that most of them are dissatisfied with being called Syrians or with the idea of Syria. In a manner of speaking, the national ideological vocation is to do

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away with the idea of Syria and to lead the Arabs to the discovery of their contemporary national identity and national mission.

It is paradoxical that the consequences of first the union with Egypt, which was initiated by the Syrians, then the secession, and finally the failure of the unity talks in 1963 have been that the Syrians have lost their position as the most unequivocal exponents of a yet-to-be-achieved Arabism and that the Egyptians, whose Arabism is at least recent, have assumed this mantle of ideological leadership and existential national purity. Thus, even more than heretofore, the Syrians are a people in search of a national identity.

It is not at all correct to say that "as Syria goes, so goes the whole of the Middle East." It is enough, I think, to say that "as Syria goes" is a sufficiently important matter in itself, for the Syrians, at least. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that the ideological solution for which the Syrian people are searching is not one that will resolve the problem of Syria alone. The Syrians' own destiny cannot be resolved without supplying a solution for the rest of the Arabs—or at least for those of the Fertile Crescent and possibly for all of the Arabs from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. It may be that this ideological vocation will escape the potentialities of the Syrian people and that they are doomed to a continuation of the kind of frustration that they have experienced up to this time. If they do succeed in finding an ideal answer to the way in which they have understood their current problem, then, in truth, we shall be able to say "As Syria goes, so goes the Middle East."

More interesting, perhaps, than speculation about an obscure future is a consideration of the causes of a complicated present. Why the people of Syria should have to resolve their own problems of national identity in terms that will comprehend the circumstances of most of the surrounding peoples is an important question. The answer to this question is at least partly to be found in the difficulty of supplying a solution to the problem of national identity for Syrians alone. The dimensions of the problem of defining a national identity for the population of Syria are not fully known because so little in the way of useful sociological and anthropological research has been done on modern Syria. It is easy enough to repeat the inaccurate statistics that are handed back and forth by supposedly reliable sources regarding the religious, ethnic, and linguistic distribution of the population of Syria or regarding the distribution of the population among the cities, the agricultural areas, and the nomadic regions. At any rate, what the French sometimes refer to as the *réalités* of present-day Syria cannot

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supply easy answers to the national question. Syrian theorists, at least the more exciting of them, have always tried to transcend those realities to find a more satisfying solution. The movements that have resulted have not been widespread, but they have had a very deep organizational and ideological impact. Two of these movements are described with some detail by Seale: the Syrian National Socialist party (the PPS) and the Ba'th. The third movement, not entirely Syrian, is briefly described by Kerr, and that is the Arab nationalist movement of pro-Nasserists.

Seen from our present perspective, the PPS has obviously been too narrow in its appeal and too negative in its ideological approach to the interests of the Maronites, on the one hand, and of the Sunni Muslims, on the other hand. The continued vigor of the movement is, therefore, all the more astonishing. The Ba'th made a better attempt to bring together Christians and Muslims, and its version of Arab nationalism was far more open to accepting the history of the Arab peoples and Islam itself as formative influences. But Ba'thi idealism and Ba'thi metaphysics have little appeal for Egyptians, so that the level of cooperation with Egypt could not be that of emotion and sentiment but only that of realpolitik and economic planning. It was, perhaps, more the spirit in which these latter goals were pursued by the Egyptians than the goals themselves that alienated so many Syrians during the period of the union. To put the problem in another way, we might say that the Syrian rejects his reality, looking for a romantic future, whereas the more pragmatic Egyptian accepts that reality and finds it satisfying as a basis upon which to build a future that will not depart greatly, in its values or symbols, from the present, even if, it is hoped, it departs by a wide margin from the material limitations of the present.

The Arab nationalist movement errs on the other side; it is far too pragmatic in its acceptance of the leadership of Egypt and its rejection of the Ba'thi secessionists. It fails to recognize that the appeal of Nasser's charisma, the attachment to the power that is Egypt's, and the association with a successful foreign policy are not enough to fulfill the emotional and identity needs of the peoples of the Fertile Crescent. The question remains then, Will a new ideological answer be produced? It is hardly likely that the nationalist imperative has been exhausted, although we can easily recognize the weakness of that imperative in Syria. We cannot know what the next ideological phase among the Arab nationalists will be, but the critical problem remains, more or less as formulated by Kerr and by Seale, and that is, Will

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there be a feasible Southwest Asian solution or will there emerge instead a workable arrangement with Egypt?

As I read Kerr, it appears to me that he prefers a Southwest Asian solution and finds the political impulses to cooperation between Egypt and Syria or Egypt and Iraq to have been flimsy and tactical. Seale, on the other hand, though he does not confront the problem quite as directly, seems to deplore the idea of a Southwest Asian solution, particularly after the decline of the Ba'th. Regardless of our sympathy for one or another movement among the Arab peoples, it is clearly not the place of Western observers to attempt to resolve this problem for the Arabs. We may get some idea of what the future may bring by examining more closely the situation that has emerged after the failure of the unity talks that Kerr describes. According to Kerr, the position of the Syrian negotiators in their talks with Nasser in 1963 was that Nasser should lend his support to the regimes of Syria and Iraq, but that, aside from the symbolic references to unification, he should rule Egypt and leave to them the ruling of their own countries. As Kerr puts it, this is precisely what Nasser refused to do, arguing that their proposal led to no kind of unity. But even though Nasser refused to go along with the Ba'thi preferences, Kerr asserts that things were working out, in the way in which the Ba'th preferred, until the summit conference of early 1964. The failure to come to an agreement in Cairo in 1963 did not topple the Ba'th governments of Syria and Iraq. Even when the Ba'th in Iraq faltered, the Syrian Ba'th regime maintained itself. So the Ba'th and Amin al-Hafiz continued in Syria while Nasser continued in Egypt, neither one approving of the other but neither one able to bring the other down. Nevertheless, the situation that prevailed was not a stable one. It is clear, as Kerr points out, that Amin al-Hafiz continued to seek Nasser's approval. Nasser's refusal to grant this approval constituted a continuing threat to both the Syrian and Iraqi regimes. The threat was not one of direct intervention in Syrian affairs, but rather of encouraging domestic opponents of the Ba'this who became known as Nasserists. Thus, as Kerr points out, Nasser's refusal to enter upon a formal union with the Ba'thi regimes in Syria and Iraq was the tactical counterpart of the desire on the part of the leaders of those two countries to avoid any return to the old basis of union.

To the Ba'th desire to be free of Nasser's control and to Nasser's continued willingness to undermine the Syrian and Iraqi regimes there may be added the renewed Israeli desire to break the political impasse in Israel-Arab relations. Israel's heightened interest was due to several causes, the most important of which is doubtless the involve-

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ment of large portions of the Egyptian army in the Yemen. To this major reason there may be added certain domestic pressures upon the successors of Ben-Gurion to maintain a vigorous regional policy, the very instability of the Syrian regime, and finally the increased intensity of border incidents (which is frequently a concomitant of inter-Arab tension). The fourth factor defining the situation after the failure of the unity talks was that the Iraqi government that succeeded the Ba'th turned to Egypt for support. From the end of 1963 until the present time the Iraqi government has had at least moral support, though little material support, against the possibility of a Ba'thi resurgence in that country and against any growth of Syrian influence. The very tension between Nasser and Amin al-Hafiz resulted in continued friendship, even if only superficial, between Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan until the fall of Hafiz. Furthermore, the more aggressive the Hafiz regime appeared, the more was Lebanon influenced similarly to maintain good relations with Egypt.

As it turns out, therefore, the incipient political separation of Southwest Asia from Egyptian involvement never did come about fully and could only be said to have characterized the aftermath of the failure of the unity discussions of 1963 with regard to the relationships between Egypt and Syria. Hence, even though largely blocked from direct intervention in the Fertile Crescent area by the presence of Israel, Egypt has been continuously invited to become involved in Southwest Asian affairs by the countries of Southwest Asia themselves. Again, as Kerr points out, the conclusions reached at the summit conference of January 1964 completely destroyed the illusion that Southwest Asia and Egypt would go their separate ways. It was agreed at the summit conference that joint action would be taken by the Arab countries, with the possible exception of Syria.

In the event, we see that once again the Arab League became the vehicle of inter-Arab cooperation. It must also be added that at no time did the Ba'thi ideology justify a political or even a policy separation of Egypt and Southwest Asia. Even if the tactical position of the Ba'th may have impressed upon the leaders of Syria the logic of the balance of regional power, the logic of Arab nationalist theory militated powerfully against articulating any such desire. The logic of the balance of power appears to drive the Arab states of Southwest Asia to counterbalance the overwhelming predominance of Egypt, but it must be remembered that Egyptian power may not be used directly in its full strength in Southwest Asia because of the presence of Israel and the continued involvement of Egypt in Yemen. Because of this limited

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application of Egyptian power, the more frequently employed tactic is that whereby one or another of the Arab countries of Southwest Asia feels that it would be advantageous to itself to invite Egyptian intervention rather than to join against the very unrealistic notion of a threat of Egyptian domination. For Egypt, by contrast, the logic of the balance of regional power requires opposition to the unification of the Fertile Crescent without including Egypt. Furthermore, once the premise of the Arab character of Egypt has been accepted, any notion of balancing Southwest Asia against Egypt is completely unacceptable to Arab nationalism. This exclusion is even more the case since Nasser has become the hero of Arab nationalism and Egypt has taken the lead in achieving the joint aims of the Arab nationalists. At least under present circumstances, it seems highly unlikely that the next ideological breakthrough will be in the direction of providing a Southwest Asian answer.

To these regional rigidities there must be added the presently much more restricted possibility of external pressures that might upset the regional situation. The great powers have come to understand that small shifts in the alignment of the states of the Middle East do not entail great threats to their own world position. As a consequence of the decline of great-power concern with the smaller powers of the Middle East, there is less pressure upon these regional governments and there has been a concomitant reduction in the tempo of assistance. This reduced flow of resources has consequently reduced the capabilities of all of the governments of the area, thus rendering them even less able to influence each other than they were heretofore. More significant, however, is the intensification of the isolation of the regional political system from the dominant international system. More than ever before, the Middle Eastern region has been left to its own resources and to its own processes. The working out of regional difficulties is, more than ever, the responsibility of the regional powers themselves, and little can be expected from the great powers except intervention if the game gets too rough. One of the most important consequences of this shift in the degree of international pressure upon the Middle Eastern region is to render domestic politics even more important than international politics in determining the fate of governments and the fate of nationalist movements.

Intervention and international military adventures have become even more difficult to accomplish than they were in the recent past. In the postwar period nobody won the struggle for Syria and nobody won the ideological cold war of which our two authors have written. It

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International Organization Prize Award

The Board of Editors of *International Organization* is pleased to announce that Mark William Zacher, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, will receive the 1966 Prize Award. His manuscript entitled "The Secretary-General and the United Nations' Function of Peaceful Settlement" will be published in the Autumn issue. Honorable mention was awarded to R. O. Matthews, a Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University, for his manuscript, "The Suez Canal Dispute: A Case Study in Peaceful Settlement," which will appear in the Winter 1967 issue.

For the further encouragement of creative scholarship by younger writers in this field the Board of Editors will offer a Prize Award for 1967 consisting of $500 and publication in *International Organization* for the best manuscript in international organizational affairs submitted by an author no older than 32 years. The theme for 1967 will focus on the role of multilateral institutions in nation building and political and economic development. Only those manuscripts which relate to this broad theme will be considered eligible for the competition.

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appears likely that the near future will give us results similar to those of the recent past. Of course, there have been some shifts in the policies of the regional powers, mostly surrounding the emergence of Syria into a more independent role in Southwest Asian affairs. Since the fall of Hafiz in 1966, Syria and Egypt have become more friendly. Iraq, of course, has shifted from its aggressive position to a more defensive one but still is unable to cope with its minority problem. Lebanon and Jordan increasingly have demonstrated their stability, though the case of Jordan has been more the consequence of Syrian hostility and past Egyptian support than of any domestic strength. Syria continues, therefore, to be almost isolated in Southwest Asia.

These shifts in the Arab alignments do not appear to be fundamental nor necessarily long-lived, and the most surprising things have occurred in the most surprisingly short spaces of time in the recent history of the Middle East. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that there will be important domestic, regional, or international political changes that will give rise to a set of circumstances that might encourage the development of a new ideological departure. The most ominous possibility looming on the horizon is that of an Israeli attack calculated to bring about within a short space of time a severe defeat of the Syrian army and resulting, perhaps, in deep embarrassment to the government of Egypt. However, even such a direct attempt to get the regional pattern of relationships off dead center would not result in any very important change. There might, of course, be an exchange of rocket attacks between Israel and Egypt, but it seems likely that great-power intervention would follow swiftly and there would be a return sooner or later to the present impasse in Israeli-Arab relations and in the political and ideological situation among the Arab states themselves.

Of course, things will not forever remain the way they are. The one thing of which we can be sure is that change will occur. But how and when it will occur are more difficult to ascertain. It is unreasonable to speculate about the future under these circumstances, but if one were to do so, one might suggest that the stalemate can be broken only if there is some shift in relationships among Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. Iraq, we have discovered in recent years, is neither stable enough nor Arab enough to play an important role in determining the existential changes that will bring in their wake a significant ideological transition. Iraq apparently will have to wait until better answers are supplied by the other Arab countries—answers that presumably will permit Iraq, with its very large Kurdish minority, to join with the other Arab countries in a new political arrangement. On the other hand, both

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Lebanon and Jordan have been able to accept their Arabism with greater self-confidence and equanimity since they each have enjoyed both a period of political stability and a continuing favorable recognition by Egypt of their limited legitimacy. One of the obvious problems with Ba'thi nationalism was that while it could, at least at a very general level, accommodate itself to Egyptian Arabism, it refused to take account of the peculiarities of Lebanon and Jordan. What is needed now is a redefinition of the Arab nationalism of Syria that will take account of Lebanon and Jordan as well as of the peculiar ideological and political circumstances of Egypt and Iraq.

What we learn from reading the two books under review here is not a lesson concerning the geopolitical significance of Syria. What we learn is rather that the ideological solutions and the political strategies that have been chosen in the recent past have been wholly unrealistic and that our interpretations have been unrealistic as well. It makes little sense to think of Iraq contending with Egypt or of the West basing its defense policy on Iraq or Jordan or Saudi Arabia. It makes little sense to think that a country like Syria could conquer its neighbors. The tragedy of Syria is not that it has lacked the power to conquer the surrounding territories or to impose its view of Arab nationalism upon its neighbors. The tragedy of Syria has been that Syria has given rise to ideologies that have far outrun the realities of Syrian and Arab circumstances. Syrian leaders have harbored glorious visions while still falling short of the simple capacity to govern their own country. Of course, Syria is not ungovernable, but it has not had a stable government since it attained independence, and it will not have a stable government until the appreciation of Arab nationalism and the relationship of Syria thereto has changed. We can only conclude, in agreement with the pre-1958 critics of the Arab nationalism of that time, that a new definition of Arabism and of its political and institutional possibilities is required and that Arab political leaders must devise more subtle political and military strategies to suit this new definition. Neither Nasser's charisma nor Aflaq's rhetoric has provided a shortcut.

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